COLUMN | The Dispute Over Antarctica

En una época en que hay potencias revisionistas que colocan en duda el orden global y las reglas que nos han gobernado los últimos 80 años, es muy posible que tratados como el Antártico puedan perder fuerza y necesitemos de la fuerza para defender lo que es nuestro.

El Mostrador, June 1, 2024

In an era where revisionist powers question the global order and the rules that have governed us for the past 80 years, it is very likely that treaties like the Antarctic Treaty may lose strength, and we may need to use force to defend what is ours.

Antarctica has been in the news and is likely to remain so, as it has recently become a declared object of desire for more than one power. This is compounded by the fact that our trans-Andean neighbors have been prioritizing the southern and Antarctic regions as their most important national objective for several years, regardless of whether the Kirchnerist left or Milei’s libertarians are in charge.

In this regard, Argentines do not get entangled, and as a new friend of mine aptly stated, Argentine progressivism—unlike Chilean progressivism—clearly understands national interest, not falling into the trap of Latin American brotherhood and multilateralism when it comes to territories and sovereignty. On the other hand, Milei has promised that Argentina will be great again and a regional power, with a particular interest in recovering the islands of the South Atlantic, which provide a projection over Antarctica, and in exercising sovereignty over the maritime and land spaces they claim as their own, as well as in ways to push the borders with Chile westward, so that they have some direct projection over Antarctica, since the other territory they claim is in British hands.

To better understand the issue, we must start with the Antarctic Treaty signed in 1959 by 12 countries, including Chile, which is of indefinite nature and has been in force since 1961. Article 4 regulates the issue of sovereignty rights and territorial claims over the frozen continent, expressly recognizing the rights and claims of the seven countries that had them prior to signing the treaty (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom), protecting them in such a way that it does not allow new claims or actions that could alter the existing situation prior to the signing.

To date, the Antarctic Treaty has 57 countries that are parties to it, some of which, like the United States or Russia, reserve the right to make claims, but for this to happen, the treaty would need to be terminated or modified, due to what is stated in Article 4. Others simply assert that Antarctica belongs to no one, and that the supposed sovereign rights and claims are mere fantasies.

Chile, like other countries, seeks to establish its rights or claims based on its geographical proximity, presence and activity on the ground, and inherited rights. The same should apply to Australia and New Zealand, and, as far as the United Kingdom is concerned. Argentina, as mentioned earlier, seeks to create or fabricate geographical proximity by pressuring its western neighbor, or by secretly assigning ownership of the islands of King Charles III.

We are a good example of the above, as we have historically met all the requirements, but we must be careful not to relax on this matter simply because there is a treaty that supposedly protects our sovereign interests.

If we say that Chile starts in Arica and ends at the South Pole, we must ensure that this is the case and that what is indicated in the decree of November 6, 1940, which establishes what is Chilean Antarctica, is a reality. It is not enough that the Chilean Antarctic Institute (INACH) is located in Punta Arenas, or that investments related to Antarctic matters are being made in that same city or in Puerto Williams. The presence must be real, permanent, and extend all the way to the South Pole. We must do this because it is an integral part of Chile, with a concrete example being that the Navy will allocate three ships to Antarctic tasks, which is a clear demonstration of action accompanying the discourse.

Returning to Argentina, it is not surprising that they seek the favor of the United States, or previously of China. They seek to have a power team up with them in their effort to enhance the quality of their claim, which would allow them to invest in the logistical infrastructure needed, as they do not have the funds required for the necessary investments.

Chile, Argentina, and the United Kingdom have overlapping spaces. For now, everyone is behaving well, but before the signing of the treaty, this was a rather contentious issue from the end of World War II until the late 1950s. González Videla’s trip to Chilean Antarctica was primarily aimed at reaffirming Chile’s sovereignty in the sector that was at risk, a tremendous effort for the time, accompanied by the establishment of bases and an annual activity of research and exercise of sovereignty that has not stopped since then.

The existence of INACH and the tireless work of Óscar Pinochet de la Barra are key elements in the development of Chilean Antarctica, as is the work carried out by the National Defense institutions on the white continent, as well as by Chilean universities and national research organizations. Reviving Villa Las Estrellas is strategic, as is moving further south, toward where Chile ends, at the South Pole.

In an era where revisionist powers question the global order and the rules that have governed us for the past 80 years, it is very likely that treaties like the Antarctic Treaty may lose strength, and we may need to use force to defend what is ours. It would be a miracle for the treaty to survive in the world envisioned for the future, which is why sovereignty must be exercised now and given the priority that the issue deserves. We should not be lamenting later if the trans-Andeans and the British outmaneuver us in this matter, or if a third party takes what is ours. We must be capable of operating 365 days a year in the southern and Antarctic spaces.

Richard Kouyoumdjian
Vice President, AthenaLab

Source: El Mostrador