Higher National Security Institutions: There Is No Room for Two Souls

Institucionalidad superior de seguridad nacional: no hay espacio para dos almas

We need to sit down to discuss and think about a new design and a new architecture for national security. A civil instance, but with permanent institutions, with a critical mass of professionals in the area of security and defense, that fulfills a role of multi-agency and supraministerial coordination and advisory. Its leadership will always be the responsibility of the democratically elected government, but its responsibility for articulating and employing all the capacities of the state to produce the public good of national security is a permanent necessity for citizens, as reflected in all opinion polls. Security is the top priority for Chileans and perhaps one of the reasons why the option to approve was rejected, as there was no popular resonance with the proposal we were asked to vote on.

We have read with pleasure the column published in El Mostrador by Miguel Navarro, titled “Debate on Defense, Armed Forces, and National Security Strategy.” Although the text is a well-deserved reply and critique to a column by engineer Eduardo Santos, a member of GADFA, it opens the door for us to deepen the debate in the right direction. Indeed, Navarro leads us to the necessary, and perhaps urgent, review of our design and architecture of the higher institutions of national security.

In an approach to properly define the problem, we encounter the necessary conceptualization of national security, a concept that divides the political soul of the current government and its coalition. At the center of the debate is the use of violence, force, and its legitimacy by the state to achieve political objectives, both within and outside its borders. 

Outside the sovereign borders, states have interests and also rights. Interests that arise from the ambition and capacity of these states to be actors on the international stage, to contribute to peace and stability, and to safeguard rights such as freedom of navigation on the seas, compliance with rules that have built an international coexistence system, demanding compliance with binding treaties and reciprocity of treatment towards their citizens. Of course, at the center of these rights is the right to be recognized as a sovereign state, to its political autonomy and self-determination with the full validity of its own laws, to its territorial integrity, to the security of its citizens, and to the fulfillment of international treaties and commitments made. Any situation that violates what has been described is a risk or a threat to “national security.”

Within the sovereign borders, the Political Constitution of the Republic, a faithful reflection of the social pact between the people and the political leaders of the state, presents a different situation. The inalienable right to self-defense of each person, by virtue of their condition and dignity, is relinquished in exchange for granting the state the monopoly on the use of force and violence, within the framework of the rule of law to guarantee the rights of individuals. The state is the only entity that can legitimately use force and violence, as there are legal and institutional checks and balances in place, but in return, it is responsible for producing the public good of “national security.”

In both cases, external and internal, the state has the obligation to provide the public good of national security. It is a public good that reaches all inhabitants of the country universally and is of primary necessity. Without national security, the development of productive, cultural, sports, family, recreational, and leisure activities is not possible; in short, without national security, the life of society is disturbed, hindered, and even made impossible.

Through a logical process of specialization and graduality in the intensity of the use of force, the state’s monopoly on its use is institutionally divided into Law Enforcement and Public Security Forces, dependent on the Ministry of the Interior, and Armed Forces dependent on the Ministry of Defense. In times of normalcy, the institutions operate based on Law Enforcement and Public Security Forces that enforce the law, give operational validity to the rule of law, and also act as a deterrent against crime and threats and risks to the national security of the country. The Armed Forces act as the military instrument of national power, assisting in the state’s foreign policy, contributing to its presence in isolated areas of the territory and abroad, and serving as a deterrent in any conflict of interests or national objectives. Furthermore, the Armed Forces constitute a political maneuvering instrument by acting in coalitions (FT Cruz del Sur, Combined Antarctic Naval Patrol, RIMPAC, Panamax, etc.) or representing the state’s will to be an international actor (Haiti, Cambodia, Timor, Golan Heights, Bosnia, etc.).

The fact that different institutions specialize, graduate, or complement their actions to meet the needs of producing the public good does not imply, in any way, that national security is only applicable outside the borders of the republic. National security relates to the effects on the life, interests, infrastructure, and citizens that a lack of security can produce. In current times, the harsh reality reminds us that it does not matter where a hacker is physically located if the effects of their actions pose real threats to the security of the country.

The governing coalition is made up of various political parties, some of which do not recognize the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. With different arguments, they attempt to override the democratic decisions of the ballot box or the rulings of institutional checks and balances, including legal ones, if the end justifies using all means, including violence and weapons, “just in case.” We then have a factor inhibiting political will to address national security issues, an “ideological handbrake” to utilize the legitimate power of the state to produce the public good of security.

That is why we need to sit down to discuss and think about a new design and a new architecture for national security. A civil instance, but with permanent institutions, with a critical mass of professionals in the area of security and defense, that fulfills a role of multi-agency and supraministerial coordination and advisory. Its leadership will always be the responsibility of the democratically elected government, but its responsibility for articulating and employing all the capacities of the state to produce the public good of national security is a permanent necessity for citizens, as reflected in all opinion polls. Security is the top priority for Chileans and perhaps one of the reasons why the option to approve was rejected, as there was no popular resonance with the proposal we were asked to vote on.

There are many models and solutions in friendly countries and those we aspire to resemble. The problem is that the only variable that can nullify the equation is political will. Without addressing that variable, Chile’s security problem has no solution.

It is perhaps time for the government to remember that in matters of national security, as well as in foreign relations, there is but one soul, the soul of Chile and its national interest, and not two as is observed today. In this matter, it is very clear how many pairs make three flies. 

Richard Kouyoumdjian
Vice President AthenaLab

Source: El Mostrador


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