This article was translated automatically and may contain differences from the original. For reference, read the original.
Mao Zedong stated that political power grows from the barrel of a gun. As a notable strategist of land warfare, he was firmly convinced that military loyalty is essential for political leadership to thrive, and the purges currently being executed in the upper echelons of the military in Beijing would have been considered essential.
Mao would likely have been particularly pleased with the high-ranking military officials recently appointed by Xi Jinping. In a move of significant symbolism, during the week marking the 130th anniversary of the birth of the first president, Xi appointed two admirals to lead the Navy and the Ministry of Defense.
Some international analysts noted that while the first appointment might seem like a fairly normal succession, the second stood out as exceptional. For the first time since its establishment, an officer in dark blue uniform took the top military office of the People’s Republic of China. Experts have suggested that Xi’s choices reflect China’s naval priorities, from Taiwan to the South China Sea. In reality, these appointments are notable for three broader reasons.
First, both relate to the Navy’s loyalty to President Xi. Last year, the Chinese military was at the center of numerous scandals, from corruption in procurement contracts to the leaking of secret documents. In June, Lieutenant General Li Yuchao, commander of the Rocket Force, became the most flagrant example of a series of arrests related to the corruption of dozens of officers. In October, General Li Shangfu, Minister of Defense, was also dismissed for his role in reviewing contracts for highly sensitive capabilities.
Adding to this is the disappearance of former Foreign Minister Qin Gang, linked to the leaking scandal, raising fundamental doubts about the reliability and credibility of crucial air capabilities. Furthermore, these appointments cast doubt on Xi’s leadership, as each of them had received his strong support.
The recent appointments of Admiral Hu Zhongming and Admiral Dong Jun send a different signal. In a country where corruption is not unusual, the Navy has enjoyed considerable budgetary support to redefine its contribution to China’s defense missions, without being embroiled in cases of malpractice at its upper echelons. It projects a professional image, aligned with the moral expectations set by Xi.
This leads to the second reason why these appointments are significant. Admirals Hu and Dong are the first generation of flag officers who embody the type of military leadership that Xi envisions for a modern China, with armed forces capable of supporting its growing global ambitions. Neither is a traditional bureaucratic figure, as would have been required in the past. Nor are they office admirals, whose greatest skill is navigating the system. Both are patriotic professionals.
Admiral Dong, the new Minister of Defense, is China’s most experienced joint operational commander. China currently faces the need to improve operational planning and tactical conduct to meet its most pressing needs in theaters of operations from the east to the south, across the Taiwan Strait. As minister, Admiral Dong is not expected to be ready to command missions. However, his experience will be vital to ensure that his commanders are prepared, while he guides political leaders to make decisions that ensure their performance produces the desired effects.
Admiral Hu is not lacking in experience either. He was professionally trained in a rapidly growing Navy, expanding its capabilities and geographic reach along the Asian coast, areas unknown to his predecessors. In the face of each challenge, he took steps to transform accidents and setbacks into opportunities to improve standards and training, and even his experience allowed him to avoid a submarine disaster as the captain of the vessel.
Most importantly, in the meantime, he was learning about the submarine domain of the crucial South China Sea.
This brings us to a third observation, perhaps the most relevant. Precisely because of the type of professional loyalty they bring to Xi’s military framework, these appointments are likely to mark a new era in Chinese military behavior. China’s assertiveness could well adapt more to specific operational contexts and increase the use of submarine capabilities to test critical underwater infrastructures, such as new frontiers of its manifestation. It will be sharper and more precise; not less.
In this context, it is also likely to adopt a more global posture. It is also likely that, to counter the power of the United States and its allies, communication and coordination with Russia will be enhanced, and commitment to BRICS countries will be strengthened. Dialogue and relations with the United States will also resume, with a renewed and more professional tone, as part of this broader visibility.
All of this points to a broader conclusion. Under Xi Jinping, these new appointments could reveal that Mao’s old saying needs to be updated. In fact, it seems that under Xi, military power no longer simply arises from the barrel of a gun; rather, it emerges from an increasingly professional Navy, with a more global posture.
Alessio Patalano
King’s College London
Translated by AthenaLab and published with the author’s permission.
Originally published in Nikkei Asia on January 10, 2024.