COLUMN | How Should the National Intelligence System Improve?

Clearly, every law and system can improve, but to expect that merely enhancing the existing law will significantly change the capabilities and effectiveness of the system is extremely naive.

One of the issues that experts, academics, members of the current government, and participants from both administrations of Sebastián Piñera mention as necessary is to have a robust and effective national intelligence system that aligns with the current needs of Chile, both due to the global scenario and the public security issues we face. The general consensus is that the current system is inadequate and is not fulfilling its purpose, which does not necessarily stem from the current law.

The current national intelligence system is regulated by the Law 19.974 of 2004, which, in addition to establishing the operation of the system and administrative aspects, creates the National Intelligence Agency (ANI), the legal successor of the Public Security and Information Directorate that was created in 1993 with a focus on public order and security, rather than on the intelligence function of the State as a whole or with the systemic perspective that currently governs us.

Clearly, every law and system can improve, but to expect that merely enhancing the existing law will significantly change the capabilities and effectiveness of the system is extremely naive and falls into the same category of naiveté as the creation of the Ministry of Security, which some believe will eliminate the criminals, terrorists, and insurgents that plague present-day Chile simply by existing and having a minister in charge.

What aspects should be improved in the current law?, which, in the opinion of this author and some reputable experts, is not bad, but after 20 years does need some adjustments. We are talking about those related to the staffing of the ANI, which by law has a staffing level close to 100, needing to have 7 to 10 times that if we take the intelligence services of European countries, particularly Spain, as a reference; a budget of at least US$80 million (10 times the current amount); a law that allows us to develop career specialists in whom we can invest; allowing governance and operation of the system to be more fluid and integrated; ensuring that matters related to intelligence are classified and that violations are punishable by imprisonment, and that it has maximum capabilities in local and international data collection of all types and its processing.

The improvements currently being discussed in Congress focus primarily on governance and the purpose of the system, but do not necessarily generate real muscle or increases in capabilities, and in that sense, suffer from the same problems as the law that creates the Ministry of Public Security, in that its modification does not resolve the issue we have of good and timely intelligence, and could even jeopardize what already exists.

Delving into details, the current law, perhaps suitable for 2004, assumes and continues the direction of public security and information created during Aylwin’s government in 1993, basing its initial capacity both on numbers and on the members of the directorate it replaced, but failing to be flexible regarding staffing, as well as in creating specialists in the field and the professional career they could develop, which remains the main problem 20 years later.

To conduct intelligence, we need people who know, have the experience, and possess the capabilities required for current times, times of AI and increasingly complex realities.

The bill that modernizes intelligence does create an Intelligence School, but fails in terms of necessary staffing and the development of a professional career, which, among other things, would facilitate investment and training in the organization’s human capital. This is standard in organizations like those in Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

As I mentioned earlier, the bill being discussed in Congress for over 5 years places much focus on corporate governance, new roles, and committees, but does not ensure or improve that coordination and information flow within the system occurs or that, if it does happen, it is quick and timely, which is one of the shortcomings of the current system, where often the director of the ANI has to request support for things to function. That said, it does incorporate organizations such as the Civil Registry, SII, Customs, UAF, Gendarmerie, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and all those that have something to do with the matter.

Nor does the law being discussed allocate greater budgets to the ANI or its successor, the Civil National Intelligence Agency (ANIC), which are necessary not only to have larger and better-prepared human teams but also to acquire superlative technological capabilities, AI, and data processing, whether from human sources or other means such as cameras, reading portals, communication interception, etc., all things characteristic of the modernity we live in. In this section, it does recognize the need for a Intelligence Fusion Center, a central component in creating information for decision-making by national authorities.

To conclude, the capabilities we have in intelligence will be directly proportional to the investment we make in the field, to the preparation and human and technological capabilities we possess, to the fluidity and timeliness of information, to the quality of corporate governance, where complexity does not help, and in understanding that it is a system that must be managed as such to be effective.

What cannot happen is to leave things as they are or to settle for a new intelligence law that does not address the main issues, which are the lack of capabilities in the system both humanly and technologically, and that, without them, it will not be effective or robust, or up to what we need for present-day Chile and the complexities of tomorrow.