PERCEPTIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

4<sup>TH</sup> SURVEY | MAY 2023







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4<sup>TH</sup> SURVEY

# PERCEPTIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY



MAY 2023

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# **Introduction: Regional Security Crisis**

Our fourth Foreign Policy and National Security survey, carried out jointly with Ipsos, confirms Chileans' concern about drug trafficking and irregular immigration, two transnational phenomena that exploit the porosity of Chile's extensive borders, and fuel the country's current security crisis.

Several of these problems, which today seem to have exploded simultaneously, had been addressed early by AthenaLab with concrete proposals in the area of border security, intelligence system reform, and promotion of interagency work to dismantle criminal economic activities.

The novelty of the 2023 edition of the survey lies in the decision to consult our neighbours Argentina, Bolivia and Peru on their opinion regarding their foreign policy objectives, their concerns, and how they perceive different nations. To this end, Ipsos, a company with international presence, relied on its established panels in these countries to ask them the same questions as in Chile. At first glance, we can perceive concern about the threat posed by drug trafficking, and the demand for governments to prioritise the fight against this crime. However, the similarities end there, as will later be seen in detail.

Despite sharing a common space in South America, we do not look at the world in the same way, nor do we assign equal importance to the threats and opportunities it presents.

We at AthenaLab believe that these comparisons can serve as a tool to explore possibilities for integration and identify the divergences that can normally be expected among societies.

Given the lack of regional instruments measuring different public opinions on specific foreign policy and national security matters, we trust that this first approximation will be a contribution and stimulate both new research on the matter and a greater understanding between countries.

Sincerely,

rebb

Juan Pablo Toro Executive Director AthenaLab

# Neighbourhood scenario

0.2

When asked about a list of foreign policy objectives, it is interesting to observe that Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru agree in considering the fight against drug trafficking the most important. Although it is a security objective, it certainly is a transnational phenomenon and therefore requires coordination between several States, where the diplomatic institutions play a key role.

Moreover, this perception occurs in a context where South America is experiencing a security crisis that is manifested with different intensities in every country, but where there are undeniable realities, such as a record cocaine production in the Andean zone and an expansion of organised crime gangs from Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela.

This coincidence could be, at least, a good starting point for a regional summit or encounter to improve security cooperation, increasing intelligence sharing and implementing more effective border surveillance. There is a notable difference regarding the objectives that occupy second place: in Chile it is the issue of migration regulation, whereas for our neighbours there is more interest in attracting technology companies.

Although the massive entry of foreigners into Chile occurs mainly along the land borders with Bolivia and Peru, the fact that the migration issue is not considered a higher priority in those countries may also explain the little collaboration that has been received from their governments; especially from President Luis Arce, who even made such collaboration conditional on the maritime issue.

Finally, despite all the presidential rhetoric and attempts to revive regional bodies, integration with Latin America does not rank high among foreign policy goals. There appears to be greater interest in addressing more tangible issues, that is, diplomacy with visible results for the people.

## FIGURE № 1 FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

In your opinion, how important for Chile is each of the following foreign policy objectives?

<b>GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT - CHILE</b>			
Very important Somewhat important Not at all importan	t Unsure		
COMBAT DRUG TRAFFICKING	89%		<mark>9% 1</mark> %1%
REGULATE MIGRATION	84%		12% <mark>2%</mark> 2%
PROTECT BORDERS	83%		13% <mark>2%</mark> 2%
COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE	76%		20% <mark>3%</mark> 1%
DEFEND MARITIME INTERESTS	72%	24	% <mark>2%</mark> 2%
ATTRACT TECH COMPANIES	68%	27%	<mark>3%</mark> 2%
PROMOTE FREE TRADE WITH OTHER NATIONS	65%	29%	<mark>3%</mark> - 3%
RESOLVE BORDER CONFLICTS	61%	30%	<mark>7%</mark> 3%
PROMOTE CHILEAN INVESTMENTS IN OTHER NATIONS	61%	32%	<mark>5%</mark> 3%
INTEGRATION WITH LATIN AMERICA	52%	37%	8% 3%
CONTRIBUTE TO PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS	52%	33%	12% - 3%
STRENGTHEN PRESENCE IN ANTARCTICA	51%	37%	8% 3%
PROJECT ITSELF TOWARDS ASIA-PACIFIC	50%	37%	<mark>7%</mark> - 6%
PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES	46%	32%	19% 4%

Sample: 1360, total sample of the general population of Chile. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

## FIGURE Nº 2 HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

In your opinion, how important for Chile is each of the following foreign policy objectives?



Sample: Total Chilean general population respondents measured every year. ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

# FIGURE № 3 FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

In your opinion, how important for Chile is each of the following foreign policy objectives?



Base: 82, total sample of the expert segment of Chile. When the results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to computer rounding or multiple responses.

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# FIGURE № 4 HISTORICAL COMPARISON: FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

In your opinion, how important for Chile is each of the following foreign policy objectives?





#### FIGURE Nº 5

### FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES: COMPARISON OF THE GENERAL POPULATION AND EXPERTS

In your opinion, how important for Chile is each of the following foreign policy objectives?



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## FIGURE № 6 FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF EACH COUNTRY SURVEYED

In your opinion, how important for your country is each of the following foreign policy objectives?



Sample: Total respondents (Chile: 1,360; Argentina: 400; Peru: 400; Bolivia: 280). ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security NEIGHBOURHOOD SCENARIO

# The regional view

Public perception in the Andean and Southern Cone countries reveals a subregional scenario acutely marked by transnational crime and the effects of the global rearrangement between China and the United States.

The clamour for greater security calls the current administrations into question. The problems highlighted by the respondents (stopping drug trafficking, protecting borders, and regulating migration) demand short-term inter-ministerial policies, which are difficult to execute, costly for the government, and loaded with political connotations that divide and polarise.

The survey determines common attention to the protection and strengthening of territorial sovereignty. Thus, it is striking that the foreign ministries' duties that are key in the execution of so-called state policies (such as promoting regional integration, fostering democracy, and resolving border conflicts) are among the objectives that the respondents gave the lowest priority in the poll.

Already cornered by populist and authoritarian projects, Latin America needs to find a healthy balance between personal liberties and national security. Is it possible to move in the right direction?

Even considering that the sample taken in Bolivia was smaller, one of the biggest surprises was that Bolivians identified with El Salvador, a state whose recent arduous police and prison emphasis on crime has raised international criticism.

In light of the tectonic clash between the United States and China, the survey exposes the imminent desire among those surveyed for their countries to join the technological and global race.

States are expected to attract innovation and development, which might explain the opinion shared by Chileans, Argentines, and Peruvians in choosing the United States and Canada, among others, as models of democratic values and a free market economy.

Beijing's centralised economy and autocratic government do not cease to attract another segment of the population. China not only captivates respondents as a model country but also appears as the first choice of "partner" in Peru and Bolivia, and second in Chile and Argentina, reflecting, in a way, the transversal interest of the countries surveyed in achieving an economic policy that leads to industrialisation.

Chinese appeal, insecurity, and other aspects linked to the areas of justice, order, and defence, make us wonder about the short-term impact that security and diplomacy will have on governance, its political execution networks, and the different lines of work that decision makers should lead. The results of this survey call for avoiding divisions among state powers and reversing trends that have bureaucratised and undermined democratic institutions in the region.



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# **Model countries**

This is an open-ended question where respondents must mention the first country that comes to their minds as a model for theirs, without a list of options. Although a great variety of choices is observed, the United States takes first place in Argentina, Chile and Peru, and second place in Bolivia. It is somewhat striking that this country takes first place in preferences, despite all the ground that China has gained in the region, and the presence of left-wing governments that have long antagonised Washington.

#### FIGURE № 7 MODEL COUNTRIES FOR CHILE

Which country or countries could serve as a model for Chile?

**GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT - CHILE** 



### FIGURE № 8 MODEL COUNTRIES FOR CHILE

Which country or countries could serve as a model for Chile?

SEGMENT EXPERTS - CHILE



Sample: 1360, total sample of the general population of Chile. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. Open-ended and multiple response.

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Sample: 82, total sample of the experts of Chile. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. Open-ended and multiple response.

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# FIGURE № 9 MODEL COUNTRY FOR EACH COUNTRY SURVEYED

Which country or countries could serve as a model for your country (Argentina, Peru, Bolivia)?



**GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT IN EACH COUNTRY** 

Sample: Total respondents (Chile: 1,360; Argentina: 400; Peru: 400; Bolivia: 280). When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. **©IPSOS** | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

Perhaps what is most curious – and to a certain extent troubling – is the appearance of El Salvador as a model, which can only be related to the security crisis that the region is experiencing. High-profile president Nayib Bukele has become known for launching a tough campaign against the gangs that plague his country, which includes direct intervention in neighbourhoods that were previously controlled by these groups and the mass incarceration of their members.

These actions have not only earned him great popularity in his country (homicides fell 60% in 2021), but it also seems that his example is beginning to arouse international interest, despite criticism from those who fear permanent restrictions on democratic freedoms and the loss of independence between branches of government.

# The view from Chile

The fourth annual AthenaLab-Ipsos survey is conclusive regarding the perceptions of threats to national security and the priorities that foreign policy should have on this matter. Drug trafficking and organised crime appear as two crucial, interrelated and intrinsically transnational phenomena, meaning they call for renewed interest in the protection of our borders. There is a strikingly high level of consistency between the answers of those surveyed from the four countries regarding foreign policy priorities and the perception of threats. This shows that there are incentives to move with Peru, Argentina and Bolivia towards cooperative procedures and confront cross-border crime.

In times of reconfiguration of power alliances and the transition towards a multipolar order, the United States is seen as a model country both in Chile and by our neighbours. This perception is shared by Chilean citizens and experts, who also overwhelmingly consider it our main partner.

At the regional level, while our neighbours consider Brazil the first or second most relevant country in their bilateral relations, for Chile it only ranks sixth. The fact that we are the only country that does not share borders with Brazil surely influences this perception, but opens a space for Chile to tend to and deepen its relationship with the South American giant. The recent entry into force of the free trade agreement is an ideal instrument to consolidate different aspects of the bilateral relationship.

Political relations do matter. This is demonstrated by the great affinity that our population perceives with New Zealand. Our trade is limited and foreign investment is very low compared to other countries mentioned, but our joint participation in initiatives related to freedom, democracy and human rights demonstrates the relevance of generating foreign policy ties that transcend the merely economic and commercial realms.

Finally, in times of constitutional debates, it is worth remembering that an institutional design capable of sustaining efficient public policies is indeed important. This is why our three neighbours agree that Chile's greatest strength is the economy and the stability that derives from it, and its greatest weakness, the current political system. Suggestive looks that we get from the outside.



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the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and Master in Law and Economics, Ortega y Gasset Institute - Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain.

# Partners, but not so much

When comparing the data from the four countries, it is interesting to note very different options as to which other nations are their main partners. For Argentina, the first option is Brazil; for Bolivia and Peru, China; and for Chile, the United States.

Peru and Bolivia give a decent second place to Brazil, whereas Argentina and Chile coincide in giving it to China. The economic weight gained by the Asian giant has undoubtedly permeated the region.

It should also be noted that, despite their proximity, the four countries do not perceive themselves as the closest partners, which may be due to several causes, ranging from historical disputes over limits to the fact that they do not trade much with each other, since in some cases their economies produce similar goods.

It is also worth highlighting the partner status that Chile attributes to various Indo-Pacific countries, which is the preferred destination for its exports and a logical geographic area for the projection of the country. European countries also perform well, even better than the Latin American countries evaluated. All this reinforces a certain Chilean singularity with respect to the American region.

#### FIGURE Nº 10

#### POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO BOLIVIA

For each of the following countries, what is in your opinion the position that they currently hold or maintain regarding Bolivia: partner, neutral, or competitor?



Sample: 280, total sample of the general population of Bolivia. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers.

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#### FIGURE Nº 11

PARTNER

#### POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO ARGENTINA

For each of the following countries, what is in your opinion the position that they currently hold or maintain regarding Argentina: partner, neutral, or competitor?

#### **GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT - ARGENTINA**



Sample: 400, total sample of the general population of Argentina. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

# FIGURE № 12 POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO PERU

For each of the following countries, what is in your opinion the position that they currently hold or maintain regarding Peru: partner, neutral, or competitor?

#### **GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT - PERU**



Sample: 400, total sample of the general population of Peru. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers.

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## FIGURE № 13 POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO CHILE

For each of the following countries, what is in your opinion the position that they currently hold or maintain regarding Chile: partner, neutral, or competitor?

#### **GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT - CHILE**

PARTNER

NEUTRAL COMPETITOR UNSURE USA 20% 65% 7% CHINA 21% 8% 61% JAPAN 48% 31% 8% 13% SPAIN 46% 38% 7% 9% UNITED KINGDOM 43% 34% 15% BRAZIL 41% 34% 14% 11% 6% 15% AUSTRALIA 40% 30% FRANCE 38% 6% 14% 42% NEW ZEALAND 41% 15% 37% SOUTH KOREA 35% 41% 15% 9% ARGENTINA 30% 32% 10% MEXICO 30% 46% 14% COLOMBIA 26% 45% 17% PERU 20% 12% BOLIVIA 14% 18% 359 22% RUSSIA 17% 49% 12% VENEZUELA 15% 42% 22%

Sample: 1360, total sample of the general population of Chile. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on

FIGURE Nº 14

#### HISTORICAL COMPARISON: POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO CHILE

For each of the countries shown, what is in your opinion the position that they currently hold or maintain with Chile?



Sample: Total Chilean general population respondents measured every year. ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

Foreign Policy and National Security

## FIGURE № 15 POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO CHILE

For each of the following countries, what is in your opinion the position that they currently hold or maintain regarding Chile: partner, neutral, or competitor?



Sample: 82, total sample of the experts of Chile. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. @IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on

Foreign Policy and National Security

#### FIGURE Nº 16

### HISTORICAL COMPARISON: POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO CHILE

For each of the countries shown, what is in your opinion the position that they currently hold or maintain with Chile?





PARTNERS, BUT NOT SO MUCH

#### FIGURE № 17 POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO CHILE: COMPARISON OF THE GENERAL POPULATION AND EXPERTS

For each of the countries shown in this table: What position do you think they currently hold or For each of the following countries, what is in your opinion the position that they currently hold or maintain regarding Chile: partner, neutral, or competitor?

#### % PARTNER

EXPERTS (82)



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#### FIGURE Nº 18

#### POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO EACH COUNTRY SURVEYED

For each of the following countries, what is in your opinion the position that they currently hold or maintain regarding (Chile, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia): partner, neutral, or competitor?

#### **GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT OF EACH COUNTRY**

% PARTNER





Sample: Total respondents (Chile: 1,360; Argentina: 400; Peru: 400; Bolivia: 280). ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

#### FIGURE № 19 CHILE'S ROLE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS: COMPARISON OF THE GENERAL POPULATION AND EXPERTS

In your opinion, what do you consider best for Chile: to maintain a proactive role on global issues, or stay away from them?



## FIGURE № 20 HISTORICAL COMPARISON: CHILE'S ROLE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS

In your opinion, what do you consider best for Chile: to maintain a proactive role on global issues, or stay away from them?



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#### FIGURE Nº 21

## THE CHILEAN ECONOMY AND ITS GLOBAL INSERTION

Do you believe Chile has directly benefited from the free trade agreements it has signed with other countries?



## FIGURE № 22 HISTORICAL COMPARISON: THE CHILEAN ECONOMY AND ITS GLOBAL INSERTION

Do you believe Chile has directly benefited from the free trade agreements it has signed with other countries?



 $\ensuremath{\mathbb{O}}$  IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

## FIGURE № 23 REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: COMPARISON OF THE GENERAL POPULATION AND EXPERTS

Do you think that foreign investment in strategic sectors or those with a high impact on Chile's security should be regulated?



## FIGURE № 24 HISTORICAL COMPARISON: FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATION

Do you think that foreign investment in strategic sectors or those with a high impact on Chile's security should be regulated?



There are no significant differences, at a 95% confidence level.

# Argentina: priorities, partners and an uncertain future in AthenaLab-IPSOS's fourth Foreign and Security Policy Survey

Numbers are good indicators when considering foreign and defence policy actions. In order to obtain them, the fourth Foreign and Security Policy Survey starts from a clear premise: to determine what the existing perceptions are of defence and security in Chile's immediate neighbourhood, investigating how close or distant they are and what challenges may appear in the future.

Carried out by AthenaLab along with Ipsos, this survey presents an overview of the dynamics facing Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru, while allowing a better understanding of how we perceive ourselves and our regional and global environment. The survey, taken as a whole, seems to show that the "lovely neighbourhood" referred to when political leadership talks about the region, might not be so "lovely" — to paraphrase a beloved character from our shared Latin American childhood.

The views of Argentina, Peru and Bolivia are similar to those of Chile in terms of foreign policy priorities, such as fighting drug trafficking, defending maritime interests, taking on climate change and protecting borders. Argentina, Bolivia and Peru share a clear mission to be part of the technological transformation, to be a little more global in our economic structures, and to be agents of change in the 21st century.

However, the survey shows a tension between a nationalist agenda, which establishes "traditional" priorities, and a more global or liberal one, where proposals for regional integration, the promotion of democracy and the contribution to peace missions – once the axes of foreign policy and regional defence – are now off the population's radar.

The outlook on the projection towards Asia Pacific is interesting, since it appears as a low priority in Argentina, which explains why its sights are set almost exclusively on China as a business opportunity, but those sights become blurrier towards countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, South Korea or even Japan, unlike those of Chile or Peru.

Another revealing fact is the low perception of relevance in the projection towards Antarctica, which is part of a broad international discussion that includes China and the US. It is true that the defence, economic and political elites of the region are aware of the future dangers that lurk in that space, but such is not the case with Argentina's general population, which is almost exclusively concerned with its climatic-environmental implications.

In this age of "autocracies versus democracies", the question about "model countries" is very timely. While there is no breakdown as to why they are models, rich and liberal countries prevail. Certainly, a gloomy question remains for the future, since China appears well positioned in Chile and Peru, perhaps as a consequence of its weight in both countries' economic structure. Meanwhile, it is viewed lower by Argentina and Bolivia, as countries of the Atlantic arc; although both want a broad political alliance with China, they are quite a boisterous bunch. Chile consolidates a certain capacity for soft power in the region, since it appears among the



Juan Battaleme Academic Director Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales (CARI). preferences of Argentina, Bolivia and Peru, a significant fact if we consider that the more nationalist factions have a certain resentment towards it. Argentina appears as a model only for Peru, perhaps the last Latin American country with which its political bond is practically indestructible – by history, but not by the present.

Finally, the study presents a section on each country's considerations in relation to its neighbourhood and the world. For Argentina, the countries considered partners are Brazil and China (both above 50%); while the US and Russia are practically tied at 33%. The ever-present "Latin Americanism" puts countries like Venezuela, Bolivia and Peru above 40%. The position held by Chile is striking, which is seen as a "partner" only by 23% of those surveyed, on par with Japan and Mexico. On the other hand, despite the fact that the neutral category is very abundant in the case of these countries, Chile is seen as a strategic competitor, even above the United Kingdom, a country that does not win the preferences of the Argentine public: only 7% consider it a partner. Perhaps there is some frustration with the success achieved by its trans-Andean neighbour. A topic to investigate in the future.

On the other hand, 33% of the Chilean population perceives Argentina as a partner, and 51% as a competitor. This is the case even though in terms of international security, they are safer today and have better Armed Forces, and because they have seen the relative decline of Argentina, therefore, they have little to fear from this side of the Andes. Perhaps bad economic and political ideas have an influence, but the resilience of Chilean society has managed to stop projects that might be bad for all the progress achieved over the years.

These bad ideas sound the alarms when proposing a foreign and defence policy, since these actions are based on the ability to generate partnerships, on how this ability is perceived in the international competition scenario, and how it impacts our countries. Even though China is not seen as a "model" country, its position as a "partner" is even higher than that of the US, which is generating a choir of coordinated opinions regarding how Argentina's international actions should be outlined. The survey reveals that the neighbourhood, despite currently being stable and peaceful, presents disturbing possibilities for the future, which should be expanded by new surveys that broaden toward a more complete discernment of the idea of a model country, on the one hand, and the idea of partners and competitors on the other.

# The view from Bolivia

One of the most interesting and striking conclusions from the Ipsos survey, prepared for AthenaLab, is the disparity among the Bolivian people regarding which countries are perceived as models or partners. Unlike the other countries in which the survey was carried out – especially Chile, where the model countries coincide almost completely with the partners – in Bolivia there is no coherence between the two categories. There are countries like the United States, or Chile itself, which the public considers models but not partners; on the contrary, they are among those considered rivals or neutral. Therefore, we might assume that the Bolivian population is not satisfied with respect to the partnerships that their government maintains.

Conversely, there are countries which for Bolivians are very low on the list of model countries, such as China (14th) or Venezuela (which is not even on that list), but among the highest on the list of partners (1st and 4th, respectively).

Another interesting fact is that the United States, despite its decline in credibility and economic and political power in the world, still remains the main model country in the perception of the majority of respondents from the four countries surveyed. China, for its part, despite its rise as an economic power and the region's main trading partner, is still below not only the United States but also Canada, both at the top of the list of model countries. Consequently, this allows us to conclude that, although the Asian giant is the main supplier of many products to our countries and has become one of the most important partners to our governments, it has not yet managed to earn the trust and admiration of the people.

Finally, another interesting conclusion is that El Salvador is considered a model country at varying degrees by the four countries surveyed, thanks to President Nayib Bukele's effective yet controversial security measures. This would have been unimaginable just a few years ago, when El Salvador was known to be the main incubator for maras and gangs in Central America. And this novelty is not only the result of the effectiveness of Bukele's policies, but also of his ability to use social networks and the media in his favor.



Andrés Guzmán Escobari

Bolivian expert in international affairs and diplomat. Coordinator of the Master's Degree in International Relations at Universidad Mayor de San Andrés.

## Strengths and weaknesses

Since everybody processes information differently, we are not always perceived exactly as we would like. Therefore, we decided to ask an open-ended question about the strengths and weaknesses that our neighbours observe regarding Chile. Chile's economic stability ranks first for Argentina, Bolivia and Peru, even despite the fact that a slowdown and high inflation (by normal standards) are projected for this year. But a decades-long trajectory of expansion and orderly public finances still

## FIGURE № 25 PERCEPTION OF CHILE'S STRENGTHS

OTHERS

2%

Please mention one strength that you perceive regarding Chile.



GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT OF EACH COUNTRY

Sample: Total respondents (Argentina: 400; Peru: 400; Bolivia: 280). ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security seem have an impact on this perception, in addition to a regional outlook that – in comparison – is not exactly auspicious.

Then come democratic stability and the Armed Forces, though not in the same order, according to respondents from Argentina and Bolivia. Along with economic performance, this demonstrates a certain coherence in the development of the different instruments of the State.

The surprises, in turn, are the perceived weaknesses, which relate to politics — both in short-term affairs (related to the current administration) and the long-term structure of the system itself. In this sense, the so-called "social uprising" of October 2019, and all the successive elections, including the active constitutional process, account for the high volatility that Chile has experienced in recent years. This is undoubtedly perceived, and represents a stark contrast with the previous 16year period where two presidents governed in alternating terms.

Chile's treatment of external affairs also experienced turbulence during the first year under President Gabriel Boric, as a result of the introduction of new issues on the agenda (feminist and "turquoise" foreign policy), of positions that went against the commercial tradition of the last

## FIGURE № 26 PERCEPTION OF CHILE'S WEAKNESSES

Please mention one weakness that you perceive regarding Chile.



GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT OF EACH COUNTRY

Base: Total entrevistados/as; Argentina: 400, Perú: 400, Bolivia: 280  $\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}IPSOS}$  | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

four decades (the initial refusal to the Trans-Pacific Agreement), and the mistakes made by some authorities.

In this regard, it is worth remembering President Boric's criticism of the handling of the protests in Peru and the audio leak from the Foreign Ministry regarding Argentina. Undoubtedly, these slips cause an impact and contrast, for example, with the good management of the legal strategy in the case of the Silala River with Bolivia. Therefore, the new authorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by Alberto van Klaveren, have a great opportunity to correct the course of foreign policy and once again conduct it with the professionalism that it deserves.

# FIGURE Nº 27 PERCEPTION OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CHILE

Please mention one strength and one weakness that you perceive regarding Chile..



Sample: 82, total sample of the experts of Chile.  $\textcircled{\sc opt}{\sc opt}$  | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

# The view from Perú

The AthenaLab Survey confirms a series of trends that have been observed in Peru in recent years. First, the public perception that drug trafficking and organised crime have become the main domestic and foreign security issue in Peru, followed by migration problems, border protection and the need to attract technology companies. On the other hand, the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights is revealed to be a minor concern.

A first observation of these results is that, in order for each country to achieve more effective results when facing their main foreign policy priorities – drug trafficking and organised crime networks, waves of illegal migration (especially in the aftermath of Venezuela's humanitarian crisis) and attracting technology companies – it is widely known that an international cooperation approach is required. Such an approach would include the design of joint regional policies, in addition to measures developed by national governments. This has been demonstrated clearly by the recent Venezuelan migration crisis on the Chilean-Peruvian border (April- May 2023), which required a concerted resolution between the three countries involved. Other issues, such as climate change, border protection, and free trade, certainly also require a transnational approach and cooperation in order to be effectively addressed and not become mere declarations of intent.

The fact that the promotion of democracy and human rights is seen as a less urgent objective in Peru does not necessarily reflect a rejection of the values they represent, but rather a frustration with the inability of institutional representatives to solve daily problems, and Peruvians' deep mistrust towards the political class. This is evidenced by the fact that most of the country's presidents have been involved in corruption cases that have landed them in prison, in addition to high disapproval ratings of the members of the Legislative and Judicial branches. Likewise, confidence in democracy and in human rights advocacy has been undermined by the manipulation of such concepts by activists and political movements that have tried to distort their purposes to put them at the service of "refoundational" projects. Such was the case of the sectors that supported the frustrated self-coup of former president Pedro Castillo, despite having been clearly unconstitutional. In addition, given the increase in crime, models such as the one established by Nayib Bukele in El Salvador are beginning to be seen as a solution. Given this state of precariousness and institutions' lack of credibility, in order to achieve a greater appreciation of democracy and human rights and, at the same time, to counteract right-wing populism and left-wing refoundational radicalism, it is necessary to show the effectiveness of a solid and respected constitutional system that is capable of dealing with issues that fundamentally affect people and society in their daily lives and that guarantees them reasonable conditions of security, peace and well-being.

Regarding the model countries for Peru, according to the survey, the United States continues to be the most important, followed by Canada. This is not only due to the large number of Peruvians who reside in and send remittances from the US, but also due to the idealisation in the largest urban areas (Lima and the cities of the north coast) of economic liberalisation. Third place is occupied by China, due to its rapid economic development in recent decades, its importance as a market for Peruvian



Ricardo Cubas Ramacciotti Peruvian historian. Associate Professor of Latin American History at the Institute of History of the Universidad de Los Andes, Chile. exports, and its large investments in the country. However, its cultural distance and communist political system may be two elements that prevent it from climbing to the top positions. The case of El Salvador is striking, and responds to the attraction exerted by the measures of the Nayib Bukele administration to combat organised crime in that country; an issue that, as mentioned before, has acquired great importance among citizen concerns. Chile arouses less admiration by Peru than in past decades, probably due to the events that have developed since October 2019, when its political system, which seemed stable, came under heavy fire with the so-called "social uprising" and later, during the failed first phase of the constitutional process. Two of the aspects that Peruvians highlighted about Chile were its solidity and respect for its institutions, and its economic performance, becoming at times an explicit model to follow. This has been weakening since Chile lost its perception as the "oasis" of Latin America in trying to adopt refoundational models.

Regarding which countries are seen by Peru as its main partners, first place is occupied by China. This reflects China's gradual presence as an investor in strategic areas, such as mining, energy and communications. This clearly demonstrates the lack of awareness among the Peruvian public about the dangers that an increasingly close dependence on the Eastern giant (and its global agenda) might pose to its national sovereignty. In second place is Brazil, which, despite the regional corruption system revealed by the Lava Jato case (which involved several Peruvian presidents who were prosecuted for corruption), continues to be perceived as an important economic and trade partner, and as an axis of shared, coordinated policies in South America. One point to take into account is the notable shift in consideration of the United States as a partner to third or fourth place by most of the countries surveyed. This is a clear reflection of the lesser geopolitical and economic interest in this country by the region, except by Chile.

Notable from Peru's point of view is how it is perceived by Chile as a relevant partner, which may reflect its growing importance as a destination for Chilean investments despite Chile's rising inflation and recession. In contrast, Peru's perception of Chile as a partner is lower compared to other countries in the region, such as Colombia, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.

Also noteworthy regarding Peru's perception of other South American countries (as partners, as neutral or as competitors), is the apparent weight of historical-cultural aspects alongside those of a pragmatic-economic nature. On the one hand, the majority of the Peruvian population perceives Argentina as a partner or neutral, and only a small fraction as a competitor. This may be due in large part to a traditional diplomatic and historical closeness between the two countries. On the other hand, with respect to Chile, although objectively there are vital economic areas in which both countries compete (such as copper mining), there are also few countries with which Peru has established so many free trade and international cooperation agreements, in addition to being part of the Pacific Alliance and the frequent meeting of binational cabinets. Peruvians could thus be expected to perceive Chile as more of a partner than a competitor. However, it seems that historical-cultural perceptions dating back to the War of the Pacific and its consequences could be at play. Chile, on the other hand, considers Peru much more a partner than a competitor.

Another important observation is that all countries perceive Peru not as a competitor but, above all, as a partner or neutral. This may be due to the fact that Peru is not considered a regional geopolitical danger, and to its policies of economic openness.

From Peru's perspective (similarly to that of other countries) it is perceived that one of Chile's greatest strengths is its stability and its economy, as well as its people. From the Peruvian point of view, this could be understood as an admiration for Chilean discipline and Chileans' traditional respect for their own institutions. This may be an apparent contradiction to the Peruvian perception that one of Chile's current weaknesses is its fragile political system, but the latter could have more to do with the current administration of President Gabriel Boric and the recently frustrated constitutional project, which sought to radically change the foundations of the country's institutional order.

Finally, with respect to the last question, the concern over drug trafficking and international organised crime is ubiquitous, followed by terrorist attacks. This might reflect that the trauma of Sendero Luminoso, still very raw to a significant sector of the population, was relived when part of public opinion compared some of the cadres that were part of the government of Pedro Castillo with Sendero Luminoso. In third and fourth place are natural disasters and pandemics. This reflects the especially harsh effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (Peru was one of the countries with the highest proportion of deaths per capita in the world) and by recent natural disasters in various areas of the country. These phenomena showed the very serious deficiencies of the public health system and also the lack of adequate infrastructure to deal with them. In other words, the prosperity generated by the macroeconomic order and the commercial aperture of the last few decades did not go hand in hand with a process of strengthening institutions and social protection, but, instead, was accompanied by a very high rate of labour informality (approximately 70% of the economically active population) and great deficiencies in the public education system. This currently produces great uncertainty and insecurity in the majority of the population when these natural phenomena occur, since they find themselves objectively vulnerable to them.

# Perception of threats to national security in neighbouring countries

In this area, what is first observed is that Argentineans, Bolivians, Peruvians and Chileans coincide in recognizing drug trafficking and organised crime as the main threats to the security of their States, which demonstrates the transnational nature of these issues and their impact on the sub-region. In Chile, 86% of the general population and 90% of experts perceive them as the main threats; while that figure is 83% in Argentina, 82% in Peru, and 87% in Bolivia. In short, more than eight out of every 10 people in our neighbouring countries consider drug trafficking and organised crime the main threats to the State.

Regarding the second most relevant threats, each country observes different phenomena derived from their own apprehensions and specific internal situations. In Peru, second place is occupied by terrorism, highly influenced by the events in the Valley of the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro rivers (VRAEM); in Argentina, the global economic crisis, which has had intense effects internally; and in Bolivia, the impact of pandemics, probably triggered by the profound effects of COVID-19 in that country. Finally, in Chile, the second most relevant threat is the porosity of its borders, which is directly related to how easily drug trafficking and organised crime operate through them.

Also, this border porosity is the element with the greatest statistical increase in Chile in the last three years. In 2020, 38% of experts (and 45% of the general population) perceived it as relevant; increasing to 43% and 59% in 2021; 66% and 70% in 2022, and 82% and 72% in 2023. In addition, cyber-attacks are considered a crucial threat to Chilean national security by 71% of experts and 61% of the general population.

Finally, in a more traditional view of threats, it should be noted that in Chile, the aggression of a rival State is highly perceived as a threat both by experts and by the general population. Indeed, 62% of the experts consider it "crucial", rising to 88% if we include those who perceive it as either "crucial" or "important". Among the general population, 58% perceive it as "crucial", and 85% as "crucial" or "important".

## FIGURE Nº 28 PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO CHILEAN NATIONAL SECURITY

For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.

#### **GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT - CHILE**

- CRUCIAL OR DEFINING THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY SIGNIFICANT, BUT NOT A CRUCIAL THREAT
- DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A THREAT

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ORGANISED CRIME	86%		9%	2% 3%
POROUS BORDERS	72%	19%		2 % 3 %
GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS	68%	25%		<b>3%</b> 4%
TERRORIST ATTACK	66%	23%	8%	4%
PANDEMICS	64%	27%	6	% 3%
CYBER ATTACK	61%	28%	8%	<mark>3%</mark>
LOSS OF ACCESS TO ENERGY SOURCES	59%	31%	6%	5%
CLIMATE CHANGE	59%	33%	6	<mark>3%</mark> 3%
NATURAL DISASTERS	58%	33%	6 <sup>6</sup>	<mark>% 3%</mark>
ATTACK FROM A RIVAL STATE	58%	27%	7% 8	%
DISMISSAL OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES	50%	34%	9%	7%
REGIONAL INSTABILITY	48%	38%	7%	7%
SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS	47%	35%	12%	6%
US-CHINA CONFLICT	42%	46%	8%	5%
AGING POPULATION	33%	49%	15%	3%

Sample: 1360, total sample of the general population of Chile. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

#### FIGURE № 29 HISTORICAL COMPARISON: PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO CHILEAN NATIONAL SECURITY

For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.



Sample: Total Chilean general population respondents measured every year.  $\textcircled{\sc opt}$  Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

## FIGURE № 30 PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO CHILEAN NATIONAL SECURITY

For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.

#### **EXPERTS SEGMENT - CHILE**



Sample: 82, total sample of the experts of Chile. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. **©IPSOS** | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

#### FIGURE № 31 HISTORICAL COMPARISON: PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO CHILEAN NATIONAL SECURITY

For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.



Sample: Total of Chilean expert respondents measured every year.  $\textcircled{\sc opt}{\sc opt}$  | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security
### FIGURE Nº 32

### PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO CHILEAN NATIONAL SECURITY

For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.



 $\textcircled{\sc constraint}{\sc constraint}$  Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

### FIGURE Nº 33 PERCEPTION OF THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF EACH COUNTRY

For each of the topics mentioned, select whether you consider it a crucial or defining threat to national security, a significant but not crucial threat, or that it does not constitute a threat.

BOLIVIA

### **GENERAL POPULATION OF EACH COUNTRY**

% CRUCIAL OR DEFINING THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY





PERU







at a 95% confidence level



Significant value variation (up or down) between countries,

Drug trafficking and organised crime

Porous borders economic crisis

Terrorist attack

Cyber attack Pandemics

42

42

US-China

conflict

Climate Loss of access change to energy sources



disasters





41

treaties

Separatist movements

47

49

Aging population

27 20

t

33

Sample: Total respondents (Chile: 1,360; Argentina: 400; Peru: 400; Bolivia: 280).

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### FIGURE № 34 NATIONAL INTERESTS

For each national interest listed, select whether you consider it vital or essential, important, or not of national interest.



Sample: 1360, total sample of the general population of Chile. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

## FIGURE № 35 HISTORICAL COMPARISON: PERCEPTION OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

For each national interest listed, select whether you consider it vital or essential, important, or not of national interest.



Sample: Total Chilean general population respondents measured every year.  $\square$  **PSOS** | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

### FIGURE № 36 NATIONAL INTERESTS

For each national interest listed, select whether you consider it vital or essential, important, or not of national interest.



Sample: 82, total sample of the experts of Chile. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. **©IPSOS** | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

## FIGURE № 37 HISTORICAL COMPARISON: PERCEPTION OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

For each national interest listed, select whether you consider it vital or essential, important, or not of national interest.



Sample: Total of Chilean expert respondents measured every year. ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

#### FIGURE Nº 38

### NATIONAL INTERESTS: COMPARISON OF THE GENERAL POPULATION AND EXPERTS

For each national interest listed, select whether you consider it vital or essential, important, or not of national interest.



 $\mathbb{G}\textbf{IPSOS}$  | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

## Tasks of the Armed Forces in Chile

There is disagreement regarding the tasks of the Armed Forces. Among experts, 98% perceive that defence of sovereignty is "fundamental", followed by the protection of national interests (67%), the presence in remote places and support in case of natural disasters (62% each). Meanwhile, among the general population, 78% chose border surveillance and protection as fundamental, followed by the fight against drug trafficking and the defence of sovereignty (72% each).

This shows that experts prioritise traditional and longer-term missions of the Armed Forces, while the general population consider the complementary tasks more important for their immediate support in the country's current security crisis. Indeed, among the general population, the variable with the highest growth was the opinion that the Armed Forces support the function of the police, from 44% in 2020 to 65% in 2023. This is consistent with the general population's majority-backed demand to broaden the spectrum of missions carried out by the Armed Forces, given the evolution of the current security crisis. Such demands can affect the main missions of the military, as well as compromise its budget, which remains constant in a context of greater tasks.

Along with the above, it should be noted that, when both experts and the general population are taken into consideration, the function of defence of sovereignty continues to have the highest relevance and value.

Finally, it is perceived that, for the majority of the population, the security crisis escaped the hands of the State, or at least the institutions that traditionally and constitutionally have the duty to impose the Rule of Law. But rather than encouraging the authorities to use the military force in tasks of internal order, this should serve as a call to reinforce the institutions responsible for these functions, namely Police and Security forces, in addition to the essential mission of prosecutors and courts.

### FIGURE № 39 ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS TO THE ARMED FORCES OF CHILE

For each of the tasks listed, select whether you consider it a fundamental task for the Armed Forces, complementary, or beyond their scope.

GENERAL POPULATION SEGMENT - CHILE				
FUNDAMENTAL	BEYOND THEIR SCOPE			
COMPLEMENTARY	UNSURE			
BORDER SURVEILLANCE AND PROTECTION	700/		15% 5	% 3%
	78%			
COMBAT AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING	72%	19%	5 <mark>7%</mark>	2%
DEFENCE OF SOVEREIGNTY	72%	21%	5 <mark>3</mark>	<mark>%</mark> 3%
ASSISTANCE IN CASE OF NATURAL DISASTERS	70%	23%	4	<mark>%</mark> 3%
PROTECTION OF NATIONAL INTERESTS, WHEREVER THEY ARE	67%	25%	<mark>5%</mark>	6 3%
SUPPORT FOR POLICE IN CASE OF A SERIOUS DISTURBANCE TO PUBLIC ORDER	65%	26%	5%	4%
PRESENCE IN REMOTE PLACES	61%	28%	7%	3%
ENSURING THE TRANSPORT OF ENERGY SUPPLY	52%	34%	11%	3%
PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE	51%	39%	8%	3%
CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL UNITY	50%	33%	13%	4%
CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT	48%	32%	16%	3%
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	40%	47%	10%	3%

Sample: 1360, total sample of the general population of Chile. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers.. ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

## FIGURE № 40 HISTORICAL COMPARISON: ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS TO THE ARMED FORCES OF CHILE

For each of the tasks listed, select whether you consider it a fundamental task for the Armed Forces, complementary, or beyond their scope.



Sample: Total Chilean general population respondents measured every year. OIPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

### FIGURE № 41 ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS TO THE ARMED FORCES OF CHILE

For each of the tasks listed, select whether you consider it a fundamental task for the Armed Forces, complementary, or beyond their scope.



Sample: 82, total sample of the experts of Chile. When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

## FIGURE № 42 HISTORICAL COMPARISON: ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS TO THE ARMED FORCES OF CHILE

For each of the tasks listed, select whether you consider it a fundamental task for the Armed Forces, complementary, or beyond their scope.



Sample: Total of Chilean expert respondents measured every year. [] [PSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

### FIGURE № 43 ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS TO THE ARMED FORCES OF CHILE: COMPARISON OF THE GENERAL POPULATION AND EXPERTS

For each of the tasks listed, select whether you consider it a fundamental task for the Armed Forces, complementary, or beyond their scope.



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### The impact of the war between Russia and Ukraine

In this section, it is possible to extract two main experiences. First, the majority (64%) of the general population and 50% of experts believe that the Chilean Armed Forces should have greater capabilities in an international scenario of increasing competition and confrontation. Meanwhile, 28% of the general population and 49% of experts believe they should maintain their current capabilities. These figures show that most Chileans do not favour reducing the capabilities of the Armed Forces, given the complex current scenario in terms of international, regional and national security. And second, regarding the question about the type of support to provide in this conflict, the majority of experts (62%) prefer a diplomatic contribution, while 21% are inclined to support Ukraine with aid in food and medicine, and 7% would opt for the delivery of non-lethal military equipment. Among the general population, 43% favour food and medical aid, and 35% highlight diplomatic support. In short, there is agreement on not getting directly involved (at least for now) in the delivery of lethal military equipment, while also on the idea that Chile should not be neutral and should get involved by providing both diplomatic support and humanitarian aid (food and medicine).



When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

### FIGURE Nº 45

# SUPPORT FROM CHILE TO UKRAINE: COMPARISON OF THE GENERAL POPULATION AND EXPERTS

The Chilean government has condemned Russia's military aggression against Ukraine. What kind of support should it give Ukraine?



When the results do not add up to 100, it may be rounded or due to multiple answers. ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

## The view from Ukraine

The Ukrainian people continue to fight against the Russian aggressor, defending not only our state, but also democratic values and liberties and the right of nations to freely choose their own future. Ukraine's victory will be a triumph for all of Europe, which will be much safer when Russia's military machine is dismantled and the Kremlin's abilities to launch invasions against other countries disappear. No appeasement strategy or fait accompli should be pursued for the occupation and attempted annexation.

Russia is preparing for a long-term war, constantly resupplying its occupying forces. Ukraine, with the support of our partners, will fight as long as it takes to win. Ukraine's victory would mean restoring our sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders; this approach is shared by our partners. 92% of Ukrainians would not agree to cede territories in exchange for peace. The ceasefire by itself cannot be a goal: we will fight for the withdrawal of Russian troops.

Russia's current goals are to occupy the entire territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, secure the land corridor to Crimea, and complete the occupation of southern Ukraine while maintaining control over the already occupied areas. Heavy bombing and fighting continue in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. The situation in Donbas remains the most problematic: Russian troops are destroying entire cities. Ukraine's Black Sea and Azov Sea coasts remain blocked. Russia continues to launch missiles and airstrikes against civilian infrastructure throughout Ukraine.

The Chilean Government's condemnation of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine is an important message of support in favour of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. We are very grateful for Chile's firm and constant position. At the same time, the war in Ukraine continues to claim dozens of lives every day and requires concrete actions to help the Ukrainian people and restore peace.

Due to the constant attacks, we need humanitarian aid to support the population affected by the armed conflict. This could include food, medicine, and other essential supplies. President Gabriel Boric also pledged his help in demining Ukraine, which has become the country with the highest number of landmines.

Also, the Government and Parliament of Ukraine have made several calls to provide military aid, since Ukraine has the full right to protect its territories and citizens.

We would also appreciate the political and diplomatic support in promoting the Peace Formula presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Considering Chile's commitment to peace, human rights, and international law, we also hope to count on its support for the establishment of a special court to ensure justice and condemn Russian war crimes.

Finally, Ukraine seeks economic assistance through investment and technical cooperation to contribute to the reconstruction and development of the country.



Vladyslav Bohorad Chargé d'Affaires of Ukraine in the Republic of Chile

### 0.9

# **Methodological Annex**

### FIGURE Nº 46 UNWEIGHTED GENERAL POPULATION SAMPLE PROFILER

# COUNTRIES (NUMBER OF CASES)



Chilean samples weighted by zone, sex, age range and SES. Argentine and Peruvian samples weighted by sex, age range and SES. Bolivian sample weighted by age and sex. ©IPSOS | Survey on Perceptions on Foreign Policy and National Security

### METHODOLOGICAL SHEET



- \* For a study with probabilistic simulation, its reference error would be +/- 2.66% (For total results with maximum variance and 95% confidence).
- \*\* When results do not add up to 100%, it may be due to rounding or multiple answers.
- \*\*\* The reason why the Bolivia sample is smaller is due to the country's population in relation to Peru and Argentina.

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