COMMENTARY | Implications of the U.S. National Defense Strategy

The new National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States, which follows the previously discussed National Security Strategy by framing China as the primary threat, is divided into 10 sections. These sections assess the operational environment; define defense priorities; develop the concept of “deterrence”; project requirements for military campaigns; propose force development; identify needs for building competitive advantages; and finally, establish guidelines for risk management. Below is an analysis of the document, available at: https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF

OBJECTIVES

The objectives established for the defense function align with the vital interests of the United States, which are: to protect the security of the American population; to expand prosperity and economic opportunities; and to defend the core values of American society.

THREATS

The NDS unequivocally identifies China as the primary and most serious challenge to security that must be addressed, characterizing its behavior as coercive and aimed at altering the Indo-Pacific region as well as the international system through the enhancement of its conventional and nuclear capabilities, as well as other capabilities in the realms of space, cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information. Secondly, it positions Russia as a significant threat, given its nuclear capabilities, long-range missiles, risks in space, chemical and biological weapons, underwater environment, and campaigns in the “gray zone,” the latter aimed at affecting the political stability of democracies. Other perceived relevant threats include North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations. Finally, it identifies risks such as climate change and other phenomena as transnational challenges for which preparations must be made.

PRIORITIES

When defining priorities for what it terms the “defense ecosystem,” the NDS establishes that it must: defend the territory and sovereignty of the United States; deter strategic attacks against the U.S., its allies, and partners (use of nuclear weapons); deter external aggression and, if necessary, dominate in a conflict; and ensure the maintenance of a military advantage based on a resilient joint force.

INTEGRATED DETERRENCE

This concept is central to the NDS and is defined by how the Department of Defense will align its policies, investments, and other activities to strengthen deterrence that must adapt to each competitor and coordinate with other instruments of national power to achieve maximum effects. To achieve effective deterrence, it is established that the perception of competitors must be addressed through an approach that considers the development of asymmetries and the necessary strength to confront them, imposing costs that far exceed the benefits of any potential aggression. In this section, there is again a direct reference to the main identified threats, such as attacks on U.S. territory and the use of strategic weapons by China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as well as the need to confront an environment where the use of space and cyberspace domains increases the opacity of aggressive actions.

PROJECTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Under the concept of “Campaigning,” understood as conducting and sequencing logically related military activities to achieve objectives aligned with the strategy over time, the NDS identifies the urgency of visualizing military campaigns that consider the entire spectrum of conflict and all domains of the battlefield, with the aim of obtaining operational advantages, enhancing deterrence, and addressing activities and challenges that potential adversaries develop in what is termed the “gray zone.”

In this regard, it is asserted that the military instrument is not always the best tool to solve problems, identifying alternative options such as intelligence sharing, economic measures, diplomatic pressures, and other actions in the information realm, which can be executed more effectively by other state agencies. Ultimately, the projection of military operations should provide planners with options to deter and reduce various forms of coercion by antagonists. This design demands a global strategic posture, where the positioning of forces must prioritize deterrence efforts toward the Indo-Pacific (China) and Europe (Russia).

STRENGTHENING ALLIANCES

As a relevant element of the NDS, alliances and other partners of the U.S. are identified, particularly those collaborating to address the threats posed by China and Russia. In this context, Washington’s obligation to demonstrate itself as a reliable defense partner is emphasized. To improve and strengthen collaboration, the NDS prioritizes interoperability, the development of new operational concepts, and a force development that considers joint and combined integration.

When reviewing the posture regarding each region, there are no new developments compared to what was already stated in the National Security Strategy, reiterating the priority represented by the Indo-Pacific, followed by Europe. Again, the Western Hemisphere, represented by Latin America, does not constitute a priority, limiting itself to noting the need for a stable region, which reduces risks and threats to the U.S.; although it indicates that it will work to understand the security needs of its regional partners and areas of mutual interest and concern.

FORCE PLANNING

It is established that, as a requirement for developing and strengthening deterrence, it is necessary to design, develop, and manage a combat military force with credible capabilities. The force in question must be structured in such a way that it can simultaneously defend U.S. territory, maintain a permanent strategic deterrent capability, and, if necessary, dominate in a potential conflict. Among the initiatives, the need to maintain advantages in information for decision-making is highlighted; to strengthen command, control, and communication capabilities in high-demand environments; to expand capabilities to deny aggression through improved detection and response capabilities; to mitigate adversarial anti-access and area denial capabilities, concepts widely developed by the Chinese armed forces; and to reinforce mobilization and sustainment capabilities for force projection. In short, a joint force that is lethal, sustainable, resilient, strong, robust, and agile. In this case, the long-term vision and assessment of threats and risks become fundamental elements when prioritizing (In this regard, it is worth reviewing AthenaLab’s publication on this topic “Net Assessment”).

STRENGTHENING SUSTAINABLE ADVANTAGES

The NDS highlights that various evolving threats jeopardize the defense ecosystem, as well as the defense industrial base and the overall capacity of private and public enterprises. Consequently, to strengthen current military advantages, coordinated and integrated work must be developed, both with various powers and state agencies, as well as with the private sector, allies, and strategic partners. Therefore, the Department of Defense must be able to incorporate cutting-edge technologies in an expedited and flexible manner, through rapid experimentation, acquisition, and incorporation, while not losing efforts on less relevant systems. Additionally, investments in technology directed specifically at advanced capabilities in hypersonic weapons, directed energy, sensor integration, and capabilities in cyberspace must be appropriately selected. Furthermore, the need to strengthen collaboration with the private sector and to have a top-tier workforce, attracting and retaining talent, is emphasized.

RISK MANAGEMENT

Finally, it observes the obligation to visualize long-term risks, given the rapid pace at which adversaries modernize their military forces, as well as the ways in which aggressions may manifest. Again, it highlights the need for tools that allow for appropriate decision-making, identifying timely the best solutions and investment alternatives.

CONCLUSIONS

• The public version of the NDS disseminated complements, from the perspective of the defense function, the National Security Strategy of the U.S., which is the foundational document for political planning to achieve U.S. national objectives, through a guidance that coordinates and integrates interagency efforts.
• Consistently, it directly and openly recognizes China as the primary competitor of the U.S., as well as Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as threats that must be taken into account. Consequently, the Indo-Pacific remains the priority region, followed by Europe.
• Similarly, it identifies other phenomena such as climate change or pandemics as transboundary risks, which necessitate the generation of capabilities to confront them or mitigate their impact.
• Although Chile, like Latin America, does not have a significant role in the NDS, it is estimated that there are areas of common interest in which collaboration with the U.S. Department of Defense can be pursued:
  • Development of high operational availability forces to address crises arising from criminal actions.
  • Illegal fishing and other activities against international law in the waters and airspace of the South Pacific.
  • Development of capabilities to address threats from space and cyberspace, where the U.S. has significant experience.
  • Protection of interoceanic passages over which Chile has jurisdiction, ensuring free and safe navigation.
  • Development of logistical capabilities and the readiness of military and civilian means to respond to natural disasters in the region.
  • Control of activities such as human trafficking and arms trafficking.
  • Mitigation of the effects of climate change on the defense function.
  • In this sense, if Chile has sufficient capabilities (current or future) to assume leadership in this region, with or without the collaboration of other states, the U.S. may not divert efforts in this sector and concentrate its resources in regions that are indeed priorities for its security.
• Some of the important concepts included in the NDS that should be highlighted for individual analysis may include:
  • Developing a national security architecture that allows for the political and strategic conduct of the military instrument. See AthenaLab publication “The Security of the State of Chile” (available at: http://www.athenalab.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/D8-Seguridad-Chile.pdf).
  • The obligation to think about these matters strategically, with a state vision, using tools such as “Net Assessment.” Review AthenaLab Working Document No. 19 “Net Assessment: A Tool for National Defense, a topic regarding power,” (available at: http://www.athenalab.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/DT19-NET-ASSESSMENT.pdf).
  • The need to develop directive and executive documents that guide and channel efforts in these matters, defining priorities, objectives, and tasks.
  • Developing and maintaining an industrial base capable of sustaining the employment of military forces, particularly in critical activities.
  • Strengthening public-private development initiatives to enhance strategic capabilities.
  • The need to attract and retain talent across the defense function.

Marcelo Masalleras, researcher at AthenaLab

November 3, 2022