The Chinese Military Presence in Latin America
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- por Evan Ellis
- Columnas
El Mostrador, Saturday, December 18, 2021
In addition to the space communications base in Neuquén, China is currently interested in building and possibly operating an Antarctic “logistics base” in Ushuaia, at the southern tip of Argentina. This raises concerns as it is very consistent with the logic and pattern of the PLA’s advance in expanding its global strategic reach.
The establishment of a space communications base by the People’s Republic of China in Neuquén, Argentina, in 2017 operated by military personnel, is an indication that the Asian power will cautiously build military facilities on foreign soil when strategic needs require it.
The Chinese military component supporting the economic expansion led by Chinese state-owned enterprises has advanced cautiously for a long time. However, some experts have anticipated the imminent establishment of a base by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Panama, since the Chinese company Hutchison Whampoa won concessions to operate two ports there in 1999, or in El Salvador, since the announcement of Chinese plans for a megaproject in La Unión.
Due to China’s dependence on established powers such as the United States and the European Union for access to markets and technology, the Asian country has generally avoided establishing formal military alliances and bases, particularly in regions of the world such as the Western Hemisphere and in areas where the United States is sensitive to Chinese presence and where the PLA still lacks the capacity to effectively defend such bases.
Nevertheless, in its White Papers on 2015 and 2019 regarding defense strategy, the Chinese Armed Forces explicitly recognize the importance of global military engagement in support of China’s growing commercial presence worldwide. The PLA Navy’s anti-piracy operations off the coast of Africa since 2009, and the establishment in 2017 of a military base in Djibouti, strategically located near the Suez Canal, are indicative of the Chinese military’s trend to expand its armed forces abroad.
The Chinese Strategic Advance in Argentina
In addition to the space communications base in Neuquén, China is currently interested in building and possibly operating an Antarctic “logistics base” in Ushuaia, at the southern tip of Argentina. This raises concerns as it is very consistent with the logic and pattern of the PLA’s advance in expanding its global strategic reach. The project would cost $300 million and could initially be financed by China. However, as noted by the then head of U.S. Southern Command, Admiral Craig Faller during his visit to the area, the question is who operates it.
In commercial terms, the Chinese deep-sea fishing fleet maintains a regular presence in the nearby waters of the South Atlantic, and sometimes within Argentina’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Regarding oil and minerals, although China has technically been a signatory since 1983 to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty that prohibits territorial claims on the continent, and consequently, its commercial exploitation, the treaty becomes modifiable in 2048. In fact, in October 2021, at the G20 meeting in Rome, the Foreign Ministers of Argentina and China signed a cooperation agreement for the exploitation of the Antarctic region and the surrounding oceans.
In military terms, the People’s Republic of China has shown an increasing interest in Antarctica. Since 1984 it has maintained a presence there and currently has four research bases, including one in the area corresponding to the historical claim of Argentina.
In 2013, a Chinese naval task force that included two missile frigates from the Navy traveled to the region and conducted military exercises with their Chilean counterparts, before navigating the challenging waters of the Strait of Magellan, and then making stops at ports in both Argentina and Brazil. The PLA icebreaker Xue Long II made its first trip to Antarctica in November 2019 and is also in talks with Chile to access Punta Arenas to support the resupply of its Antarctic bases from there.
The construction and operation of a polar logistics base in Ushuaia fits the pattern of the Chinese Navy to expand its global presence in multiple ways. First, such a base would support China’s access to an area of interest. Similar to the base in Djibouti, the establishment of an ostensibly commercial facility at the southern tip of Argentina would provide the PLA with plausible deniability regarding its military intentions. Additionally, the impact on the United States would be limited by its distance from this country, and it would have the advantage of being located in an area where China already has significant commercial and strategic presence.
What implications does the Chinese military presence in Latin America have?For the moment, the Argentine government has attempted to assure that it is not advancing towards the establishment of a China-controlled base in Ushuaia, but the strategic implications of such a presence should not be taken lightly. From a strategic perspective, the prospect of China controlling transit from the Atlantic to the Pacific through the Strait of Magellan or the Drake Passage in times of conflict would be significant, particularly if the power could close the Panama Canal in the context of a war potentially triggered by its attempt to forcibly incorporate Taiwan.
For the British, China’s presence would add to the threat that Argentina poses to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, heightened by Argentina’s planned acquisition of
Professor and researcher on Latin America at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.
Member of the China and Latin America Network: Multidisciplinary Approaches (REDCAEM).
Column initially published on the portal of the REDCAEM.
www.latinoamerica21.com , a pluralistic medium committed to disseminating critical opinion and truthful information about Latin America.
