The troubled relationship between Bolivia and the People's Republic of China

Beijing's presence in the Latin American country is experiencing one of its weakest moments after two decades of expansion. Stalled projects, companies leaving the country, military equipment out of service, and the Bolivian economic and political crisis have eroded a relationship that reached its peak during the corrupt governments of the MAS.

In May 2026, while Bolivia was paralyzed by protests aimed at overthrowing the government of Rodrigo Paz, the People’s Republic of China and its ambassador in Bolivia, Wang Liang, maintained a striking silence in the face of the crisis. In a dystopian scenario, anti-government elements launched dynamite at the police and maintained roadblocks that prevented the entry of food, gasoline, and even medical supplies into the capital, La Paz, while Wang Liang celebrated an economic forum in the southern department of Tarija, ironically titled “Bolivia, to the World with China.”

From May 20 to 30, 2026, the author traveled to Bolivia, where he engaged with business, academic, and government personnel regarding the evolution of the country’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China, among other topics. This work reflects the ideas drawn from those contacts and supplementary research.

Chinese activities in Bolivia have notably deteriorated compared to their golden era under the leftist populist governments of Evo Morales and Luis Arce, as reflected in a myriad of projects marred by corruption, poor outcomes, and resistance from affected communities. The growing economic, fiscal, and political crisis in Bolivia, as well as the Paz government’s efforts to restore positive relations with the United States and other Western countries, have also limited China’s progress.

Between 2006 and 2019, the Morales government opened Bolivia wide to economic, military, technical, and other forms of cooperation with the People’s Republic of China. During that period, the People’s Republic of China sold Bolivia 6 K-8 fighter jets, 6 Z-9 military helicopters, 31 armored vehicles, and an indeterminate number of trucks and patrol boats, as well as the national surveillance system BOL-110, customs scanners, and the Tupac Katari satellite, including the construction and equipping of ground space facilities in Amachuma (La Paz) and in the La Guardia district of Santa Cruz, in addition to sending Chinese technicians to support the facilities.

According to Bolivian entrepreneurs interviewed for this work, more than 60 Chinese companies operated in the country during that period, selling telecommunications equipment and building digital infrastructure for the national telecommunications company ENTEL, supplying equipment and performing work for the mining and oil sectors, and participating in infrastructure projects valued at an estimated $6 billion, ranging from asphalt and zinc processing plants to hydroelectric plants like Rositas, San José, and Ivirzu, as well as large road and railway projects. However, almost all of them consisted of contracts with the Bolivian state for the acquisition of Chinese goods and services, rather than real investments. Currently, fewer than 20 companies based in the People’s Republic of China continue to operate in the country. The Chinese ambassador himself, Wang Liang, has attributed the lack of Chinese investment to Bolivia’s uncertain nature..

In the infrastructure sector, virtually all Chinese projects are stalled. Their main construction companies in the country, Sinohydro, Vicstar and CAMCE, have closed or significantly reduced their offices. The government has refused to accept a major highway between Santa Cruz and Cochabamba built by Sinohydro, which has been found to have numerous structural defects. The $460 million steel processing plant built by Sinosteel in El Mutún has far exceeded the initially promised delivery date, has hundreds of identified defects, and has yet to produce a gram of steel. Megaprojects once considered, such as the central railway line of the IIRSA that would connect the Atlantic and Pacific through Bolivia, are no longer even seriously debated.

At the local level, Chinese companies are hindered by problems largely caused by themselves. Executives from the Bolivian construction sector interviewed for this work noted that few local companies want to provide services to Chinese companies due in part to abusive practices of very low and often delayed payment, as well as issues with their compliance with local labor, environmental, and other laws.

In the oil sector, there were reportedly quality issues with drilling equipment and services sold by companies based in the People’s Republic of China to the previous MAS government. Recently, there has been little activity from companies based in the People’s Republic of China in the sector.In the mining sector, several smaller Chinese companies reportedly sell equipment and buy gold and other metals, primarily in the informal mining sector, but there has been little formal investment from large Chinese mining companies.

In the

lithium sector, Chinese companies CATL and CITIC Gouan have contracts that have yet to be ratified by the Bolivian Congress. In February 2026, these mining companies reportedly took a delegation of Bolivian congress members to the People’s Republic of China to facilitate such ratification, but so far without success.In the

agricultural sector, experts interviewed for this work indicate that Chinese agricultural logistics companies, such as COFCO and its subsidiary Nidera, do not operate in the country. They also noted that few local producers want to bear the costs and risks of sending their products to the People’s Republic of China, dealing with a Chinese client when they have trusted buyers for their products closer to home.In the telecommunications sector, the industrial giant Huawei has performed poorly in Bolivia and has closed offices, although its Chinese rival ZTE continues to carry out telecommunications infrastructure work for ENTEL. Nevertheless,

companies based in the People’s Republic of China have collectively built more than half of the country’s telecommunications infrastructure. The Chinese luxury brand Xiaomi is marketed through a Bolivian partner, and the Chinese company Honor, which competes primarily on cost, is rapidly expanding in the country.In the retail sector, Chinese cars and other products have achieved considerable penetration in the country, mainly through local Bolivian companies, such as the Saavedra group in the automotive sector. However, it is noteworthy that companies based in the People’s Republic of China have not established shopping centers for the sale of Chinese products, as they have done in

Nicaragua ,Honduras and other places in the region. The few that remain in Bolivia, such as the veteran Chinbol and ChinaCruz, are managed by local entrepreneurs who supply the stores through small-scale relationships with individual suppliers from the People’s Republic of China. In the business and academic community in general, ties with the People’s Republic of China remain equally limited. Bolivia’s ambassador to the People’s Republic of China during the MAS era,

Hugo Núñez del Prado , was called back by the Arce government and has yet to be replaced. There is a small chamber of commerce and friendship society between China and Bolivia led by Bolivian sinologist Ximena Barrientos, who grew up in the People’s Republic of China. Similarly, the country has only one Confucius Institute, at the University of San Simón in Cochabamba, home to the political ally Evo Morales and his coca growers’ federation. There are none in the capital or in Santa Cruz, the economic center of the country. That center was once linked to “volunteer” teachers from the People’s Republic of China who worked at state universities in other departments, although reportedly that Chinese staff has been replaced by Bolivian personnel.Although several Bolivian universities have small Chinese programs, interviewees for this work found it difficult to name a degree program at a Bolivian university dedicated to the study of China from a business, political, or security perspective. Similarly, while some Bolivian journalists have been invited to the People’s Republic of China to participate in training programs, interviewees found it hard to name any who particularly stood out for their coverage of China-related issues.

In terms of

security , although the Bolivian army reportedly continues to send personnel to courses in the People’s Republic of China, according to Bolivian security officials who spoke confidentially,currently no member of the Chinese army participates in courses in Bolivia. Of the six K-8 fighter jets sold to Bolivia, two have crashed, and reportedly only one remains operational, reflecting the difficulties in maintaining and finding spare parts for the aircraft. Similarly, of the six Z-9 Chinese helicopters acquired by the MAS governments, only one remains operational, and according to unofficially consulted security officials, the army is wary of flying in it due to its maintenance condition. The fleet of trucks and armored vehicles manufactured in the People’s Republic of China is reportedly in a similar state of partial deterioration, with no current plans to acquire more.In the space sector, the contract for China to maintain the ground facilities controlling the satellite

Tupac Katari expired some time ago, and reportedly, the Chinese personnel who visited the facilities have stopped coming. Currently, there are no plans to replace the satellite when its useful life expires in 2030. It is important to recognize that China’s current setbacks in Bolivia are due to the disastrous performance of entities based in the People’s Republic of China that have dealt with the former corrupt MAS regimes

, as well as the uncertainty arising from the current economic and political crisis. This will only translate into an opportunity for the United States if Washington acts decisively to offer concrete alternatives to the government in La Paz and the Bolivian business community.*Originally published in Infobae.

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