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Juan Pablo Toro V.
El Mercurio, March 25, 2019
While several countries in the region embarked on attempts to revive socialist experiments, some under the Bolivarian label, Chile focused primarily on consolidating its democracy through institutions and expanding its economy through free trade with the world.
Over time, the country emerged as an attractive model, both for its own successes, reflected in its political stability and development and security indicators, and for the failures of other alternatives—from Chavismo to Lula-ism—and for external validations, such as the magnetism it exerts on immigrants or the Brazilian government’s interest in replicating national public policies in pension matters.
All of the above has helped build a reputation that explains why today Santiago, Chile, and not Mexico City or São Paulo, is hosting in the same year an exploratory summit of the emerging Prosur bloc, the meeting of leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC), and the environmental summit known as COP25.
In each instance, Chile, through the current government of Sebastián Piñera, will need to deliver a respective message: we want democracy in Venezuela and to avoid authoritarian drift in the region; free trade is the instrument to build a community of prosperity in the Asia-Pacific and not a tariff war; and our development must be environmentally friendly, therefore we are committed to combating climate change.
All these responses are valid, but the question is how to unify them through a narrative that conveys the vision of how the country wants to relate and be perceived. A prosperous and pragmatic nation of the eastern Pacific or the best student in a Latin American course where the average is often low?
Capitalizing on this new high-intensity foreign policy, which does not fear prominence nor forces it to reconsider assumed consensuses that sometimes lead to inaction, is a major challenge. In this regard, turning foreign policy into a local battleground is counterproductive in the face of a rarely seen opportunity.
The surprising rejection in one instance of Congress of the TPP+11 is a demonstration of how far the country’s interests can be overlooked, as it was the intellectual author of this free trade agreement and later promoted it during Michelle Bachelet’s government. The marginalization of Senate and House leaders from an event with Jair Bolsonaro, the democratically elected president of Brazil (the main destination for Chilean investments abroad, the fifth recipient of our exports, and a traditional and historical ally of Chile), is another example.
An active foreign policy, where values, national interests, and idiosyncrasy converge, should position Chile as a medium international actor that has something to say in the world. Capitalizing on this moment is key, but there are those who, with internal strife, seem to prefer to remain in their comfort zone in a small corner of the world. What is more a mental condition than a geographical one is emerging.
An active foreign policy, where values, national interests, and idiosyncrasy converge, should position Chile as a medium international actor that has something to say in the world.
