Institutionality, Governance, and Critical Infrastructure

El Mostrador, January 22, 2023

The combined effect of all these variables is that for quite some time now, SECURITY, in capital letters, has been by far the main and most urgent concern of Chileans. It is not only about the insecurity resulting from robberies, carjackings, murders, and contract killings that terrify the population. It is not just about the gunfire in neighborhoods, the settling of scores between gangs, the narco-funerals, and the street vendors taking over the streets and plazas. It is about Chile losing its institutionality, its sense of adherence to laws and norms of coexistence. In Chile today, it makes no difference whether one complies with the law or not.

We all agree that we are living in complex realities at the beginning of a year that promises to become even more complicated. The economic crisis, which is clearly on the horizon, with its associated social clouds and storms, is compounded by a new constitutional process filled with uncertainty and unpredictable factors that no one can control. All of this occurs against a backdrop of inflation at unprecedented levels in 30 years and a very precarious and expectant labor market, awaiting key reforms in taxation, pensions, and labor legislation.

The complex realities include uncontrolled illegal immigration at the northern border and its effect on the main cities of the country. They include armed, violent crime that is out of control, with organized crime viewing this disorderly scenario as ideal for drug trafficking and other illegal trades such as the theft of copper cables, the street vending of stolen or smuggled goods, and other lucrative criminal activities. They also include the emergence of radical terrorist groups in the southern macrozone and organized crime associated with the climate of disorder, primarily in drug trafficking, illegal arms, and timber.

The combined effect of all these variables is that for quite some time now, SECURITY, in capital letters, has been by far the main and most urgent concern of Chileans. It is not only about the insecurity resulting from robberies, carjackings, murders, and contract killings that terrify the population. It is not just about the gunfire in neighborhoods, the settling of scores between gangs, the narco-funerals, and the street vendors taking over the streets and plazas. It is about Chile losing its institutionality, its sense of adherence to laws and norms of coexistence. In Chile today, it makes no difference whether one complies with the law or not. There is impunity, and there exists a system, an institutionality, that does not function and has people on the streets who pose a real danger to society, in plain sight of the courts, the public prosecutor’s office, and the police. The most dangerous aspect of this diagnosis is that there is no political will for the system, the institutionality, to function properly, effectively, and efficiently, promptly considering the innocent, the victims, and the affected.

The main security problems in our society are the result of variables of different origins. Since we do not have consensus on what illegal immigration is and how to address it, we dilute the State’s capacity to respond until our own citizens rise up and say enough. Since we do not have consensus on how to address crime, with positions ranging from justifying crime due to the inequality of opportunities produced by society to reinstating the death penalty, the State’s response is diluted due to a lack of political will. Courts often favor the criminal rather than the victim, the Public Prosecutor’s Office archives cases of repeat offenders, and the police wonder what the point of all their effort is if they are released anyway or given ridiculous measures that are a mockery. Since we do not have consensus on whether there is terrorism and armed insurgency in Araucanía and the southern macrozone, the State’s action is diluted and becomes ineffective. Millions are spent on patches that do not address the root causes of the problems but rather generate greater injustices by trying to alleviate the effects with ideological biases that end up rewarding the violent.

And now who will defend us? As the effects of the security crisis of an indignant society with the ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and abandonment of institutionality are impacting the governance of the country and putting pressure on the executive power, we quickly turn to the institutions that do function, which have the highest valuation, credibility, respect, and trust from the public: the Armed Forces.

Our constitutional framework establishes, in an exceptional, limited manner and with precise deadlines, the authority of the President of the Republic to employ the Armed Forces to control a crisis and create the necessary security conditions for State agencies, institutions, and offices to carry out their work. The role of the Armed Forces, which is constitutionally enshrined, something that the Minister of the Interior and Public Security seems to agree with, is exceptional, temporary, and responds to situations and circumstances that are extremely serious for society or even for the very existence of the Republic. Because it is exceptional, it must, even more so, be subject to the political control exercised by the Chamber of Deputies over the activities of the executive.

We have been practically four years in which the Armed Forces have been almost permanently, not exceptionally, contributing or directly taking charge of overcoming crises and imposing order and conditions that allow the State to function. Social unrest, pandemic, special decrees in the northern zone, states of exception in the southern macrozone, and recently a state of catastrophe due to fires in the Valparaíso region. This last point is no longer news, but the Armed Forces continue to be there, on the ground, alongside the population, to this day.

During the course of this week, at least two astonishing events occurred in Congress. The first is that to avoid the exceptionality mandated expressly by the constitution, safeguarding the checks and balances of power among the branches of government, and which requires the executive to appear every 15 days before Congress to renew the constitutional state of exception in the Southern Macrozone, an agreement was reached to modify the deadlines and extend the exceptional period to 45 days. The second is the process of the constitutional reform that will allow the President of the Republic to assign the Armed Forces to the protection of the country’s critical infrastructure, without a constitutional state of exception. In the context of the processing of the reform, with the commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces invited to provide their expert professional opinion, an unusual situation arose where a honorable deputy expressed her “discomfort” with the contents presented, stating that the commanders-in-chief were deliberating on exposing the inconveniences, inconsistencies, dangers, and errors of a poorly drafted text that opens flanks for the solution to lead to greater evils. It is the same as criticizing the treating physician because one does not like the specialized diagnosis.

This anecdote reflects that part of the crisis of institutionality we are experiencing is due to the quality of the laws, the preparation of legislators, and a complete lack of accountability for the inconveniences caused. It would suffice to ask parents waiting in lines in tents to participate in the lotteries for student selection at educational institutions or housewives about the effects of pension fund withdrawals on their cost of living. There are no accountable parties.

The Armed Forces have become a “trump card,” a flexible and infallible solution, a kind of universal panacea for the problems of our society. It is time to ask ourselves: Is the governance of our country viable without the involvement of the National Defense institutions? What would happen if we removed the armed institutions from their “exceptional” duties at the northern border and in the southern macrozone, and in the Camiroaga neighborhood of Viña del Mar?

Today, the Armed Forces are sustaining an institutionality that does not function. That lacks the political will to function because the solutions strain the political relationships of both government and opposition coalitions. An institutionality that must be reformed from the ground up regarding security, both citizen security, combating crime and delinquency, upholding the rule of law, as well as at the level of national security. We must understand the nature of the problems we face to realize that the issues before us are not of the type that can be solved with armed forces. For this reason, the military solution to these problems can only be an exception and for a very limited time, and we must understand that by employing inadequate solutions, we may end up affecting our defense capacity and the institutions that make up national defense. In plain Chilean, we should not let the remedy cost more than the disease.

Richard Kouyoumdjian
Vice President AthenaLab

Source: El Mostrador