Elections in Polarized Societies: Implications for Chile

1. Context

Two general elections marked the international agenda this past weekend. Both took place in strongly divided societies, albeit for different reasons: Peru and Hungary.¹. In Peru, the high fragmentation of the vote postponed the presidential decision to a second round; in Hungary, the overwhelming victory of the opposition ended sixteen years of Viktor Orbán’s hegemony. Beyond their institutional differences and geographical distance from Chile, what do the results of these elections tell us? What strategic implications do they pose for our country?

Figure 1. Political-Institutional Profile of Peru and Hungary

2. Peru and Rootless Democracy

The first round of the presidential election in Peru offered few surprises. As in previous processes, the election took place in a context of strong conflict between the Executive and the Legislative, a large number of candidates, and a contested definition of the runoff, marked by allegations of electoral fraud. At the close of this report, the second round has been defined between Keiko Fujimori (17%) and leftist candidate Roberto Sánchez (12%).

The Peruvian electoral scenario is preceded by a sequence of political crises. Since 2016, presidential resignations and dismissals due to accusations of corruption and “moral incapacity” have become recurrent². Paradoxically, this high turnover did not contain the proliferation of presidential candidacies: in 2026, the thirty-five candidates registered in the first round confirmed the anomaly. However, the abundance of names coexists with a scarcity of solid, stable political alternatives with territorial anchorage. This has fueled citizen disaffection, weakened the legitimacy of institutions, and strengthened personalist leaderships³.

The second round is shaping up to be a polarized and competitive contest. However, the high vote for candidates linked to the political right makes the victory of Keiko Fujimori in her fourth attempt to reach the presidency likely. If this result materializes, Peru would join a visible trend in part of Latin America since 2022: the alternation in power and the ideological shift to the right (figure 2).

Figure 2. Projection of the Political-Ideological Map in South America since June 2026

In a country undergoing a deep representation crisis, without parties with clear programmatic identities and with limited capacity for mediation⁴, the possible victory of the right should not be read as an exclusively ideological shift. Rather, it expresses the weight of a situation in which insecurity has become the main organizer of political competition in the region⁵. So far, Fujimori and many of the candidacies whose votes could tilt the second round have focused their promises on a hardline approach against crime and irregular immigration. With homicides, extortion, and contract killings at the center of public concern, the election seems to favor the Fujimorist alternative.

3. The Fall of the “Illiberal” Reference

In Hungary, the result left little room for speculation. The ruling party, Fidesz, suffered a resounding defeat against Tisza, the opposition force that obtained two-thirds of the seats in Parliament. This concluded Orbán’s era as prime minister, after four consecutive re-elections since 2010.

Three dynamics seem to have eroded support for Orbán. The first was the wear caused by persistent corruption allegations. Scandals and nepotism practices reinforced the perception that Fidesz had devolved into a machine for political favors⁶. This made the anti-corruption promise of the opponent – and former ally – Péter Magyar resonate with a weary electorate.

The second dynamic was economic deterioration. Since mid-2022, the interest rate in Hungary has remained above 6%, and the country grew by only 0.4% last year⁷. Compared to neighboring economies, such as those of Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia, Hungary’s performance was weaker, reinforcing the perception that Orbán no longer guaranteed material well-being.

The third dynamic was the growing political cost of Orbán’s confrontation with the European Union, in a context marked by his closeness to Moscow. By denying military support to Ukraine and blocking sanctions against Russia⁸, the prime minister deepened his isolation in Europe and reinforced the perception that this strategy was generating material costs for Hungary, which still had about €17 billion in European funds withheld due to failures in rule of law (figure 3).

 Figure 3. Democratic Deterioration in Hungary 2000-2024, according to V-Dem indices⁹

The results of the elections in Hungary are relevant because they contradict several entrenched intuitions. When the deterioration of liberal democracies seemed to have settled as an unquestionable diagnosis, Orbán’s defeat shows that mobilization at the polls still matters, even when the mechanisms of checks and balances weaken. Likewise, the intervention of a superpower like the United States in a domestic election – Vice President J. D. Vance traveled to Budapest a few days prior to support Orbán – seemed not to alter the electorate’s preferences. Hungary thus demonstrates that liberal democracy can still prevail, even in one of the emblematic strongholds of so-called “illiberal democracies.” .4. Implications for Chile

The results of the elections in Peru and Hungary have direct and indirect implications for Chile. In the case of Peru, the likely election of a candidate ideologically aligned with the Trump administration will increase the chances of reinforcing the strategic alliance between the two countries. This bilateral link has increased in recent years, with recent milestones including negotiations for the eventual purchase of a dozen F-16 fighter jets by Peru from the United States

10^{, and the decision made by Washington on January 14, 2026, to designate Peru as a “Major Non-NATO Ally”}11^{, the largest military strategic alliance in the world.}Although this status does not imply an automatic defense guarantee for Peru, it does provide certain military and economic benefits, such as expedited licenses for access to satellite technology, cooperative research and development, commercial leasing of defense items, and counter-terrorism cooperation. In South America, only Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia maintain this category. In this context, the fact that two of Chile’s three neighbors maintain a privileged military relationship with the United States forces our country to consider how it aspires to position itself with respect to Washington in the medium and long term, and whether it is advisable to reinforce, balance, or diversify its own strategic alliances. 

Simultaneously, a probable rapprochement of the new Peruvian government to the United States could strain relations with China, which seeks to preserve its influence in the South Pacific. The recent conflict surrounding the port of Chancay and other disagreements between the two superpowers over their influence in Peru anticipate tensions that, under certain conditions, could also project onto our country.

On the other hand, the possible ideological affinity between the future Peruvian government and the Kast administration could facilitate a more fluid relationship of trust and cooperation. The convergence of interests in areas such as combating transnational organized crime, border control, and economic projections towards the South Pacific opens an opportunity to strengthen ties at a symbolically relevant moment: the proximity of the centenary of the 1929 Treaty, which resolved the sovereignty controversy between the two countries after the Pacific War. However, this possibility will depend on the ability of the next Peruvian president to stabilize internal politics and sustain their government in a country marked by years of instability. 

Regarding the electoral results in Hungary, their implications are more indirect for Chile. Nevertheless, Orbán’s defeat sends several warning signals to the Kast government, which has expressed admiration for the leadership model of the Hungarian prime minister and his security policies

12^.First, the Hungarian experience suggests that the “securitization” of the agenda may be effective for gaining power, but insufficient for retaining it. The discourse of order and the promise of control ensure the cohesion of an electoral majority in contexts of fear and uncertainty. However, once in government, this formula begins to wear thin if not accompanied by economic results and expectations of collective progress. Orbán’s Hungary shows, in this sense, that security can open an electoral door, but does not replace the conditions that sustain the legitimacy of a project over time.   

Orbán’s fall also suggests that the main threat to a right-wing project does not always come from the left, but from internal dissent capable of capitalizing on its mistakes. When a government begins to be associated with corruption and system capture, its most effective critics are often those who understand its language, share part of its electorate, and can present themselves as a correction rather than a break. For President Kast, the lesson is clear: the most serious risks to his government could come from figures or sectors on the right capable of contesting his base from a more credible and less worn position.

Finally, Orbán’s decline shows that international alignments can generate internal costs. A strongly identity-driven foreign policy can become, over time, a source of visible costs if it becomes associated with isolation, rigidity, or material detriment to the country. For the new government in Chile, the lesson is that ideological closeness to certain external leaderships poses risks, as it can become a liability if it ends up affecting valuable strategic relationships for national interest.

Diego Sazo

Head of Research in International Relations
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1. V-Dem, “Political polarization score – V-Dem” [dataset], procesado por Our World in Data, basado en “Democracy report v16” [datos originales], consultado el 13 de abril de 2026, https://archive.ourworldindata.org/20260402-164039/grapher/political-polarization-score.html ↩︎
2. Carmen Ilizarbe Pizarro, “Perú 2022: Colapso democrático, estallido social y transición autoritaria,” Revista de Ciencia Política 43, no. 2, 2024. ↩︎
3. Carlos Meléndez, The Post-Partisans: Anti-Partisans, Anti-Establishment Identifiers, and Apartisans in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2022). ↩︎
4. Jason Seawright, Party-System Collapse: The Roots of Crisis in Peru and Venezuela (Stanford University Press, 2012). ↩︎
5. Lucía Dammert, Anatomía del poder ilegal: Violencia, crimen organizado y corrupción en América Latina (Ariel, 2025). ↩︎
6. József Péter Martin y Áron Hajnal, “Trials and Errors: Limitations of Anti-Corruption and Rule-of-Law Policies in the Context of Systemic Corruption. The Case of Hungary,” Public Integrity, 2025, 1-16; Mihály Fazekas y István János Tóth, “From Corruption to State Capture: A New Analytical Framework with Empirical Applications from Hungary,” Political Research Quarterly 69, no. 2, 2016, 320-334. ↩︎
7. Trading Economics, “Hungary GDP Growth Rate,” con datos de la Hungarian Central Statistical, consultado el 14 de abril de 2026, https://tradingeconomics.com/hungary/gdp-growth ↩︎
8. The Guardian, “Viktor Orbán refuses to agree to €90bn loan for Ukraine as EU leaders accuse him of betrayal,” 19 de marzo de 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/19/hungary-orban-ukraine-loan-veto-eu-summit-europe ↩︎
9. Según V-Dem, el indicador “Democracia electoral” calcula en qué medida los gobernantes son elegidos mediante elecciones libres, justas y competitivas, con sufragio amplio y libertad de organización política y de prensa. “Democracia liberal”, en tanto, extiende la democracia electoral incorporando la protección de derechos individuales y de minorías frente al Estado: independencia judicial, estado de derecho y límites constitucionales al ejecutivo. ↩︎
10. La República, “Gobierno elige los cazas F-16 Block 70 en un proceso con criterio político,” 14 de abril de 2026, https://larepublica.pe/politica/2026/04/14/gobierno-elige-los-cazas-f16-block-70-en-un-proceso-con-criterio-politico-fuerza-aerea-del-peru-fap-mindef-ministerio-de-defensa-hnews-570332  ↩︎
11. Swissinfo, “Perú anuncia que Trump lo propone como aliado principal «extra OTAN»,” 13 de diciembre de 2025, https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/per%C3%BA-anuncia-que-trump-lo-propone-como-aliado-principal-%22extra-otan%22/90634216 ↩︎
12. France 24, “El presidente electo de Chile dice que se inspirará en políticas de Italia y Hungría,” 7 de febrero de 2026, https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20260207-el-presidente-electo-de-chile-dice-que-se-inspirar%C3%A1-en-pol%C3%ADticas-de-italia-y-hungr%C3%ADa ↩︎