COMMENTARY | G20: The Hour of Geopolitics

The annual meeting of the Group of Twenty (G20), comprising the world’s twenty most developed economies, concluded in Bali, Indonesia, with a final declaration stating that “the majority of members firmly condemn the war in Ukraine” and “demand the total and unconditional withdrawal of Russia from Ukrainian territory.” The meeting was attended by the highest leaders of each country, except for President Vladimir Putin, who sent his Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, as a representative.

This meeting held particular importance this year due to the various global crises affecting the world, beyond the concerning outlook stemming from the economic crisis. Indeed, in addition to the economic scenario, issues such as the war in Ukraine, nuclear threats, energy and food security, climate emergency, and the China-U.S. conflict are also at play.

Therefore, this summit was an opportunity to address global geopolitics multilaterally, particularly security in Europe and Asia, with aspects that are affecting the prospects for global stability and development.

The G20 is a body with a more limited number of members than the United Nations, and therefore has greater agility and capacity to influence global affairs. It is also an excellent opportunity for bilateral meetings, one of the most notable and anticipated being that between the leaders of the two global superpowers, the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China.

Necessary and Timely Détente

On November 14, the first meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping took place, occurring during a recent period of maximum tension and minimal communication between the two superpowers.

Both leaders arrived at this meeting more empowered and with greater negotiating capacity, considering the internal political situation of each country.

As previously described in an earlier essay[1], Xi Jinping emerged from the last Communist Party Congress as the formal leader for the next five years, with a Central Committee composed of loyalists and without any indication of a potential successor for the next five-year term.

In the case of President Biden, the midterm elections in the United States that occurred the previous week, contrary to projections, provided relief for the Democratic Party and the president, allowing him to maintain initiative and freedom of action in managing foreign relations.

Indeed, in an election that is traditionally negative for the new administration, and which was preceded by an adverse economic scenario, the ruling party managed to retain control of the Senate, and while the prediction of losing the majority in the House of Representatives remains, the projected differences, according to the latest results, indicate that it will only be by a slight margin favorable to the Republicans. This, combined with favorable results in gubernatorial elections and the defeat of many Republican candidates endorsed by former President Donald Trump, dispels the occurrence of the so-called “red wave” of a Republican victory.

Thus, holding the meeting between the leaders of China and the U.S., each with a clearer mandate, sends a positive signal of thawing bilateral relations, which had been virtually severed following the visit of then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan last August [2].

While there are some statements and leaks regarding a three-hour session, one should not have expected a detailed and elaborate agreement from this meeting, but rather a first and necessary step to jointly address the main threats to global security and the economy with some degree of cooperation.

This does not mean that there are no significant differences and problems between the two countries, but it does provide the opportunity to channel them through negotiation and communication, avoiding uncontrolled escalation due to misinterpretation or overreaction. In fact, President Biden announced a forthcoming visit by Secretary of State Antony Blinken to China.

The issue of Taiwan and the strategic competition for technological leadership in the new digital era undoubtedly underlie the main areas of conflict, with China expanding to become the dominant power facing the U.S., which is in a position to contain that growth and maintain its global leadership and influence.

It is important that positions have been expressed, and thus President Biden indicated that the adherence to the concept of “one China” (without details on what that means) has not changed, but he also emphasized that the status quo must be respected (which can be interpreted as no military coercion against Taiwan and a free and open Indo-Pacific), although he reiterated that they are not seeking conflict and that a new Cold War is not necessary.

Xi Jinping, for his part, reiterates the stance that there should be no interference in internal affairs, and that Taiwan represents a vital interest for China, so the United States should not cross that red line.

The positive aspect of this détente is the reopening of communication channels, including those related to combating climate change, as there can be no real progress without the commitment and decisive action from China, the world’s leading emitter of greenhouse gases, but also a leader in many areas related to clean energy.

Russia-Ukraine and the Nuclear Threat

The situation arising from the Russian invasion of Ukraine last February remains a destabilizing factor for the global economy and security, including the negative impact on progress in combating the climate crisis.

The firm and determined stance of the Ukrainian regime, supported by the United States and Western powers, allowed Ukraine to survive the initial attack and begin a successful counteroffensive, which has left Russia in a position of military, political, and diplomatic weakness, with its leader Vladimir Putin questioned abroad.

The critical situation for Russia’s interests, and particularly for the survival of President Putin’s leadership, combined with various statements from the latter regarding a potential use of nuclear (tactical) weapons, has raised fears of a catastrophic nuclear escalation, and this period has been compared to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

At the beginning of the invasion, Russia had the explicit or implicit support of China and the neutrality of India, including trade exchanges, particularly of oil and gas, which allowed it to mitigate the impact of both Western economic sanctions and condemnatory resolutions from the UN Security Council.

However, the evolution and prolongation of a war that Russia expected to be short, seeking a regime change and the recovery of its sphere of influence, where Ukraine would act as a “buffer” against NATO, combined with the demonstrated weakness of its military capacity and actions against the civilian population, as well as the possibility of using nuclear weapons, ultimately distanced both India and China from their initial position.

Thus, during the visit of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to China on November 4, it not only signified Beijing’s support for Germany, one of the countries most directly affected by the conflict with Russia, but also a clear initial statement from Beijing against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, calling for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Additionally, the U.S. warnings to Russia regarding the nuclear option, expressed by the president, the Secretary of State, and recently by the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to his counterpart Sergei Naryshkin during a meeting in Ankara on Monday, November 14, were significant.

During the G20, as a result of the bilateral meeting between Biden and Xi, statements were issued against the nuclear option, with the U.S. being clearer and more direct than its Chinese counterpart.

Finally, in the final declaration of the leaders, which includes Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, it is noted that this forum is not for resolving security issues, but it does express that the majority of members condemn the Russian aggression, that international law must be upheld, that the threat of nuclear weapons should not be used, and that there is concern for the impact on food security (wheat exports from Ukraine via the Black Sea) and for the safety of vulnerable populations, women, and children.

With these statements, combined with Putin’s absence from the G20 (President Volodymyr Zelensky explicitly referred to the G19), Russia finds itself in a weakened position, without international support and with few military options to reverse the situation of gradual withdrawal. This does not preclude Moscow from continuing to use its fossil fuel production capacity politically and maintaining its resilience to withstand economic sanctions, as it retains control over its population.

This allows us to see that it is not foreseeable that the war will be stopped in the short term, as neither Ukraine would accept a negotiated solution that involves not recovering its territory, nor would Russia accept defeat while it can prolong the conflict, particularly now that winter is beginning.

Therefore, it is most likely that this situation will remain as a prolonged conflict, in which different dimensions of power will continue to be employed and where regime change in Russia cannot be ruled out as one of the objectives of the West to facilitate a more definitive settlement.

Outstanding Issues

The immediacy of the conflicts between the two superpowers and the war in Ukraine with its global effects may divert attention from two major problems affecting international security and stability, namely the climate emergency being addressed at COP27 and the global inflation-debt crisis that threatens to have significant short-term effects.

Both problems will generate social repercussions, with a greater effect on less developed countries or those with fewer adaptation options.

This combination of factors is highly likely to affect stability and security at the global level and cannot be addressed except multilaterally, where the capacity, resources, and leadership of the major powers will be decisive elements.

In summary, the mere fact of holding a G20 with a global geopolitical perspective is a good sign, essential and timely for the challenges we face.

Cristián de la Maza, research fellow Athenalab

Boston, November 16, 2022

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[1] De la Maza, C. “Taiwan in the New Era of Xi Jinping’s China,” essay published by Athenalab on November 10, 2022. Available at https://www.athenalab.org

[2] De la Maza, C. “Taiwan and the Thucydides Trap,” essay published by AthenaLab on August 5, 2022. Available at https://www.athenalab.org