COMMENTARY | Reflections of a soldier on the war: General Valerii Zaluzhnyi

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched its large-scale invasion of Ukrainian territory, which Russian President Vladimir Putin called a “special military operation.” What Moscow’s leadership planned as an offensive lasting a few days to reach Kyiv was unsuccessful and repelled. After three years of war, operations have spread to Ukraine’s oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, as well as Crimea and the Russian region of Kursk. 

Leading Ukrainian defense forces was General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, who remained in the position of commander-in-chief until February 2024, meaning that he not only headed Ukraine’s defense, but also the planning and execution of the 2022 and 2023 counter-offensives.

While talking to a serving ambassador is always interesting, doing so with somebody who was also the senior commander of armed forces involved in a high-intensity conflict, is even more so. Additionally, having the opportunity to exchange points of view with someone who has been described as a national hero and a relevant part of recent history, represents an exceptional occasion. The open and frank conversation with Zaluzhnyi took place at the end of January 2025, that is, when President of the United States Donald Trump had just taken office, but before he began his negotiations for the expected — but apparently distant — ceasefire.

ON UKRAINE’S DEFENSE

One of the topics discussed was the success of Ukrainian defense against the initial 2022 Russian offensive. Seven key aspects determined a favorable outcome for Ukraine. First, without a doubt the most important has been and continues to be the will to fight and resilience of the Ukrainian people. This has been one of the most important objectives that the Russian regime has tried to undermine, as it is key to sustaining the operations effort, filling the ranks in the armed forces and supporting the government in the direction of the war.

Second, he recognizes that Kyiv had capabilities to fight. Although in the balance prior to the February 24 Russian invasion, Moscow appeared to have far superior military power, in terms of quantity and modernization of weapons systems of all types, the truth is that, after three years, the results showed that the mentioned asymmetry did not manifest on the battlefield. In this sense, the third key element is international support. The initial provision of weapons systems such as Javelins (anti-tank missiles) or Stingers (anti-aircraft missiles), combined with an adequate operation and smart deployment, inflicted unexpected damage that caused a high impact on the Russian units intended to capture the Ukrainian capital in a few days, forcing them to withdraw and reorganize operations. The fourth element mentioned by Zaluzhnyi refers to military leadership. This component created the defense strategy and directed the operations that allowed resistance against the offensive, constantly adapting to the changes and demands of the situation. Furthermore, and from the perspective of military leadership, the former head of the Ukrainian armed forces identifies the correct balance between offense and defense. Moreover, closely linked to the above, he emphasizes the role of technology to compensate for the imbalance of forces. Thus, although Russia had a larger military force, the technology provided by the West, in addition to good intelligence, the adequate concentration of forces to create local superiority at decisive moments, and correct decisions at key moments, were decisive for success.

Finally, he identifies that political leadership in the conducting of war is the most critical factor in directing the nation in this stage, defining the objectives of the war, providing the material conditions for defense, and playing a role in strengthening cohesion in the most complex moments.

ON THE BATTLEFIELD

General Zaluzhnyi’s experience is important to assess the current situation on the battlefield. He visualizes that some characteristics of World War I (massive use of artillery and trenches), World War II (use of armored units) and the use of precision weapons — emerging in the 1970s and progressively developed until 2022 —, continue to be relevant to warfare. However, these precision weapons proved to be extremely expensive, complex to operate, and of limited availability in response to the excessive demand during high intensity operations between peer states and of limited effectiveness against troops deployed on a broad front or protected by fortifications. In contrast, efficient and cheaper alternatives have emerged, such as the massive use of drones (unmanned aerial vehicles, UAV) developed by Ukrainians themselves. Examples such as the FPV (first-person view) drones built in Ukraine in facilities as basic as garages or dining rooms, or the Iranian Shahed 136 with a cost of around US$10,000 and which can be produced in the tens of thousands per month, change the scenario.

In this process, he projects the year 2027 as the point at which mass production capacity will allow the availability of these resources in quantities and costs acceptable for a large-scale war. He states that countries like China and Russia have identified this situation and are working to anticipate it. Likewise, he suggests that regarding these technologies, a true race for dominance has been unleashed between the capabilities of drones and those of electronic warfare (EW). For now, as observed by Zaluzhnyi, UAV builders have a slight lead.

At the same time, in his analysis he observes that 2024 was a relevant year in the emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) in the use of drones. There have been important experiences in the employment of these systems on land, air and sea, in what he estimates could be a profound and relevant change in the characteristics of warfare. Ukraine has understood this, adapted to it and been a pioneer in innovation for the last three years. He states that countries such as Russia, China, Iran and even North Korea have also addressed this challenge, but NATO countries in general are significantly behind, which will present limitations that could be exploited by their adversaries.

Finally, when countries try to identify the type of force they require in this scenario, he concludes that it is very difficult since this process is dynamic and in a state of constant evolution. However, in general terms and in accordance with the reality of each country, from his experience he identifies that changes will be required in the doctrine that promotes and facilitates the adaptability of the armed forces, in addition to generating large formations (corps or division level) to cover extensive areas of land, coordinate operations and integrate supports and battlefield enablers.

ABOUT THE WAR

The primary element that emerges from the conversation about the characteristics of this war is that what is at stake goes far beyond Ukraine; it has global repercussions, particularly for the future and security of Europe. The presence of Iran and China and the deployment of North Korean troops in support of Russia’s war effort complement the acknowledged Western support for Ukraine, providing global relevance. Since war is an intrinsically political act, this conflict will inevitably end up affecting the politics of other countries and their alliances, so all countries — especially democracies — must watch how conflicts and war evolve.

The Ukrainian ambassador and general reiterates that countries must avoid war at all costs due to the dramatic effects it has for nations. But if it is not possible to achieve that goal, the State must be ready to confront it and protect its citizens, not only in terms of military power, but especially in preparing society for the conflict.

He emphasizes that this war has made it clear that countries require two essential conditions to win: demographics and economy. The birth rates of 100 years ago, where families often reached a dozen children, allowed societies such as Russia to assume great losses, like those in World War II, and still be able to replace casualties in high-intensity and long-duration conflicts. This has changed, since many societies’ birth rates — war or not — have fallen below replacement, or are definitively decreasing. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has reiterated that the main instrument, and the most difficult and costly to replace, continues to be people, which is why countries’ demographics significantly define the future in a prolonged conflict.

As previously stated, the costs of modern weapons systems developed in recent decades make high consumption prohibitive. Therefore, States with stronger economies will have greater possibilities of overcoming conflicts. The consumption of artillery ammunition in World War I is inconceivable today. In February 2022, many developed Western states did not have enough stock of artillery shells, not even the equivalent to what armies fired in a single day during the great offensives of 1917. In summary, Zaluzhnyi projects that the future of warfare will be characterized by the deployment of smaller numbers of soldiers and the massive use of cheaper weapons. 

CONCLUSIONS

From the conversation we had with Ambassador Zaluzhnyi during January 2025, it is possible to highlight the following main points:

• The nature of war remains unchanged, as a political phenomenon that implies a confrontation of wills;
• As usual, the character of war is evolving, driven by the will of the people, the need for operations and technological innovation;
• Both political and military leadership are fundamental to the outcome of conflicts;
• Although war must be avoided at all costs, it is the responsibility of States and their governments to prepare for these situations, whether it is the preparation of society, the education of the elites that will direct it; the armed forces that will execute it, and the economy— including industry —that will sustain it;
• States that are not at war must always observe current conflicts to obtain the necessary experience, in accordance with their own reality.