Assessment of Four Years of Government in Public Security (2022-2026)
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- by Pilar Giannini
- Strategic Affairs
Legislative Achievements, Persistent Operational Deficits, and Implementation Challenges for the Next Government
As President Boric’s government reaches its fourth year, this document provides an assessment of its management in public security, an area that has become the primary concern for citizens during his term and has compelled the Executive to reformulate some of its initial priorities.
The analysis of the available evidence presents a dual picture. On one hand, there was unprecedented legislative productivity, equipping the State with new institutional tools. However, this achievement must be qualified: several of these initiatives were in progress from previous administrations, and their passage was made possible by a Congress that opted for collaboration rather than obstruction on this matter.
On the other hand, operational results reveal both successes and failures that prevent a triumphalist reading. While the upward trend in homicides was reversed—reducing the rate from peak of 6.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2022 to 5.4 in 2025—unprecedented figures persist in violent crimes associated with organized crime. Kidnapping, possession of firearms, and drug trafficking reached unprecedented levels,[1] evidencing a mutation of criminality towards more extreme forms of instrumental violence that the implemented policies have failed to contain.
Finally, it is evident that the next government will face a major challenge: to implement an institutional framework that, to a large extent, still lacks regulations, action plans, and operational developments. The transition between the approval of laws and their effective implementation in the next government is key to success, in a context of high citizen expectations and evolving criminality.
Legislative Agenda: The Government’s Shift and the Key Role of Congress
President Boric’s government came to power with a programmatic agenda primarily focused on social reforms. However, the rapid increase in violence in 2022—which included the peak historical homicide rate—and the growing pressure from citizens and Congress prompted a significant shift towards strengthening state capacities in this area.
It is important to qualify that the legislative advances of the period cannot be attributed solely to the executive’s initiative. On one hand, various key laws regarding institutional matters—such as the creation of the Ministry of Public Security and the new anti-terrorism law—were already in progress from previous administrations. On the other hand, the National Congress played a decisive role: unlike other periods marked by high political polarization, in security matters, both the Chamber and the Senate exhibited comparatively less obstructive behavior, approving initiatives from both the executive and the opposition. Among the most relevant regulatory milestones are—besides those mentioned—the new bill on the Intelligence System, the creation of the Supraterritorial Prosecutor’s Office, and the establishment of the Victims’ Advocacy.
However, this framework of new laws and reforms has been constructed without considering, in parallel, a national public security architecture that articulates and coordinates the efforts of the various institutions involved. This absence of a systemic design poses a structural difficulty, as it ultimately relegates the effectiveness of the new tools to the willingness of the current actors to coordinate. Comparative experience from OECD countries shows that this challenge of inter-institutional coordination is often resolved by strengthening a robust institutional framework with effective powers, capable of providing coherence to the system as a whole.[2]
Results in Crime Indicators: Advances in Homicides versus Escalation in Violence Associated with Organized Crime
The evaluation of the operational results of the security policy requires a disaggregated analysis that distinguishes between criminal categories. While the executive has emphasized improvements in certain indicators such as violent robberies and homicides, there is an unprecedented increase in high-profile crimes directly associated with the operation of organized crime.
- Homicides: Break in the Trend, but at Historically Elevated Levels
The main achievement highlighted by the government is the break in the upward curve of homicides. According to data from the Ministry of Public Security and the National Prosecutor’s Office, a peak of 6.7 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants was reached in 2022, the highest level recorded in decades. Since then, the rate has begun a sustained decline, closing at 5.4 in 2025. Additionally, the annual report from the National Prosecutor’s Office for 2025 revealed a 1.7% decrease in the total number of homicides compared to 2024.
However, these figures, while positive in their recent evolution, must be interpreted with caution. Current rates remain well above Chile’s historical averages, which ranged between 2 and 3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, there is an unequal distribution in the commission of these types of crimes, suggesting the need for intensified targeted interventions.
- Violent Crimes and Organized Crime: Unprecedented Figures in Firearms, Drugs, and Kidnappings.
The main point of concern for the assessment of the period consists of crimes directly associated with the operation of organized criminal gangs. According to the latest police report presented by the Ministry of Public Security[3] there are increases in crimes associated with firearms and drugs. While this increase can be interpreted as a result of greater enforcement efforts, it may also reflect a higher circulation of these elements within the criminal context. In fact, criminal organizations often employ high firepower and have significant participation in the drug trafficking market, as noted in a report on organized crime in Chile developed by the National Prosecutor’s Office.
In terms of kidnappings, the period from 2022 to 2026 saw a consolidation of this practice as part of the regular repertoire of organized crime. According to data from the Prosecutor’s Office, kidnappings linked to organized crime reached 38% in 2024. Regarding the nationality of the accused, a quarter of the cases involved at least one foreigner, increasing by ten points compared to 2022. This evidences a mutation of the crime towards more extreme forms of instrumental violence linked to organized criminal organizations.
In the realm of violent robberies, the assessment is mixed. While violent robberies in general experienced a decrease in the last year of government—by 9.8%—and violent vehicle thefts—by 22%—the 15.2% increase in the total number of crimes in 2025 was primarily driven by cybercrimes, an expanding category that poses new challenges for prevention and criminal prosecution policies.
Persistent Challenges and Pending Tasks: Penitentiary Crisis, Pending Police Reform, and Bottlenecks in Criminal Prosecution.
Despite the intense legislative activity deployed in the last period, the assessment reveals structural deficits that were not resolved and that will condition security in the next period.
- Penitentiary Crisis
The Chilean penitentiary system is undergoing a critical situation, particularly regarding overcrowding—reaching 141% of prison capacity—and weak control within prisons with evident inflows of illicit substances. Additionally, there has been an increase in the admission of foreign individuals overrepresented in drug-related crimes and homicide convictions[4] which may be linked to criminal organizations. In summary, prisons remain completely overcrowded, making it impossible to properly segregate the penal population by criminological profiles and fostering criminal contact that deepens the criminal careers of inmates.
- Structural Reform of the Police
The ambitious reform project for Carabineros and subsequently for the police, proposed at the beginning of this government, has progressively diluted, replaced by a focus on budget strengthening and equipment renewal. The model, centered on providing material resources rather than on institutional culture, training models, and internal control, is a necessary debt to resolve considering the scarce existing resources.
This situation leads to reflection on the fact that the participation of the Armed Forces in internal security tasks should be only exceptional, transitory, and subject to limits. Therefore, the prolonged nature of these deployments raises the need to clearly define the missions assigned to each institution in the new organized crime scenario. This challenge, due to its transnational dimension and implications for national security, transcends the realm of public security and requires a comprehensive and coordinated response from the State. The strategic definition is the framework through which this coordination is articulated, what the impact of the results is, what means will materialize it, and what resources will be used.
Implementation Challenges for the Next Government.
The assessment of the period 2022-2026 cannot conclude without noting that the next government will face major challenges in security, arising not only from the persistence of criminal violence but also from accumulated citizen expectations and pending tasks in the implementation of approved institutional changes.
Implementation of New Institutions
Despite the positive aspects of the creation of new institutions and legal frameworks during President Boric’s government, they still lack the regulations, operational developments, and necessary installed capacities for their full functioning. The next government will not only have to manage security in the short term but also complete an implementation process that is currently in its initial phases. Two examples are particularly illustrative of this gap between the law and its effective implementation: the Municipal Security Law and the new State Intelligence Law.
- Municipal Security Law. Enacted in February 2026, the Municipal Security Law constitutes a milestone in the preventive recognition of local governments, establishing a clear framework that creates and regulates the functions of municipal security inspectors, their coordination with the police, and the use of technologies for crime prevention. The law authorizes municipal teams to carry out autonomous actions—such as arresting in flagrant cases, seizing illegal goods, and conducting surveillance tasks—and collaborative functions with Carabineros such as joint patrols and traffic controls. However, the law includes a six-month vacancy period from its enactment for it to come into effect, and there is a series of enabling regulations that need to be drafted, publicized, and put into operation for the correct application of the law’s spirit.
Furthermore, although it was defined that the Undersecretary for Crime Prevention will collaborate in the acquisition of protective equipment for inspectors, as well as in the development of a technological platform for information sharing, these resources will be distributed based on territorial prioritization criteria that will need to be executed by the next government.
- Intelligence Law. Even more paradigmatic is the case of the new State Intelligence Law, dispatched by Congress on January 28, 2026, after more than seven years of processing. The law introduces changes to the State Intelligence System (SIE): it creates the Interministerial Intelligence Council, chaired by the Minister of the Interior; establishes the State Intelligence Committee, led by the director of the ANI; incorporates collaborating agencies into the system such as the National Cybersecurity Agency, Gendarmería, the Financial Analysis Unit, Customs, and the SII; and sets new control mechanisms, among other modifications.
- However, this law establishes important deadlines for its operationalization, such as the bill regulating the special statute for ANI personnel. Additionally, the First National Intelligence Policy of the State must be issued, which will set the medium- and long-term strategic objectives. This implies that the secondary regulatory framework and the consolidation of inter-institutional mechanisms will need to be developed by the next administration. The magnitude of the challenge is not minor.
In summary, the next government will not only have to manage security in the short term but also complete the implementation process of an institutional framework that, for now, exists mainly on paper. Both the Municipal Security Law and the new Intelligence Law represent significant legislative advances, but their effectiveness will critically depend on the next administration’s ability to issue the pending regulations, allocate the committed resources, train personnel, and consolidate the new coordination structures. The transition between the approval of laws and their effective implementation on the ground is thus shaping up to be one of the main tests for security policy in the next period.
4.2 Citizen Expectations and Social Pressure
Citizens have placed security as their primary concern throughout the period, and perception surveys—such as the ENUSC—show a persistent gap between the improvement of some objective indicators and the subjective experience of the population. This phenomenon, attributable in part to the high media exposure of violence and accumulated institutional distrust, creates a scenario of high expectations for the next administration, which will need to manage not only results in criminal matters but also communication and the generation of public trust.
The Mutation of Organized Crime
Finally, the next government will have to face a criminal reality that has significantly mutated over the past four years. The consolidation of criminal organizations—acting as true criminal enterprises—with logistical and violent capabilities, the internalization of criminal gangs in the country, and the normalization of practices such as kidnapping and the use of firearms as instruments of territorial dispute pose challenges for which the Chilean State has not yet developed fully effective capacities. Consequently, the new government will need to not only implement the created institutions but also adapt them to a constantly evolving criminal reality.
Conclusions
President Boric’s government managed the dispatch of a long-awaited legislative package on security, although it is necessary to qualify that several of these initiatives were not of its original authorship and that their processing was made possible by a Congress that opted for collaboration. On the operational front, official figures indicate a deceleration in the increase of homicides and a reduction in the rate compared to the critical peak in 2022.
However, the overall assessment reveals significant limitations. The perception of insecurity has not diminished, and indicators of violent crimes associated with organized crime—such as kidnappings, possession of firearms, and drug trafficking—have reached unprecedented figures in the historical series. The penitentiary crisis is now evident, not only due to high levels of overcrowding but also due to the commission of crimes within the prisons themselves. The committed reforms regarding the police were insufficient, and the prolonged use of states of exception highlights the need to clearly define the missions of the Armed Forces in internal security.
The government leaves a legacy beyond laws and resources, but fails to consolidate a state policy on security that balances punitive approaches with deep institutional reform and a long-term preventive strategy. Particularly critical is the realization that no progress was made—nor was there will or interest to do so—in articulating a national security architecture that systematically integrates and coordinates the police, Armed Forces, intelligence, the penitentiary system, and criminal prosecution. This absence of strategic design, which transcends the mere overlap of laws and institutions, ultimately relegated the effectiveness of the new tools to the willingness of current actors to coordinate, without addressing the structural causes of institutional fragmentation. The next government will thus face the major challenge of implementing an institutional framework still in formation, in a context of evolving criminality and high citizen expectations that will demand tangible and high-impact results in the short term. The transition between the approval of laws and their effective implementation on the ground is consequently shaping up to be the main test for security policy in the next period.
[1] According to the National Prosecutor’s Office report on organized crime, kidnappings doubled in 2022 (492 in 2021 compared to 826 in 2022), remaining at high levels during 2023 and 2024, reaching 850 and 857 cases respectively. In the case of drugs, in 2025 there was a 24.8% increase compared to 2024. In the case of firearms, there was a 3.4% increase compared to 2024 but with an upward trend (thresholds above the expected averages in the results management model of Carabineros de Chile, according to their own methodology).
[2] For more details on the need for a robust national security architecture, see Massalleras, M. (2026). “Proposal for a New National Security Architecture for Chile”: Athenalab. Available at https://www.athenalab.org/publicaciones/2026/01/26/estudio-propuesta-para-una-nueva-arquitectura-de-seguridad-para-chile/
[3] 2025 Assessment Ministry of Security. Available at https://bit.ly/4tXTmg0
[4] Gabriel Ugarte and Rodrigo Vergara. “Immigration and Crime: Latest Figures.” Benchmark Points: Economy and Public Policy. No. 663 (July 2023). Center for Public Studies. https://www.cepchile.cl/investigacion/inmigracion-y-delincuencia-ultimas-cifras/
