The Armed Forces and Politics

El Mostrador, Tuesday, July 21, 2020

Over more than 200 years, they have learned that being in government does not pay off and that it is better to act as apolitical Armed Forces focused on Chile and distanced from anything that sounds or smells like partisan politics. They have made mistakes in the past and are not interested in repeating them; they know that those who wish to make revolutions will seek to have them on their side, as no revolution succeeds without the power of arms, or they will seek to neutralize them through legal, communicational, or any actions that allow them to move forward with their plans.

On July 16, the feast of the Virgin of Carmen, patroness and general of the Chilean armed forces, was celebrated. I found it appropriate to write about the relationship between the Armed Forces and politics, something that becomes even more important when the political, economic, and social environments are tumultuous, as Chile has a tradition of looking to its armed institutions when things get tough. One only needs to look at the Civil War of 1891, the intervention of 1973, and many other instances when matters did not escalate further.

The relationship between military power and politics has never been easy, as the former wields the power of arms and can, if it wishes, seize power, as has happened multiple times throughout human history. The most famous case was Julius Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon River in 49 B.C., which violated the restriction preventing Roman legions from crossing that river due to the risk of military intervention in Roman politics. Apparently, that restriction was well thought out, as Julius Caesar initiated the end of the Republic and declared himself consul and lifelong dictator.

Until recently, it was normal for military power and political power to be integrated, but in the West, over the years, this ceased to be the norm with the establishment of democracy as a form of government and the separation of powers of the State. It is only maintained in some countries where democracy is not well developed, such as China, Russia, Cuba, Venezuela, Myanmar, Thailand, and some Middle Eastern countries, where it is crucial to have effective control of arms to remain in power.

In Chile, we have evolved from the figure of the governor general, who was also the captain general and President of the Royal Audience, to the current situation where the armed institutions are under authority but not integrated into the Executive. The President, who must be a civilian, only assumes supreme command of the Armed Forces in times of war, appoints and dismisses the commanders-in-chief and the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To reach the current situation, we have gone through several events where the Armed Forces were involved in politics, such as, to name a few: the Civil War of 1891, the saber rattling of 1924, the Tacnazo of 1969, the participation of generals and admirals in the cabinets of Balmaceda or Allende, the military coup of 1973 that led to a military government lasting just over 16 years, and more recently, the boinazo of 1993.

Considering both historical evidence, whether our own or that of others, the reality in non-democratic countries, and assuming we agree that the Armed Forces should not participate in politics, the question is: how do we sustain the reality of non-participatory and non-deliberative Armed Forces beyond legal and constitutional safeguards?

Starting from the premise that they must be effective, efficient, well-managed, and therefore should not be interfered with in their administration, we must respect them for their role in protecting sovereignty and political independence, the existence of democracy as a system of government, economic development, and the well-being of Chileans. This respect should imply fair compensation, recognizing that their pension regime must be different due to their functions, and understanding that they have the capacity to think and express opinions, which is not the same as deliberating. Above all, we must avoid them being used or captured by interest groups or political parties that require them to access or remain in power, or to use them for purposes other than their nature.

Given all of the above, it is appropriate to ask whether, under current circumstances, we are pushing the Armed Forces toward situations that may bring them closer to political contingencies. The answer is a clear and resounding yes. The deployment of the Armed Forces for the State of Emergency on October 18, 2019, and again for the State of Catastrophe that began in mid-March and will accompany us until spring, transforms these institutions into frontline political actors. In States of Exception, defense chiefs act by presidential delegation and report to the Head of State through the Minister of the Interior. They are above the regional governors and operate at the political level, commanding the military and police forces assigned to them.

Not only do current circumstances transform them into political actors, but also the fact that over the years they have been assigned a series of mission areas that go beyond national defense. Having mission areas where versatile capabilities can be utilized is effective and efficient, but it involves engaging them in aspects that are much more political than pure national defense. For example, any of the three institutions—aside from the mission area of defending sovereignty and territorial integrity—has assigned responsibilities in international cooperation and support for foreign policy, national emergency and civil protection, contribution to national development and state action, security, and territorial, maritime, and aerial interests.

The next question is: if they have the power and are already deeply involved in what is happening in Chile, why do they not seize power and govern themselves? My personal response is that they do not have a political vocation in the sense of governing and choosing between leftist or rightist positions. It is not in their DNA; however, that does not mean they do not think and have their own assessment of what is happening, or that they do not express their opinions through regular channels, through third parties, or very discreetly. They know they have the power of arms and that their opinions will be heard and taken into account, but I insist that they are not interested in governing and exercising political power. They care about the well-being of Chile, Chileans, and protecting their homeland.

Over more than 200 years, they have learned that being in government does not pay off and that it is better to act as apolitical Armed Forces focused on Chile and distanced from anything that sounds or smells like partisan politics. They have made mistakes in the past and are not interested in repeating them; they know that those who wish to make revolutions will seek to have them on their side, as no revolution succeeds without the power of arms, or they will seek to neutralize them through legal, communicational, or any actions that allow them to move forward with their plans.

I have never seen armed institutions so well-grounded and self-assured, with absolute clarity of their purpose, and aware of the demands and tensions they will face if the political, economic, and social environment remains tumultuous and convulsed.

In conclusion, I do not see any possibility of a repeat of 1891 or 1973 on the horizon, despite some trying to draw parallels between current and past situations. If they intervene in any way to restore order, it will be in a more subtle, less evident manner, with one sole purpose: to protect Chile and Chileans.

Richard Kouyoumdjian
Vice President, AthenaLab

Source: El Mostrador