Counterargument to "Butter or Guns"
This article was translated automatically and may contain differences from the original. For reference, read the original.
By John Griffiths
December 22, 2020
I thank Mr. Eduardo Santos for his reference in the opinion column. In it, he clearly states that his foundations for proposing a force structure and a specific number of personnel for the Armed Forces of the 21st century are not valid arguments based on reasons, but merely a way to justify budget cuts. It was evident that his motivation and sole justification were the budget, in the face of a proposal whose content does not pass any test or withstand any analysis. Doctrines, technologies, methodologies, and future challenges no longer matter. Likewise, the strategic environment, state challenges, and the security of Chileans are of no interest, only the pesos.
As I mentioned in my first intervention regarding Mr. Santos’s column titled “Guns or Butter,” the approach he proposes, akin to a “landowner’s style,” is valid; it is one of the nine internationally accepted methods for force development. To establish it, one must simply assume the political costs of doing so and be brave and clear in stating that these strategic capabilities do not adhere to any rational design or validated study; it is simply what exists. Let us say it loud and clear, end of discussion.
I share Engineer Santos’s concern for the future of the economy, not so much due to the pandemic, which is a health-based phenomenon and not economic or financial, but rather the potential effects that arise from it. What is truly concerning is that in the last ten years, the political leadership of the country has managed to lower the trend GDP to a value close to 1.9%, with a demographic growth rate close to 1.5%. As a society, we have indulged in asking the State for a series of benefits far beyond what we are capable of paying, and the capacity for indebtedness, which has already mortgaged our future, has reached its limit. Just like in Codelco, the lack of available funds is usually the result of poor economic management and not a specific factor.
Under these circumstances, indeed, there is no worse blind person than one who does not want to see. Let us try to avoid, in time, the disaster for the country of raising excessive expectations disconnected from the available capabilities or means, a classic definition of a poorly conceived strategy. The oath of service to the Fatherland that we in uniform take goes beyond mere protection. Additionally, national defense does not collapse, nor does its security and development. These are basic functions of the State, as a form of political organization. Now, the political leadership of national defense is the responsibility of democratically elected authorities. This political leadership includes the responsibility to finance the level of security that the country needs. It is not the military leaders who need to open their eyes even wider. Once again, it is the political leaders who must assume their responsibility before the country. The burden of proof does not fall on military leaders, who do not act independently, but on political power.
Finally, Mr. Santos, in the scenario you so graphically describe and considering that 80% of shareholders want to live in a more just, humane, and fraternal society, an aspiration I evidently share, I wonder if that condition does not require some degree of security to allow it, or if it is spontaneous generation?
Butter or Guns and October 25
By Eduardo Santos
December 20, 2020
We agree with Mr. John Griffithsthat the defense budget must be adequate to finance the strategic capabilities necessary for national defense, as determined by political authorities (the board).
To this end, it is unavoidable to consider that on October 25, 2020, 80% of Chileans (the shareholders) decided they want to live in a more just, humane, and fraternal society, and in that scenario, the high priests of the economy will be relentless in enforcing the dogma of macroeconomic balances.
Citing the famous phrase from the former CEO of Codelco, “There is no money, old man. Understand me, there is not a single peso” we can illustrate the budgetary restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the immense social demands arising from millions of people earning below 400,000 pesos per month or who have run out of retirement funds in their AFPs, which are already generating a monstrous public debt to finance them.
Under these circumstances, there is no worse blind person than one who does not want to see and my opinions aim only to timely prevent the announced collapse of national defense, for which I reiterate the call to our military leaders (the managers) to open their eyes in favor of the homeland they swore to defend.
Who is Kodak?
By John Griffiths
December 10, 2020
A solid democracy requires the best integration of civilians and military personnel, with one group in political decision-making and the other providing the best professional advice. The dilemma between guns and butter has been resolved for a long time and is not a dilemma for the Armed Forces; it is a political one that requires knowledge and will to clearly express what is desired and where we are headed. The alignment between the political and the strategic exists and is based on the goodwill and patriotism of people seeking the best for the country, as demonstrated by this exchange of opinions. What we need to strengthen are the leadership capabilities of the board so that we do not experience what happened to Kodak.
I celebrate this opportunity provided by El Mostrador to debate with sound arguments on a matter of the utmost significance for the future of the country, such as national security.
Mr. Eduardo Santos surprises us in his openness by stating: “Thanks to El Mostrador we have the opportunity for civilians and military personnel to debate professional topics, such as the urgent need to redesign our Armed Forces to face the unavoidable reduction in defense spending, in response to the dramatic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and to redirect new permanent resources to priority demands.” He immediately suggests that, of the nine internationally accepted approaches for planning force development, it is “unavoidable” and “imperative” that we apply the one centered on the budget, known as “budget driven.” This preconceived idea of leading by budget, while valid and legitimate, has caused significant harm to the political leadership of defense over time, as it is characterized more by a patronal style of leadership versus the rational and analytical style demanded by our times. The freedom and sovereignty of a State still depend on adequate security.
When national political authorities and the Armed Forces of Chile abandoned the planning model for force development based on neighborhood conflict hypotheses nearly two decades ago, they adopted a capabilities-based development model. Adapted to national reality, of course. That is to say, the civil leadership required by that development model is inexcusable and unavoidable and must be manifested in specific documents that reflect the command and political leadership of the elected authorities over the Armed Forces.
These essential documents are a State Security Strategy that articulates all instruments of national power and converges them on clear and defined political objectives that satisfy national interest. Foreign Relations, Defense, and Budget policies that are subsidiary to the former, articulated as State policies and agreed upon with the respective Senate committees. This has not been possible to achieve in Chile. The clearest, albeit timid, attempt was the National Security and Defense Strategy (ENSYD), which has been resting in some drawer in the Senate since 2014, waiting for someone to consider it, evidently with the necessary updates and conceptual separation between the political (security) and the strategic (national defense).
Based on these arguments, we can fully agree with Engineer Santos that the major problem with our defense has been the lack of political leadership to make explicit the responsibilities of command and leadership that the Political Constitution of the Republic places on the elected authorities of the country.
I cannot agree more with Mr. Santos in his assertion that in the scenarios of the 21st century, there are no longer certainties. This has been the case for a long time, and the processes of updating and developing the Armed Forces have placed us on a footing of interconnectivity and interoperability, providing us with response flexibility based on strategic capabilities, which in turn are versatile, as they allow covering the spectrum of mission areas assigned to the Armed Forces of Chile by their political command.
Engineer Santos proposes that we focus on a capabilities-based force development methodology, which has been in practice in national defense for quite some time and contradicts his assertion of openness, where he suggests that we must face a force development by budget. It is different to state that the country and its political authorities must resolve what budget will be adequate so as not to affect the aforementioned strategic capabilities.
Our Army is doctrinally much closer to Grey, Lykee, and Echavarría than to Rommel’s Afrika Korps. While our Navy, which has traditionally been much closer to Corbett than to Mahan, is now much closer to Vego and Till. The Körner mission was a mission tasked with modernizing the Army. The idea of “bringing” a military mission to modernize a joint force of the 21st century, such as the Armed Forces of Chile today, seems quite obsolete. Our Armed Forces have developed talents and trained in Chile and abroad a body of officers and non-commissioned officers of excellence, meeting the highest international standards and are available to perform their professional duties.
Perhaps a special mission that strengthens our knowledge as a country in leadership and political defense management and enhances the professional preparation and updating of those civilians who, fortunately, wish to specialize in these matters is more necessary.
The mention made by Engineer Santos regarding the Kodak company is very appropriate. The question now is: who represents Kodak in this analogy, the Armed Forces or the political leadership of defense?
Agreeing with Eduardo Santos, I believe the time has come for us to take the debate very seriously. For a long time, the country has needed a core group of specialized and updated individuals in defense matters to contribute their opinions to generate the necessary political leadership for this essential function for the country’s development to be carried out effectively. National defense is a public policy of the utmost relevance; however, the government schools of our universities have not given it the importance or space it requires.
The Armed Forces are obedient and do not deliberate, but they are professional, trained, highly technological, and possess very high standards of intellectual human development. This poses a challenge of leadership that surpasses mere obedience. A solid democracy requires the best integration of civilians and military personnel, with one group in political decision-making and the other providing the best professional advice.
The dilemma between guns and butter has been resolved for a long time and is not a dilemma for the Armed Forces; it is a political one that requires knowledge and will to clearly express what is desired and where we are headed. The alignment between the political and the strategic exists and is based on the goodwill and patriotism of people seeking the best for the country, as demonstrated by this exchange of opinions. What we need to strengthen are the leadership capabilities of the board so that we do not experience what happened to Kodak.
John Griffiths
Head of Security and Defense Studies AthenaLab
Butter or Guns and Kodak
by Eduardo Santos
Thanks to El Mostrador we have the opportunity for civilians and military personnel to debate professional topics such as the urgent need to redesign our Armed Forces to face the unavoidable reduction in defense spending, in response to the dramatic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and to redirect new permanent resources to priority social demands. In this context, I appreciate the comments of General (r) Mr. John Griffiths on my previous article.
In the strategic scenarios of the 21st century, the certainties derived from our traditional neighborhood conflict hypotheses are no longer valid; rather, there are other diffuse forms of risks that must be faced differently than the simple projection of our history. To this end, it is necessary to apply a new probabilistic methodology of Demand-Capacity, which has an associated magnitude and probability of occurrence, which together allow us to determine the Damage Potential we will face.
Accordingly, we must differentiate the Maximum Possible Conflict, historically used for defense design, from the Maximum Probable Conflict, which should be employed in the future to specify the Capabilities necessary for defense. Therefore, this procedure is different from the old design by Threat, which identified deterministic events for which a specific response was designed, such as our AfrikaKorp deployed on the northern border to return to Lima and the doctrine of the Decisive Battle of Mahan applied by our Navy, which today are obsolete.
The success of the past is the origin of the defeat of the future, as shown by the history of the Kodak company, once a leader in the photographic industry, which after 120 years entered bankruptcy for failing to evolve timely to the digital camera market.
For this reason, we must develop a Military Review that strengthens civil leadership and facilitates a joint reengineering designed with the participation of a new Körner Mission that, just as in 1885 it led us into the 20th century, this time propels us into the 21st century, taking us from deterrence to cooperation and legitimate defense, to harmoniously resolve the dilemma between butter or guns in favor of a new political-strategic alignment.
December 5, 2020
On Butter or Guns: A Response to Eduardo Santos
by John Griffiths
El Mostrador, December 5, 2020
I would like to start by agreeing with Eduardo Santos on one aspect of his diagnosis. He states that “to understand this situation, it is necessary to remember that in recent decades our Armed Forces have continued to apply an obsolete 19th-century doctrine to operate in the 21st century, with 20th-century technology, intimidating neighboring countries with military capabilities inconsistent with foreign, defense, and budgetary policies, thus disregarding the dividends of peace.” This statement contains one great truth and a component that he must demonstrate, as it is not at all evident. Additionally, the most relevant variable is left out of the equation: the preparation and professional capacity of the force. More than technology, the preparation of personnel is what matters, and the most powerful weapon remains their courage and intellect.
El Mostrador has become an essential medium for debating security and defense issues, fostering dialogue and the exchange of ideas on a topic that is relevant to our country. Moreover, on the brink of a constitutional assembly, whose main task will be to determine the checks and balances of power in the political leadership of the Republic, and no one can deny that the power of arms is a considerable power that must be discussed and established with utmost clarity.
Mr. Eduardo Santos makes a valuable contribution to the discussion, as he presents a methodology to reach conclusions on force design and structure that makes it seem simple and follows a Cartesian logic to perform numerical calculations, and voilà, the security and defense problems of Chile are resolved. Unfortunately, solving political or strategic problems is not as easy as solving an equation, as they are unstructured problems.
John Griffiths Spielman
Head of Security and Defense Studies AthenaLab
December 4, 2020
Butter or Guns
I would like to start by agreeing with Eduardo Santos on one aspect of his diagnosis. He states that “to understand this situation, it is necessary to remember that in recent decades our Armed Forces have continued to apply an obsolete 19th-century doctrine to operate in the 21st century, with 20th-century technology, intimidating neighboring countries with military capabilities inconsistent with foreign, defense, and budgetary policies, thus disregarding the dividends of peace.” This statement contains one great truth and a component that he must demonstrate, as it is not at all evident. Additionally, the most relevant variable is left out of the equation: the preparation and professional capacity of the force. More than technology, the preparation of personnel is what matters, and the most powerful weapon remains their courage and intellect.
The great truth is that we have spent several decades developing military capabilities inconsistent with foreign, defense, and budgetary policies, because those policies that materialize civil political command over the Armed Forces have been sectoral attempts of goodwill, not coordinated and aligned in a structure and security policy that visualizes the challenges of Chile, at least over a four-year period. There has been no political will to assume that responsibility. Command and civil political control are exercised and manifested through the missions, objectives, and resources assigned. Where are the Foreign and Defense policies of the State of Chile? Both are subsidiary policies to the National Security Policy. Where are the foreign and defense strategies subsidiary to the aforementioned policies?
It seems that, in recent decades, national political leadership found it convenient to resolve the dilemma of guns or butter, as titled in the article in question, with the Copper Law for the acquisition of material and the legal floors of the defense budget referenced to the 1989 budget, which were also violated through the authorization of budget execution.
This solution did not require assuming the political cost of deciding unpopular but necessary and even vital issues. It is striking to assert that the Armed Forces of Chile employ 19th-century doctrine to operate 20th-century technology in the 21st century. The burden of proof lies with the engineer to demonstrate his assertion that the doctrine of the Armed Forces of Chile is from the 19th century. We could not, today, be interacting militarily with first-world powers using 19th-century doctrines if we continuously receive greater demands and praise from friendly countries and the region to share our experience.
The most notable aspect of Mr. Santos’s article is his mathematical methodology for reaching strategic conclusions. He applies the potential calculation methodology used in military planning processes, typically at the operational level, to conduct feasibility and acceptability tests in the development of operational designs and specific courses of action, that is, in the presence of given tasks, in a theater of operations, against a specific adversary within a determined time horizon.
This is a profound error and very dangerous. Military capabilities are structured based on the defense of national interests and possible scenarios, in a visualization of probable future battlefields, where it is crucial to define the character of the potential upcoming conflict (traditional, asymmetric, or hybrid?). The potential calculation is a methodological tool more suitable for the former, that is, the use of traditional force, as long as it measures the tangible and appreciates the intangible (value, moral strength, discipline, cohesion of the force, etc.). The same criticism that Mr. Santos makes regarding the absence of political orientation and leadership to articulate Foreign Relations, Defense, and budgetary policies, he applies in his methodology. What Foreign Relations and Defense policy did Mr. Santos use to dimension the inventory material and personnel endowment of the Armed Forces of Chile?
If we do not start from the beginning, from the political leadership that guides and articulates the instruments of power and capabilities of the State, we will not reach any valid result. I hope that in the upcoming constitutional debate we implement the constitutional obligation of the President of the Republic to promulgate his National Security Policy for his term and that the ministers of Foreign Relations and Defense, also mandatorily, promulgate their respective policies with the agreement of the respective Senate committees. Only then, with clear political leadership in its orientation, will it be time for specialists to formulate and optimize the solutions regarding the military capabilities required to satisfy the orders of civil political leadership to the Armed Forces. The final stage of the process is to assign numbers and optimize the budget.
Finally, Mr. Santos presents us with a powerful idea, that of the “dividends of peace.” I would like to remind him that only shareholders have the right to receive dividends. If one does not invest in defense, one will not receive any dividends. Additionally, it is worth asking whether we have not enjoyed the dividends of peace by having adequate military capacity, which has deterred others from affecting our interests.
Nonetheless, I believe the value of these opinions compels us to rearticulate our defense community to converse and discuss the relevance of these issues, to find the best solution that the country requires through a consensual and robust effort. Chile deserves it.
