Armed Forces and National Defense in the 2022 Constitution

It is time for the sea of Chile to be recognized in the Constitution, as well as its airspace and submarine territory. It is time that, in addition to stating that we are a democracy, we acknowledge our origins and the indigenous peoples who were here before Magellan and Almagro arrived. It is time for us to recognize who we are and what we believe in. In summary, what I propose is simply to indicate who we are, where we come from, where we want to go, what we believe in, where we live, what unites us, and what makes us call ourselves Chileans. Chile needs a purpose, and it is time for us to define it.

Recently, this outlet has published two opinion columns related to the topic of the Armed Forces and National Defense, in light of the new Constitution of the Republic of Chile that is to be promulgated in 2022. Before delving into the matter, I would like to express my respect for the opinions that others may have on this subject, but it is another thing to agree.

Regarding the column by Mr. Jorge Vera Castillo, I find it excellent that he raises the need for foreign policy and defense to be interconnected, as these are obviously two topics that are closely related. However, I disagree with the necessity of going into such detail, as national interest can vary over time, and imposing constraints on those who direct these aspects of the State may not be appropriate. For example, Chile today is a country much more oriented towards the Pacific Basin, with which we trade more than any other part of the planet, and on the other hand, we no longer have as much relationship with Europe and somewhat less than in the past when we talk about the United States, which has diminished in relative importance to us, not to mention our neighbors, with whom we are only connected by borders and, day by day, more problems than benefits.

The world and interests change, and we must ensure that, as a country, we do not have limitations and possess the necessary flexibility so that our foreign policy does not hinder Chile’s development and that defense policy takes care of protecting what matters to us. That said, the big question is whether we are willing to allow both topics to remain exclusively presidential or if we want to address them in a more collegial manner, such as through councils on foreign policy and national security composed of representatives from the Executive and Parliament, along with other experts in the fields who represent civil society, thus ensuring that they operate as state policies, but without the constraints and loss of flexibility that excessive detail in the Constitution may entail.

Where I do take Jorge Vera’s idea is in defining what Chile is, and for that, I refer to its territory, its seas, airspace and submarine areas, exclusive economic zone, extended continental shelf, its island possessions, and the Chilean Antarctic, as I do not want to find myself with authorities who later give away parts of Chile, which belongs to those who came before us, to those of us who are here now, and to those who will come.

It is time for the sea of Chile to be recognized in the Constitution, as well as its airspace and submarine territory. It is time that, in addition to stating that we are a democracy, we acknowledge our origins and the indigenous peoples who were here before Magellan and Almagro arrived. It is time for us to recognize who we are and what we believe in. In summary, what I propose is simply to indicate who we are, where we come from, where we want to go, what we believe in, where we live, what unites us, and what makes us call ourselves Chileans. Chile needs a purpose, and it is time for us to define it.

Changing the subject, the column by Mr. Luis Mariano Rendón concerns me, as he accuses the defense institutions of being the great original constituent power that acts alongside the elite and economic powers, basing the strength of his arguments on three situations that occurred in the past and in contexts completely different from the current ones, which renders his conclusions and subsequent work lacking a methodological foundation, which is no longer very solid, as it is based solely on three readings of time, and assumes that the current reality and political actors are the same as in the past.

In Lircay, he forgets that both sides had their own armies, so I do not see the point he is trying to establish. If we then go to the example of General Navarrete’s participation in the advisory commission, he is mistaken in saying that he was the Commander-in-Chief, as he was the Inspector General of an Army that had Carlos Ibáñez del Campo as Minister of War, thus his superior, and he omits to indicate that the Army was very disorganized and divided. Lastly, he does not mention that the only purpose General Mariano Navarrete had was to seek to resolve the chaos in which the country found itself and not to impose a constitution with a military seal. It goes without saying that this constitution was in effect until 1973 and was not changed during that period, despite the fact that the Army was considerably diminished and had less power in the following years.

I have nothing to say and agree that the 1980 Constitution is a product of the military government, but it is worth mentioning that today specialists estimate that only 20% of the original Constitution remains and that I have not heard of any efforts by the Armed Forces to oppose the changes that have been made, including those that took place in the plebiscite of July 30, 1989, a little over seven months before Augusto Pinochet left power.

When he departs from the arguments that –as we have already seen– lack much support, he makes value judgments regarding the current Armed Forces and adds them to the previous ones to justify what he calls military refoundation, without going into details on how he would carry out such a process. However, I am particularly concerned about three comments he makes: in one, he assigns responsibility to the Army for the so-called “Pacification of La Araucanía,” as the Army followed the orders of the Executive and did not act independently in that process. Second, he holds the current commanders responsible for past actions. And third, he indicates at the end that if changes are not achieved through constitutional means, they will use the veto power to subsequently carry out the refoundation through ordinary legislative means.

All of this sounds undemocratic to me and, rather, an action that seeks to eliminate the armed institutions, replacing them with organizations that have a non-neutral political orientation and are inclined towards the interests of non-democratic groups.

Now, getting to the point, what should the Constitution consider when we talk about defense and the Armed Forces? Why is it important to address this issue in the Constitution?

Two fundamental reasons make it necessary for the Constitution to establish the role and purpose of the Armed Forces and what is understood by National Defense. The first is that the State has the obligation to defend and protect its people, its territory, seas, airspace, and submarine areas, and national interests. On the other hand, the State has a monopoly on force, which is assigned to the land, sea, and air forces for external defense, as well as to the police regarding the security and public order of the Republic.

Given the importance of the above, defining their purpose, roles, who leads them, and how the respective leaders are chosen, as well as who and how individuals enter the institutions, becomes matters that –due to their importance– should be of constitutional rank, as we do not want to leave the power of arms in anyone’s hands, ensuring that they are only used for the correct ends and purposes, namely, to protect and defend Chile, Chileans, its territory, seas, airspace, and submarine areas, and national interests, wherever they may be located, from traditional and/or modern threats, such as cyberattacks, transnational crime, and the impacts of climate change.

All of these occur in a world that is also more tumultuous and entangled, where the stability once offered by the Americans has been lost, which compels us to take seriously the roles and missions we assign to the Armed Forces, their joint operations, and the eventual support they provide to the police when they are overwhelmed, while being careful not to overexpose them or burn them out in functions that do not correspond to them.

Richard Kouyoumdjian
Vice President of AthenaLab