COLUMN | When the Power Game Becomes Real

El Mercurio, May 5, 2019

The Lima Group should seek an urgent meeting with Russia and China to explain to them that their support for the Chavista regime only weakens their position in the region.

Juan Pablo Toro V.

International Crises tend to open opportunities for great powers to advance their agendas and settle scores. In this sense, the situation in Venezuela is a problem that transcends South America or even the continent, confirming that there is currently no regional crisis that does not have a global impact. Just as the instability stemming from the Arab Spring helped create a migratory wave that is now shaking the foundations of European unity.

The United States, China, Russia, and the European Union (EU) are expressing their positions and interests, where the most recurring concepts seem to be democracy, elections, sovereignty, oil, military, and humanitarian aid, indicating the enormous complexity of the issue.

The administration of President Donald Trump, which has practically ignored all territories south of Mexico, has had the foresight to support the initiatives of the Lima Group—which includes Chile—complementing the diplomatic pressure of this bloc with economic sanctions and the sending of assistance for the Venezuelan people, which is deposited in Colombia.

However, in the U.S., they must understand well that neither economic sanctions nor isolation lead to a regime change. They have the close example of Cuba and the distant one of Iran; countries that have been under sustained pressure for decades without yielding significant progress toward effective change. One cannot expect Iran to become democratic.

The overvalued argument of dependence on Venezuelan oil ignores the reality that today the United States is the world’s leading crude oil producer, with over 11 million barrels per day, thanks to new extraction techniques, surpassing Saudi Arabia. For Venezuela, it remains its largest buyer—and a good payer—but it is a business that is declining. It has dropped from over one million barrels in 2008—the peak of Hugo Chávez—to about 500,000 barrels in 2017.

So, what could be the objective of the Trump administration behind the removal of Maduro? If we apply a discount rate to the promotion of democracy—which does not align with the approach to dictators like Kim Jong-un—and to the argument of energy security—which is insufficient in figures—then two purposes remain: to prevent Venezuela from becoming a failed state (run by corrupt elites and where criminal activities thrive) in the heart of the Western Hemisphere and fertile ground for rival power competition. Both objectives imply recovering and exercising leadership.

China and Russia have not hesitated, so far, to support Nicolás Maduro’s regime, under the argument of respecting sovereignty and fearing instability. They would not even consider recognizing Juan Guaidó as the legitimate President. While Beijing is Caracas’s main creditor, with a debt of about $60 billion, Moscow is a supplier of arms and military cooperation (and has about $17 billion committed in Venezuela through loans and investments). However, their relationship with Maduro is neither close nor vital. Rather, it would be an excellent opportunity to demonstrate to Washington that they can also make noise in its spheres of influence. A settling of scores, in light of what is happening with U.S. ships in the South China Sea or with Western support for Ukraine. The renewed power game is knocking at the door.

U.S. Southern Command is monitoring Latin America more closely than the State Department itself, having included China and Russia in its 2017-2027 ten-year strategy as “rival powers,” whose activities should be closely observed, as they have a competitive pattern.

The key, then, may lie there. The Lima Group should seek an urgent meeting with Russia and China to explain to them that their support for the Chavista regime only weakens their position in the region, which is already affected by a migratory wave, increasingly aware of the evidence of drug trafficking penetration in Venezuela, and must divert its attention to growth and combating poverty in the face of military aggression bravado. A country like Brazil, still part of the BRICS group (with Russia, India, China, and South Africa), can be fundamental in this effort. Because a failed state benefits no one. And there is the EU, which, as a good peaceful and normative power, is promoting a contact group with Latin American countries that are not valid interlocutors for the Venezuelan opposition. A well-intentioned initiative, but with limited prospects.

How much will the calculations of the powers influence the fate of Venezuela remains to be seen. What is clear is that the board is broader than it appears. The game transcends the region, and experience shows that the more global the crises, the more difficult they are to resolve, because interests multiply. Whether this is good or bad for the future of Venezuelans who aspire to a regime change, all indications point to the latter.

* Juan Pablo Toro V. is an international analyst.