Political Responsibility for the Management of National Defense

In Chile, our defense capabilities reflect what we can apparently afford rather than what we actually need, a fact tacitly accepted by both the Executive and Legislative branches. It is not that there is no money; rather, we do not wish to invest it in defense.

What does a country do when it is evident that National Defense is not receiving the necessary attention? Who is responsible for the lack of investment in strategic capabilities or the budget of the Armed Forces to operate? What should the commanders-in-chief of the armed institutions do to represent such situations? What is the role of the Minister of National Defense, and what responsibilities does he have regarding the portfolio he oversees? What role does civil society play in something as important as the defense of Chile?

It is clear that the President of the Republic is ultimately responsible for what happens within his government, setting priorities and ensuring they are executed in a timely and proper manner.. To this end, he has the assistance of the so-called “second floor,” a specialized management control unit that helps him verify and ensure that things happen.

In the case of National Defense, he delegates its management to the Minister of Defense, but at the end of the day, he controls and has the final authority by approving defense policy, the budget, the appointments of the commanders-in-chief, the Chief of the Joint Staff, and the composition of the senior leadership of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

In present-day Chile, priorities lie in rebuilding economic capacities and substantially improving the quality of public security provided to citizens, reducing crime and defeating organized crime before it is too late. Defense is not among the priorities, despite what is happening in the Southern Macrozone and at the northern and northeastern borders, as well as the intended support for the police.

One could argue that we are facing an absence of external threats or that our national interests are not at risk, but this is not a well-supported claim given that the world is going through one of its most complex moments. These are not times to be without relevant military capabilities, especially in a world where the message from superpowers is that one must fend for oneself and that the days of relying on others are over. Countries must have the capacity to defend themselves against external threats—neighboring, regional, and global—to their territory and national interests, and this is something they must be able to address both now and in the future. If they do not have a clear understanding of the threats, they must develop the minimum necessary capabilities to ensure national survival, which is not something that can be built overnight.

It is expected that the above should be captured by the defense policy and the respective military policy. Ideally, there should be a National Security policy that outlines what is expected from National Defense, as well as from public security systems and intelligence, which together with National Defense form the basis of a country’s National Security, such as Chile, which, despite being at the southern tip of the world, is not exempt from risks.

It happens that in Chile, defense policy does not necessarily align with the budgetary. The former indicates what we should have, while the latter indicates what we can have in terms of capabilities and operational budgets. In Chile, our defense capabilities reflect what we can apparently afford rather than what we actually need, a fact tacitly accepted by both the Executive and Legislative branches. It is not that there is no money; rather, we do not wish to invest it in defense, clearly prioritizing social spending and public security.Defense investment as a percentage of GDP is less than 1.5%, and as part of the public budget, it is slightly less than 4.5% if we include everything, including pensions.

Clearly, the commanders-in-chief have responsibilities, but the political world demands obedience rather than deliberation, which is generally understood to mean they cannot speak publicly, only through regular channels or when required by Congress. This is a mistake, as it prevents public opinion and civil society from evaluating the state and capabilities of their Armed Forces.

There is a noticeable absence of an active National Security Council, one where they can express opinions without the risk of being silenced. Apparently, the answer to avoid the fluctuations of politics is for defense to be a state policy, with financial independence from the current administrations. The Minister of Defense

has already reported that the funding policy for strategic capabilities failed shortly after its implementation. It was assumed that the political system was serious and responsible. RICHARD KOUYOUMDJIAN

Executive Vice President AthenaLab.