COLUMN | In response to the opinion "Frigates on the Horizon and the Intangibles of Peace"

COLUMN | In response to the opinion "Frigates on the Horizon and the Intangibles of Peace"

El Mostrador, June 25, 2019

Juan Pablo Toro V.

Under the title “Frigates on the Horizon and the Intangibles of Peace,” Mr. Eduardo Santos published an extensive opinion piece on a series of topics related to national defense. We are pleased that defense is part of the debate, as it is a sector that requires much greater participation from civil society; however, we must be critical of the article as we believe it does not point in the right direction, contains assertions that require substantiation, and confuses public opinion.

The most serious problem with the defense debate in our country is that it is viewed in a partial manner and typically focuses on numbers. There is a true obsession with the “how much.” How many planes, how many brigades, how many frigates, how many people… This can be explained by a context of limited resources and growing social demands, forgetting that defense is an absolute and indivisible public good. Therefore, the question is different: “What role do we want to play in the world as providers of stability and security?”

From the answer to that question, we must design our foreign policy and our defense policy synergistically. Chile has changed. Decades of successful economic expansion have created new interests that did not previously exist in distant regions and that require protection by military forces capable of projecting power over distance. In a country that conducts 95% of its international trade by sea, the freedom of the seas and the ability to interact in coalitions are as crucial as the cybersecurity of our networks, our energy security, and the security of our borders.

Mr. Santos suggests that we need to improve the quality of military spending, and we could not agree more. However, when he justifies why, we disagree. We believe the problem lies in the political definitions that constitute the essence of the subordination of the Armed Forces to political power. The core of the debate must be there. Let us clearly define what tasks, missions, and structure we will assign to our Armed Forces, where, when, for how long, and most importantly, with what effect or for what purpose.

The methodology for computing potential that Mr. Santos applied is useful for the commander who will employ force, but it is no longer used as a methodological tool to construct the type of defense needed. Today, the most developed countries use “net assessment,” which measures qualitative and quantitative aspects of forces across a broad spectrum and in a global security context. Applying that methodology of computing potential to determine a naval force structure, as proposed by the author, is a profound error. The figures of resources and personnel he proposes appear to come out of nowhere and lack any support whatsoever.

Let us first define our role in the world and in a Pacific that is losing stability, is highly exposed to climate change, and where there are increasing responsibilities. From that ambition, let us share an analysis of our opportunities, challenges, strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and threats. Let us jointly analyze foreign policy and defense policy so that they produce the synergy that benefits our interests and tell our Armed Forces what we expect from them. Only after that process can we engage in a debate with numbers. When a figure of any kind is rejected, there must be political responsibility from those in command and an acceptance of their political command responsibilities.

I believe Mr. Santos will agree with us that his closing question about “with whom we will build the frigates” is only part of the true challenge of national defense.


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