The state of the Chilean intelligence system

Chile needs a more effective intelligence system that helps us manage and reduce the risks and threats we face. Living unaware and innocent with a largely ineffective intelligence system is no longer an option.

Recently, this outlet published an editorial titled “Intelligence for Democracy.” The purpose of this column is not to comment on that article, but to explain the current state of the national intelligence system, what should happen following the enactment of the regulations that modernize the Intelligence Law, the main issues that need to be addressed, and some complications that will need to be managed until solutions are found.

On Saturday, May 30, 2026, Law 21.821 was published in the Official Gazette, aiming to strengthen and modernize the State Intelligence System. This law, which amends Law 19.974 from 2004, took many years to come to fruition. Reaching a political consensus on what is understood by intelligence and counterintelligence and their purpose for national security was challenging. The geopolitical reality and the neighboring situation certainly played a role, but above all, the threat posed by organized crime, which is actively operating within national territory, was a significant factor.

The National Intelligence Agency (ANI), the core of the system as we know it today, is not equipped to be effective in the risky and insecure reality that Chileans currently face, both due to the limited resources allocated to it until 2025 (US$ 11 million and just under 100 personnel) and the insufficient definition of what the system includes and its scope. Perhaps this was what we wanted in 2004, but it is not what we need more than 20 years later.

What Law 21.821 did was clarify the purpose of the system, which will be to “contribute to the planning and definition of actions aimed at addressing the risks, threats, and aggressions that affect the security of the Nation, national interests, and constitutional order.”

The Chilean State Intelligence System is not a secret service, which does not mean it does not operate in secrecy or that its outputs are not subject to confidentiality. The national intelligence system is not the DINA, the CNI, or the KGB. It is also not the CIA, MI6, or MI5 of the United Kingdom, all of which have significant operational capabilities. Its purpose and objectives are clearly defined in Law 19.974, modernized by Law 21.821.

It is a system that should fundamentally conduct intelligence and counterintelligence. To this end, it has units that are part of it, others that collaborate, and much clearer—though still imperfect—guidance regarding command, control, and coordination of the system, integrated and under the direction of the Executive Power, with a more central, principal, and empowered ANI.

The challenges for the national intelligence system to be better than the one we currently know lie in securing the budget and personnel necessary for the ANI to be more effective, as with its current budget and personnel, we will not achieve anything better or incremental. Argentina has 15 times more personnel, and Spain has 50.

The director of the ANI, Vice Admiral (ret.) Ronald MacIntyre, who previously led the National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies (Anepe), is responsible for making this a reality. He will not be alone in this effort. The modernizing law 21.821 provides that support and resources will be available, and it is in the President’s interest that this occurs.

We must also ensure that the declaration of collaborating units within the system functions operationally and is not merely symbolic. Collaborators include the National Cybersecurity Agency, Gendarmería de Chile, the Financial Analysis Unit (UAF), the National Customs Service, the Internal Revenue Service (SII), and the General Secretariat of Foreign Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the Public Ministry, a critical actor for national security, must be incorporated as soon as possible, regardless of its independence from the Executive Power.

For example, the outputs produced by the UAF are primarily directed to the Public Ministry and not to the intelligence system with which it now needs to integrate and collaborate. It seems necessary to review the legal frameworks governing each of the collaborating institutions to ensure they can effectively integrate into the system.

We must be willing to allow the State Intelligence System to be adaptable and improvable. To fulfill its purpose and the objectives assigned to it, any system must be capable of adapting to changing realities. Eventually, considering that collaborators become integral units is something we should contemplate. Chile is a country where only what has a leader or is mandated by law functions, not necessarily what depends on the good intentions of those categorized as collaborators.

Another aspect that needs to be reviewed is the control of the system. Legislators have overreached in their requirements for special operations, which will now require Supreme Court ministers (previously they were from Appeals Courts), and additionally, the quality control of operations will have its own internal oversight, plus that of the Comptroller, courts, and the Chamber of Deputies. Clearly, this is a bureaucratic exaggeration that undermines effectiveness and proper operation. Best international practices in this area recommend a simpler scheme that acts ex post in the form of audits.

Chile needs a more effective intelligence system that helps us manage and reduce the risks and threats we face. Living unaware and innocent with a largely ineffective intelligence system is no longer an option.

For more details on what is expected from an intelligence system or what it should be capable of doing, I recommend reading the attached document from AthenaLab “General Considerations for the Proposal of an Intelligence System in Chile,” by its director John Griffiths, which was presented in late January 2026 along with documents related to the national security architecture we need and the public security strategy that Chile requires to confront organized crime.