COLUMN | What Can We Conclude from the Electrical Failure of February 25?

We will know, depending on the reason for the failure, whether the problem can be corrected with greater investments, but to argue that the systemic cause of the blackout is the lack of investments or the issues with the granting of permits is somewhat premature.

Evidently, an electrical failure like the one that occurred on Tuesday, February 25, 2025, generates all kinds of opinions across the political spectrum, most of which are unfounded or misinformed, ranging from the need to nationalize the entire system, to conspiracy theories, or blaming the lack of investment or permits. Everyone is expressing opinions without knowing what caused the failure, most lacking knowledge or experience in electrical engineering or in how the National Electric System operates.

Given the level of electrification and digitalization of the society we live in, the electrical issue is of utmost criticality, as demonstrated on Tuesday the 25th, when everything that could potentially fail due to the absence of electrical supply did fail, except that this time the COGRIDs were activated promptly, as were the measures taken by the authorities to implement contingency actions.

That said, it became clear that in highly technical problems like the one that occurred, the COGRIDs, especially those operating at the national and regional levels, lose their importance when the issue requires experts rather than political authorities. Before long, the management of the contingency was handed over to the National Electric Coordinator (CEN).

We have a National Electric System (SEN) since 2017, when the central and northern systems were interconnected, which had been a long-standing aspiration in Chile, as the central region, which for these purposes extends to Chiloé, did not have the capacity to continue managing the electrical demand it faced, while on the other hand, we had a north with a surplus, especially of the type of renewable energy sources (ERNC).

The system is composed of three parts: generation, transmission, and distribution, with the transmission initially failing this time, followed by the incorporation of generators. The transmission failed under the management of ISA Interchile, but as of now, the reason for the failure is not known, and it may take a couple of weeks before we have clarity and accuracy regarding what caused the system’s collapse.

To understand the second part of the failure, one must comprehend how the system operates and the role of the CEN, an autonomous public law corporation created to operate the National Electric System, which arose from the union of the existing systems.

The Coordinator is a technical and independent body responsible for coordinating the operation of the interconnected facilities of the National Electric System. Among its most important objectives are to ensure open access to all transmission systems, preserve the security of service in the electric system, and guarantee the most economical operation for all facilities within the electric system.

At the time of the failure, ISA Interchile was transmitting energy produced at a lower cost from the north to the center of the country, which meant that not all generators in the central-southern region were operating and supplying energy. For reasons that are also under investigation, these generators could not quickly enter the system, which meant that the crisis lasted longer than expected.

The above occurs due to the economic objective of the system, which is to select the energy generated at the lowest cost, even if this may imply a greater risk due to the distance from which it is transmitted, as was the case on February 25.

I do not believe there are errors in the setting of the CEN’s objectives, but it must ensure that security is not at the expense of electricity prices. It is evident that we all want cheap and hopefully clean energy. If this implies that they must have oversight powers to ensure energy delivery, then it is appropriate by law to grant them those powers.

The cost of energy must incorporate the cost of delivery security, and therefore, it is very necessary not to reach conclusions about what needs to change until we know what failed, as well as what other failures are not being mitigated. A high inherent risk that cannot be mitigated is not an acceptable risk, just as if the solution to energy delivery failures is to place other generators to replace the one that is lost. This must be proven and should only be acceptable if the speed at which it is done is reasonable and short-term.

We will know, depending on the reason for the failure, whether the problem can be corrected with greater investments, but to argue that the systemic cause of the blackout is the lack of investments or the issues with the granting of permits is somewhat premature.

Clearly, additional investments help, but someone must pay for them. The Kimal-Lo Aguirre line is a good idea, as it improves the system’s robustness and security and allows for continued energy supply from the north, which is produced at a lower cost, but we must ensure that it is not affected by the failure experienced by ISA Interchile.

A separate chapter is the Superintendency of Electricity and Fuels (SEC), which does have the oversight powers that the CEN is requesting. This is the second significant failure that has occurred recently, the first being the one caused by the winds in August 2024. In both cases, it does not assume its oversight responsibility and does not understand that good and timely oversight ensures better services and energy delivery to the population.

In conclusion, we need to understand the reason for the failure that affected transmission and why the generators that were offline took longer than necessary to come online. With that clarity, we will be able to see what changes need to be made to the National Electric System and who is responsible for its operation, the CNE. We will also be able to determine if there is a need to improve oversight and regulation, as well as the investments necessary to ensure the system’s security.

What we cannot lose is the advantage of an integrated electric system, along with the benefits it provides.