COLUMN | On the State of Public Security in Chile

In summary, we not only need a public security strategy but also a significant increase in allocated resources to invest in the systems and human resources we require.

Public security is by far the issue that concerns Chileans the most. It is no longer just a matter for the Metropolitan Region, but for all of Chile. It is not a topic raised by the press; it is a real problem that primarily affects the poorest, women, and the elderly.

Although the Government tries to demonstrate that the figures are not rising, the reality indicates that we have a complex problem that is not easily solved. In this sense, both the Executive and all those seeking to be presidential candidates prioritize it and claim to be working or will work on designing a public security strategy. However, the truth is that their plans usually amount to lists of actions aimed at addressing individual issues, rather than tackling the whole in a systemic way, which risks being ineffective.

To be more precise, when the issue is approached systemically and public security is understood as a system that should provide safety, which has objectives and requires a strategy to achieve them, the likelihood of resolving the problems we face increases.

In contrast, when approached with a laundry list of independent actions directed at specific aspects, such as prisons or the northern border, we run the risk of not solving what troubles us, which is the absence of public security in the national territory.

The Government only understands that it requires a strategy when it pushes the Ministry of Security, but mistakenly leaves it as a task for the future agency, which will not be operational before June 2025, if everything goes according to plan.

The ministry, if it indeed becomes part of the solution and not an additional problem to resolve, is part of the means, but it is not the strategy, nor is it the objective. It is an idea that sounds good, but for now, it is nothing more than that—an idea that must be materialized and, in the process, resolve the operational aspects that have already been identified so that it can operate effectively.

The list of legislative initiatives from Minister Tohá does not resolve the problem either, many of which are simply there to make up numbers. That said, there are good and effective ones, such as the anti-occupation laws, the Anti-Terrorism Law, and the Naín-Retamal Law, as well as some that are missed, such as the Intelligence Law 2.0, the law that operationalizes the constitutional amendment on critical infrastructure, and the Rules on the Use of Force (RUF).

When a problem is viewed strategically, one must think about means, methods of use, and objectives. Part of our insecurity problem arises from the belief that the enactment of laws resolves everything; however, the necessary means to do the work are just as important as how they are used and the objectives that are set.

To be more precise, and as an example, the staffing of prosecutors in the Public Ministry. The number they have is the one authorized decades ago, and in a country where everything criminal or delinquent goes through the prosecutors, the available quantity does matter and has a significant impact. The same applies to Carabineros, the PDI, Customs, UAF, SII, forensic laboratories, the Legal Medical Institute, courts, Gendarmería, and ANI. That is, to all the institutions that are part of the process.

I gain nothing by placing more Carabineros if I do not increase the staffing of the Public Ministry, as all I do is shift the bottleneck to another part of the process or system. Similarly, I gain nothing by placing more cameras or reading portals if there is no one to review and manage the data in the Public Ministry.

The current reality as we close 2024 is that we do not have a strategy, we do not have objectives, we do not have a public security system and processes, and the means, whether legal or institutional, either do not exist or are insufficient. Given the aforementioned deficiencies, security is either being privatized or municipalized, as citizens in this matter have no patience and will not wait for state organizations to be ready.

If we have results in security, and there have been some, it has been more due to the efforts and capabilities of specific individuals than through systematic actions or as a result of strategies in the field. However, the reality indicates that we will need much more than that, or lists of actions that target specific issues (the so-called laundry lists), which can be integrated into the whole as they fit, allow us to achieve objectives, and do not distract critical resources.

Without going further, I would review what has been done in Argentina regarding security (Rosario) or public order (protesters in Buenos Aires). What Patricia Bullrich has achieved comes much more from strategic clarity than from the technologies used to monitor what happens in the capital or the use of electroshock weapons. Something is happening across the Andes that is producing results.

The right should support the Government. Otherwise, in March 2026, if they are in power, they will have to resolve the problem that will be left to them, which could add to a public order issue if the left takes to the streets as was common during Piñera’s administrations.

Today, Carabineros does not have the capacity to simultaneously manage order and public security. All mayors complain about their absence, with the security of the municipalities effectively in the hands of their mayors and security directors, who, without having greater legal powers, try to provide their neighbors with what the State is not supplying.

Regardless of having a good public security strategy, it is evident that the staffing of all institutions participating in the system must be increased, especially that of Carabineros and the Public Ministry. What is currently invested in security is insufficient and will need to increase dramatically. Given that the State is highly indebted, we will have to reduce spending in other areas to make the necessary technological investments and increase the human resources dedicated to security.

What we urgently need is to place professionals in charge of security. For this reason, I refer to what Las Condes and other municipalities have done, which are hiring recently retired Army or Carabineros generals to lead their security departments. The seriousness of the matter no longer admits amateurs, something that must be observed when the Ministry of Security is launched or in the formation of any team dedicated to the subject.

In summary, we not only need a public security strategy but also a significant increase in allocated resources to invest in the systems and human resources we require, and why not, also to subsequently enact a good Intelligence Law 2.0 that ensures timely, quality intelligence with operational capabilities.