Sebastián Piñera on International Relations, National Security, and Defense

El Líbero, February 14, 2024

Regardless of the mistakes he made, my overall assessment of the former President is positive, especially when compared to the results achieved by those who made his life difficult, even during the pandemic.

My previous column was sent to the editor hours before he tragically passed away Sebastián Piñera Echenique. My sincere condolences to his widow, children, grandchildren, and family. Along with the interview I gave that day in this medium, both addressed the issue of public security, organized crime in the main cities of Chile, summer wildfires such as the one that occurred in the V Region, illegal immigration from Peru and Bolivia accompanied by the entry of criminals into national territory, and insurgency in the Southern Macrozone. All these issues exist primarily due to the absence of a strategy, architecture, and national security system, which have affected both Boric and the last government of Piñera and Bachelet during her second presidential term.

Sebastián Piñera was concerned about the aforementioned issues. Some more than others. In 2018, he presented bills aimed at addressing issues that were already important to Chileans at that time. I refer to the modernization of the police, the state intelligence system, gun control, and the strengthening of the role of municipalities and citizens in security matters. Unfortunately, these projects did not progress due to a lack of parliamentary majority and, primarily, because the left denied any support to anything coming from his government, regardless of the quality and logic of the ideas presented, something that President Boric himself acknowledged when he bid farewell to his predecessor at the National Congress in the capital.

We all know that when the social outbreak and the subsequent Covid-19 pandemic occurred, priorities changed. Piñera entered into State Chief mode and focused on managing the country. He was not popular, he saved democracy, succeeded in managing the pandemic, and managed to conclude his second presidential term with dignity. The improvement in the perception of his second government is largely due to the lack of good governance demonstrated by his successor, something similar to what happened with Bachelet 2, which allowed Piñera to repeat between 2018 and 2022, confirming something that is already known: the narrative of efficiency from the right does not guarantee elections; rather, it is the poor governance of the left that leads individuals like Piñera or potentially Evelyn Matthei to the presidency.

Having clarified some contextual aspects, the purpose of this column is to understand the right regarding its relationship with international relations, national security, and defense. A good starting point is the survey Cadem Plaza Publica published on Sunday, February 11, 2024, which indicates that 77% of respondents agree that Sebastián Piñera’s governments generated a good international image, which does not necessarily mean that Chile’s national interest was well protected or safeguarded to warrant that assessment of Chile’s foreign relations management.

One thing is to have a good country image, participate in global events and multilateral institutions, support initiatives like COP, and another is to protect our national interest, territory, seas, airspace, and space. In this sense, under President Piñera’s government, we lost Chilean maritime territory in The Hague in 2014, something that his ministers tried to downplay as unimportant because fishing activity in that portion of the sea was not significant.

Subsequently, in his second government he granted support to Argentina during Alberto Fernández’s visit in January 2021 that did not protect national interests. Moreover, this support came shortly after Argentina published its extended continental shelf, which encroached on a significant part of Chile’s southern interests.

Piñera, who may have fallen into personalism, but did not follow turquoise or feminist foreign policies, corrected the error of his Foreign Ministry before the end of his government and, with the support of Difrol and the Undersecretary of Defense, in a masterful move, published the nautical chart No. 8 which clearly delineates Chilean maritime boundaries, while expediting studies to present the extended continental shelves to which Chile is entitled. In my opinion, this is the best thing he did in terms of foreign relations.

Overall, Piñera had good ambassadors, especially when compared to some of the current political appointments, and regarding chancellors, I highlight Teodoro Ribera who, along with his director general of strategic planning, set the Foreign Ministry on a good course, and national interests were never better served. Unfortunately, we will never understand Ribera’s departure and his replacement by Allamand, a move that seems to serve party interests rather than Chile’s interests, nor his interest in going to Cúcuta and the risks of getting involved in Venezuelan politics.

Where Piñera never felt very comfortable was with the military world, something that did not occur in either his first or second government. Some say that it was a relationship that had not been well established since previous times, but concretely, some actions such as sending aides to the basement of La Moneda in his first administration, or decapitating the high command of the Chilean Army at the end of 2018 due to the ticket case, a case that five years later has no convictions, are not understood, and I assume he was poorly advised, as the consequences of removing many good generals were clearly not measured, seriously affecting national security.

People tend to forget the good things accomplished and focus on highlighting the negatives, such as the closure of Penal Cordillera. Over the years, some forget that Piñera 1 was the reconstruction of Chile after the tsunami and earthquake of February 27, 2010. In that sense, all the capabilities of the Talcahuano Naval Base that were affected were recovered or improved. Piñera decisively supported the Navy’s plans, financed them, and they were completed before the end of his first term.

I have reflected a lot on President Piñera’s relationship with the armed forces. I may be mistaken, but due to his nature, some operate in terms of effectiveness while the President thought in terms of efficiency, something that the Undersecretary of Defense in his second government understood perfectly. The undersecretary was the military equivalent of the president in terms of intelligence, way of thinking, and reasoning, which is why the first defense policy was established, relevant acquisitions and naval constructions were approved, the national defense industry was organized, and the aforementioned nautical chart No. 8 was produced. The synergy they achieved was key and is what still allows National Defense, two years later, to continue delivering results in key areas of modernization and equipment for the three institutions.

What remains to be seen is what will happen with the law for financing strategic capabilities that replaces the copper law. In the 2024 budget exercise, it has already failed for the first time, and the fears of many could become a reality if the government does not fulfill its promise to replenish the piggy bank this year. The logic of the idea of Piñera and Espina, which was highly celebrated at the time and approved by all politicians, depends on the willingness of the Treasury to finance what was agreed upon, and on politicians not forgetting their commitment. Without stable financing, there is no development of strategic capabilities.

Piñera’s administration, like the current one, ended up making intense use of the armed forces in states of constitutional exception, sought the support of the armed institutes at the borders with Peru and Bolivia through decree 265, and did not understand that what we had in the Southern Macrozone was insurgency and not crime. His strategy was to file lawsuits until he had no choice but to establish a state of emergency and hand over the baton to the Army and Navy of Chile.

Perhaps this is not what supporters of Sebastián Piñera want to hear, but it is the reality. That said, and regardless of the mistakes he made, my overall assessment of the former President is positive, especially when compared to the results achieved by those who made his life difficult, even during the pandemic; who claimed to have moral superiority, and who will never measure up to his predecessor.

The great lesson to be learned from Piñera’s governments in terms of foreign relations, security, and national defense is that one can lose direction if the national interest is not clear and if there is no strategy, architecture, and national security system to ensure that the leader does so.

Sebastián Piñera Echenique, rest in peace.

Richard Kouyoumdjian
Vice President of AthenaLab

Source: El Líbero