The Relationship Between Chile and Argentina

Argentina has not modified its Defense policy, which states that the Strait of Magellan is shared waters, despite it being clear that these are Chilean waters. We also have conflicts regarding the Chilean continental shelf and the extended continental shelf that Argentina claims.

Historically, I have been considered both in Buenos Aires and Santiago as one of the “hawks” of Chilean foreign policy, but that does not mean I do not want the relationship between both countries to thrive and to be qualitatively better than what we currently know.

Chileans and Argentines deserve to move from a relationship characterized by a lack of trust and some disagreements to one where we empower each other and where the sum of the parts is greater than what we are accustomed to in Chile and Argentina.

The relations between countries like ours—sharing very long land and maritime borders—will never be free of noise, but after more than 200 years of relations, we deserve something better.

This does not mean that the “hawks” should remain silent and that relations between countries should only focus on what is easier to address. The strategy of keeping issues separate does not allow for relationships of second derivation: it only manages to improve what exists temporarily and imperfectly. What Ambassador Uriarte proposed this week clearly helps, but it only focuses on economic matters, plus the extradition of Apablaza.

The first principle that any good neighborly relationship entails is not to interfere in others’ affairs. This ensures a relationship that is not contaminated by third-party opinions. Obviously, having administrations on both sides with a certain political affinity helps, but in the case of the relationship with Argentina, we need it to be resilient to ideologies. Economic integration aids in this regard.

The second principle is not to covet others’ goods, and perhaps this is where we have the most work to do. Argentina has not modified its Defense policy, which states that the Strait of Magellan is shared waters, despite it being clear that these are Chilean waters.

We also have conflicts between the Chilean continental shelf and the extended continental shelf that Argentina claims in the Southern Ocean, which is constructed using the same geoscientific method used for the maritime spaces surrounding the Falklands-Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands, a projection that also infringes upon point F established in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (TPA) of 1984.

In addition to this, there is the imperfect and unfinished delimitation of the Southern Ice Fields and, most importantly, the overlapping of Chilean, Argentine, and British sovereign rights in Antarctica.

This is something that we must agree upon and resolve among the three countries. For now, the conflicts generated by the overlapping claims are primarily due to the projections of exclusive economic zones (EEZ), continental shelves, and extended continental shelves.

I do not believe we need to abandon the TPA and replace it with a new treaty, but that possibility always exists, and it is clear that when its spirit was agreed upon, it did not consider the presentation made by Argentina in 2009 regarding the extended continental shelf, which constructs and assumes, among other things, the ownership and sovereignty of island territories currently in British hands, as well as those claimed jointly with us and the United Kingdom in a superimposed manner in the White Continent.

By resolving the aforementioned issues, we can focus not only on economic integration and the combined strength that generates a powerful Southern Cone of America, including revisiting matters that were left in the past, when in the late 90s we looked at defense issues from a broad, integrated, and strategic perspective. It is time to resolve problems and disagreements; it is time to move forward.