COLUMN | Military Leadership for Presidential Candidates

COLUMN | Military Leadership for Presidential Candidates

Clearly, being the candidate of a coalition is more challenging than being the candidate of a party that operates independently, by rote, indoctrinated, and with Prussian discipline.

Recently, I had the opportunity to review the history of how British Marshal Bill Slim first expelled and defeated the Japanese from Burma, now Myanmar, and then completed the task in the rest of Southeast Asia during World War II.

The story of what Bill Slim accomplished, who began his life as a normal school teacher in Birmingham, is well depicted in the book “Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945,” which starts with Slim organizing an orderly retreat of his army from Burma to India, and then, after reorganizing, indoctrinating, training, and properly equipping it, reconquering all the lost territory and defeating the Japanese in 1945.

Marshal William Joseph Slim became the head of the British Imperial Army in the late 1940s and Governor-General of Australia. Originally a middle-class Englishman, he was made a viscount for his military victories. Some leadership lessons from Slim that can be applicable to competing presidential candidates are:

  • Slim never lost his composure, always projected being in command, or in command as English speakers would say, which is nothing more than starting from being in control or in charge of oneself, a condition without which one cannot project calmness, confidence, give orders, and ensure they are followed and executed well. You may notice that some candidates do this better than others or find it easier to do so, something that every president who prides themselves on such knows how to do correctly, a skill in which Ricardo Lagos was unbeatable, but where Eduardo Frei Jr. or Patricio Aylwin also performed well.
  • Slim effectively applied the concept of mission command, a concept created by von Moltke the Elder, which is nothing more than ensuring that subordinate commanders clearly understand the strategic intent of the commander, have a common doctrine, are trained to carry out orders, but apply initiative when necessary, which they can do by understanding both the role they and their units play in the overall effort and the purpose of the whole. In this sense, you may observe candidates who do this better than others, or who have been preparing their teams for the path to victory for some time. Those who have not yet completed their tasks still have time to do so. Clearly, it is more difficult to achieve when leading alliances rather than a cohesive single party.
  • Slim allowed initiative from his subordinate commanders with the understanding that they comprehended the purpose of the whole and how they contributed to the overall effort, but more importantly, he fostered a culture in which mistakes were accepted and desired, expecting them to generate learning and changes in behavior. He did not tolerate the repetition of mistakes, in which case he would change commanders without hesitation, as in war, as in other risky activities, there is no room for incompetence.
  • To command large armies over great distances, Slim had a good chief of staff. Clearly, one person cannot do everything. The role of the commanding general is to lead and command, to provide the main directives, but they cannot be involved in the details, in the planning, and in every single issue. The chief of staff organizes and makes things happen, and if they are good and reliable, even better. José Antonio Kast has Arturo Squella from the presidency of Republicans, and Evelyn Matthei has Juan Sutil as the new campaign chief, a person whose character, experience, and knowledge will ensure that things function correctly and swiftly.
  • Slim had a very good strategic eye. He knew when and how to commit resources, or when they should be protected. He had a clear objective, a systemic view of things and processes. A political campaign is not very different from a military campaign. Both do not allow for permanent changes in strategic objectives, as doing so will only guarantee defeat. In this sense, it is advisable for candidates to maintain the general course and only make tactical adjustments, as otherwise, the troops become lost and confused, potentially changing leaders if it happens too frequently.
  • Slim knew himself well, self-motivated, and always maintained a positive outlook, and more importantly, he recognized his mistakes and corrected them. He laughed at himself when necessary and never lost his sense of humor. He was not the most likable general in the British Army, but he knew his soldiers well, their capabilities, and their problems. He communicated effectively with them, in whatever language was necessary. He was a soldiers’ general, the British equivalent of General Patton.
  • Slim led by example, demanding nothing he could not do himself and understanding that example is moral authority in the exercise of command.
  • Slim had intuitive intelligence, which is nothing more than the depth of accumulated knowledge and experience in the field. One cannot reach high leadership positions and be successful without this condition, which is obviously necessary to be president.
  • Slim understood that for a strategy to be winning, it had to be simple, easy to understand, and executable even for the youngest soldiers. When this condition is met, execution errors are minimized. In war, as in sports and politics, it is not always the case that the one who scores the most goals wins, but rather the one who prevents the most goals from being scored against them.
  • Finally, like other great military leaders, Slim knew that victory was 90% execution and 10% strategy. Once the strategy was decided, he ensured it was implemented.

I leave it to the readers to conclude which candidate is more diligent in following the rules of Marshal Slim, and, on the other hand, how easily applicable they are, as anyone could eventually apply them. It requires discipline, almost to the point of being German. Clearly, being the candidate of a coalition is more challenging than being the candidate of a party that operates independently, by rote, indoctrinated, and with Prussian discipline.


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