Public security beyond organized crime or border shield

The minister is not to blame for the absence of a strategy; she inherited a new ministry that has a national public security policy, which is not the same as a strategy.

The aim of this column is to clarify that public security efforts must extend beyond those related to organized crime and border control. The public security strategy must prioritize the safety of individuals, citizens, and all Chileans as its main objective, which is not necessarily the case today due to the focus on more complex crimes such as those associated with organized crime, trafficking, murders, kidnappings, and extortion.

It is indeed important to address the operational capacity of organized crime and drug trafficking, as well as to take control of the borders to prevent criminals, smugglers, and illegal immigrants from entering or leaving. It is clear that doing so makes Chile a better, safer, and less dangerous country. The issue is that all of the above does not necessarily improve the public security of the general population, nor does it address the insecurity that affects millions of Chileans daily, who long for the days when Chile was a country where one could walk the streets at night without fear of being robbed.

I am confident that the Presidential Commissioner for the Northern Macrozone, Rear Admiral (R) Alberto Soto, will make “Border Shield” a reality, and I also hope that the Minister of Public Security, Ms. Trinidad Steinert, will apply her experience and knowledge to the pursuit of organized crime, an area where she should have the support of the experienced teams from the Public Ministry, Carabineros de Chile, and the PDI.

While we have strategies for the border and organized crime, where I believe we are lacking is in addressing the crime that affects the daily lives of Chileans. We lack a clear strategy in this regard. We have no objectives, resources are scarce, and their use is clearly reactive rather than directed toward achieving non-existent goals. Perhaps I am mistaken and unaware of the objectives, but if that is the case, someone is not communicating them clearly.

The minister is not to blame for the absence of a strategy; she inherited a new ministry that has a national public security policy, which is not the same as a strategy. A policy establishes the what and the why, while the strategy adds the how. This exercise would provide us with the necessary human and material resources to achieve the objectives and their use.

Another aspect that obviously requires a strategy is the measurement of data. If we want to improve, we must measure the results. In this regard, we are more advanced; we have the “Tactical Police Operation System” known as STOP. There are also equivalents in the Public Ministry and the PDI. If we can get all involved parties to see the same data, we would already have made significant progress. The same applies to the integration of police systems and municipalities.

We gain nothing if, despite an improvement in hard data, the public’s perception of security does not improve. In Chile, this measurement exists and is known as the National Urban Citizen Security Survey (ENUSC). For now, we have data from 2024, which indicate a perception of increased crime at 87.7%, accompanied by a perception of insecurity when walking alone in one’s neighborhood at night of 67.9%. There is also data on what is not being done, such as the most common incivilities in the areas where people live. Women’s perceptions of insecurity are greater than those of men, which requires additional measures to ensure their safety.

Therefore, to improve the insecurity affecting individuals, we must address what is called the crime opportunity triangle, which is nothing more than the obvious theory that a crime occurs due to the convergence in time and space of three elements: a motivated offender, an attainable target/victim, and the absence of a capable guardian. By this, we understand:

• Motivated Offender: A person with the intention and interest to commit the crime.
• Attainable Target/Victim: A target that is attractive and accessible (e.g., a house without alarms, or valuable items in plain sight).
• Absence of a Capable Guardian: Lack of formal surveillance (police or municipal/private guards) or informal surveillance (neighbors, cameras, passersby) that can prevent the action.

A successful prevention strategy needs to act on all three elements, but particularly on the last two, that is, to not create opportunities for the offender, as well as to have Carabineros and municipal security conducting patrols, the presence of security guards and concierges in buildings and condominiums, the use of security cameras and license plate readers, alarm systems, and street, sidewalk, and plaza lighting.

When there is a possibility to implement the aforementioned measures, the actions of offenders shift to places where people are either more careless or where there are no police, municipal security, and other means that deter or prevent the occurrence of crimes.

What the Undersecretary for Crime Prevention recently stated is correct and aims to not create opportunities for thieves. It is logical that if one acts carelessly, even applying all the means of the state, it will not be possible to prevent the occurrence of crimes.

This is why an effective strategy to combat crime begins with education aimed at prevention, accompanied by means and actions that provide surveillance aimed at preventing the actions of criminals. The problem is that I not only need to educate but also to have a sufficient number of police, municipal guards, private guards, along with adequate technological means, something that only the wealthiest municipalities can afford, not because they have more Carabineros—in fact, they do not—but because they have the means to supplement them with both municipal security and systems of cameras and readers, and AI that optimize their use and effectiveness.

It helps to advance not only to have more Carabineros but primarily to have objectives for reducing crimes at the national, regional, and municipal levels. Therefore, I refer to percentage reductions for each category of crime, as well as, and primarily, the indicators of perceived insecurity, which for all intents and purposes are skyrocketing and are little affected by actions directed at organized crime and what occurs at the borders, which are also critical due to their danger and nature, but require specific actions aimed at the issues experienced by the general population.

To date, I have not seen proposals from national authorities seeking improvements in STOP figures or indicators of security perception. The STOP figures for the RM have improved by 12% compared to the previous year, and we will have to see if the ENUSC for 2025, which will be published soon, shows similar improvement. If it does, it is because actions were taken that generally aimed to reduce criminal activity, but nothing that can be said to have been planned and sought. Greater magnitude improvements require a strategy.

Las Condes, by the way, is reaching the end of April 2026 with a 20% (STOP) improvement compared to the same period in 2025. This is a result of the communal security plan, the work of then-General Director Christian Bolivar and his team, and the sustained increase in the assigned budget, which has allowed for a reduction in indicators that had been rising since 2024. Las Condes is a municipality targeted by crime, so the strategy is simply to reduce the opportunity for the crime triangle to present itself, something achieved through an intense presence of municipal security, cameras, and license plate readers, and a central team that manages everything with cutting-edge technology, AI, and coordination with the police and neighbors.

Las Condes is very short on Carabineros, but despite this and the fact that the municipal security law does not help much, except in clarifying the powers of municipal inspectors, it is making progress because it has strategy and resources. It is achieving this despite not having much police support, as Carabineros de Chile is prioritizing assigning its scarce personnel to municipalities that do not have other means to address the crime triangle.

The issue of public security beyond organized crime requires a specific strategy, resources, and objectives, which are recommended to use the STOP figures and those provided by the ENUSC. Despite having discussed this before, it is difficult for the political and police worlds to accept the existence of objectives, as failing to meet them would expose their lack of fulfillment if they existed. It is enough to look at public accounts where it is stated that things were done, but there is no mention of objectives and their degrees of fulfillment, something that is common in the private sector.

If Minister Steinert wants to make a difference, she must have strategies for organized crime, and if she does not have one, she can use the one we created at AthenaLab, as well as needing one for everything that is not organized crime, which is recommended to be developed following the guidelines provided here. As for the borders, let Presidential Commissioner Rear Admiral (R) Alberto Soto take care of that, who as a good strategist should already have one that includes objectives, means, and methods of use.

We need the following to happen in Chile: to have a public security strategy with objectives, focused on the crime triangle, human and material resources to implement it, and self-care measures for individuals that allow for reducing opportunities for criminals.