Brief overview of civil-military and political-military relations in Chile since the return to democracy

Óscar Izurieta Ferrer
Former Undersecretary of Defense, Master in Political Science from the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile.

During the political transition process (October 1988-March 1990), there were explicit agreements that allowed it to be characterized as “negotiated.” Of course, this included the full validity of the 1980 Constitution and its reforms in 1989. At the same time, there were also tacit agreements, among which were: “the political institutional framework of the Armed Forces, General Pinochet’s parliamentary immunity, and the amnesty law” (Godoy, 1999). Such agreements (Bruneau, 2006) are characteristic of the new democracies of the so-called “third wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1994), where one of the greatest challenges to the consolidation and deepening of democracy has been finding the appropriate balance between civil and military sectors.

We believe that the end of the political transition (regime change) allowed for the beginning of the refinement of democracy starting in 1990, within which it was necessary to achieve full military subordination to political power; a transitional military process that extended until 2005, with the constitutional reforms introduced during President Ricardo Lagos’s administration and was consolidated with the enactment of Law No. 20,424 in 2010.

It is now evident that in 1990 the Armed Forces had an autonomy incompatible with a full democracy, due to the prerogatives that emanated from the 1980 Constitution and the respective Constitutional Organic Law.

Both the refinement of democracy and the political subordination of the military were influenced and, in some way, postponed by the continued presence of General Pinochet as Commander in Chief of the Army until March 1998.

In this regard, a former Minister of State stated that the end of General Pinochet’s term as Commander in Chief in March 1998 would “normalize the hierarchies of the Army and signify a change in the relations between politicians and the Army, always tense due to the presence of the general” (Boeninger, 1997).

The political subordination of the military

The long time it took both successive governments and the legislative power to enact legal provisions aimed at achieving political control of the Armed Forces, which was part of the process of refining the democratic system, did not imply that since 1990 the military did not maintain a progressively subordinate behavior towards civil authorities. The conduct of the uniformed personnel, with the exceptions we will indicate later, changed more due to political circumstances than due to legal changes (Fuentes, 2006).

In our opinion, this was contributed to by the fact that the Armed Forces, despite significant initial involvement in consolidating the military government, largely returned to activities related to national defense. Evidence of this was the successful resolution of two complex neighborhood crises in the first half of the military regime. It also helped that the Armed Forces were not ideologized, as although the government followed a certain economic model and an authoritarian political approach, it was never structured around a specific ideology. The Armed Forces followed and supported their institutional leaders who were governing the country. Additionally, the military did not become corrupt during the military government, nor did they engage in illegal activities.

The exceptions we referred to earlier, which created tension in the political-military relationship, were practically linked to General Pinochet’s continued command of the Army (1990-1998). These relate to the “Linkage Exercise” (1990), the “Boinazo” (1993), and the resistance to the arrest of General (R) Manuel Contreras (1995), convicted by the Supreme Court for the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington D.C. Fortunately, all these tense situations were ultimately resolved peacefully and positively.

Later, an important contribution to civil-military relations materialized with the preparation of the first White Paper on National Defense in 1997; an initiative by Defense Minister Edmundo Pérez Yoma, which was pioneering in Chile and opened spaces that brought the Armed Forces closer to society on issues of an eminently professional nature.

Starting in 1998, in the more typical political-military relations, governments assumed their powers to control the Armed Forces with greater naturalness, counting on the open collaboration of military leaders, beyond strictly legal terms. Notwithstanding the above, the greatest test for the maturity of the political-military relationship was the arrest of former Commander in Chief General Augusto Pinochet in London in October 1998. During the nearly fifteen months of his arrest, the government and the Armed Forces agreed that his return to the country was important for national stability and coexistence, joining efforts to achieve it. One consequence of this episode was the intensification of judicial actions regarding cases related to human rights violations that occurred during the military government, starting with General Pinochet himself.

Human rights and their impact on civil and political-military relations

Shortly after President Aylwin’s government began in April 1990, and as a consequence of the creation of the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, the issue of human rights violations that occurred during the military government emerged as a dependent variable in the political-military relationship. The Armed Forces expressed their rejection of the final report of the commission, known as the Rettig Report, stating their fundamental disagreement with it and denying its historical and legal validity (Army of Chile, 1991).

As emblematic cases of human rights violations began to be known in the courts, a progressive estrangement between civil society and the Armed Forces began to emerge. For the military institutions themselves, any argument in favor of the situation of involved personnel became unsustainable, since they had previously denied the validity of the Rettig Report, which already had broad and cross-party acceptance. Consequently, it was necessary to seek a forum that would allow for a reconnection with the truth and that would express the context of what had occurred. Hence, the support for the initiative that emerged from the Minister of Defense in 1999 to establish a “Dialogue Table” that brought together the most representative sectors of society and members of the Armed Forces.

This was the first occasion in which military institutions dialogued with various representatives of civil society about events that had caused division among Chileans and had a favorable impact on civil-military relations in general, and on political-military relations in particular. In its final declaration, it is important to highlight the recognition of “the serious human rights violations committed by state agents during the military government. We also refer to the political violence committed by opponents of the military regime.”

Subsequently, and in accordance with the commitment made by the Armed Forces at the Dialogue Table, a six-month deadline was set for them to provide useful information leading to determining the final fate of the remains of the disappeared detainees. The report submitted by the institutions did not satisfy certain sectors that felt their expectations regarding concrete results to locate the whereabouts of those categorized as “disappeared” were disappointed.

However, the most significant aspect was the positive political environment generated from that instance, which allowed President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) to decisively support the modernization plans of the Armed Forces, as a continuation and deepening of what had been initiated by President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000). For the first time in decades, the governing political class internalized the need for Chile to have military capabilities commensurate with the significant development it was achieving; with its new and broad international insertion; with the likely complex scenarios it could face; and with the strategic stature it wanted to project.

The above led successive governments, despite the significant issue of human rights, to provide important support for the re-equipment of the armed institutions. This meant a reinforcement of professionalization, as well as a renewed motivation and dedication to military affairs, a process that notably contributed to the political subordination of the Armed Forces.

However, after 45 years, the prolongation of the judicialization of human rights cases and their radicalization in recent years leads us to reflect on President Aylwin’s thinking on this matter. He believed that by combining the virtue of prudence with that of justice, judges would prioritize the responsibility of senior commanders, weigh that of subordinates, and recognize the non-imputability of those who had not acted directly. Furthermore, he suggested that once individual responsibilities were established, the time for forgiveness would come later. He also called for the expediency of processes so that sooner rather than later, the moment of reconciliation would arrive (Rodríguez Elizondo, 2018).

Unfortunately, Chilean judges have demonstrated in democracy that they are not conditioned by deadlines or good political intentions. Moreover, in many cases, they have violated due process norms, applied laws retroactively, resorted to legal fictions, or issued sentences based solely on presumptions. Over time, political sectors and organizations advocating the thesis of “neither forgiveness nor forgetfulness” have gained strength, particularly as the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia has disintegrated.

Civil control, financing, and modernization of processes

The constitutional, legal, and administrative norms aimed at ensuring the democratic governance of the Armed Forces only began during President Ricardo Lagos’s administration.

Thus, for example, regarding contributions to military spending from Law No. 13,196, the Comptroller General of the Republic issued a ruling in December 2002 determining that “the funds allocated in the various accounts of the Armed Forces could be used interchangeably to finance investment projects of any of the institutions, provided that such projects had the backing of the Commanders in Chief” (Ministry of Defense, 2010). Additionally, in the institutional accounts, only the “floor” established by law was deposited, with all excess funds being directed to the “fourth account” of ministerial administration.

As a result, the armed institutions lost autonomy to invest the funds assigned to them by the reserved copper law, as practically all resources became managed by the Ministry of Defense, constituting, therefore, an important first step towards political financial control of the Armed Forces.

In 2005, the most significant change in the political-military relationship occurred with the reform of the 1980 Political Constitution. Important modifications regarding the Armed Forces were introduced. These eliminated the political status they had by repealing their exclusivity as guarantors of institutional integrity; by removing the immovability of the Commanders in Chief and the General Director of Carabineros, making them dependent on the trust of the President of the Republic; by abolishing appointed and lifetime senators; and by changing the organization and powers of the National Security Council, which, following this reform, would only have advisory functions, and would be convened exclusively by the President of the Republic.

Subsequently, in 2007, by Supreme Decree from the Ministries of Finance and Defense, a new system for formulating and evaluating investment projects in military capabilities and maintaining combat potential was created. The institutions ceased to evaluate their projects, transferring this responsibility to the Ministry of Defense. Consequently, to this day, resources cannot be spent if the project has not been positively evaluated and prioritized by that State Secretariat.

Later, on February 2, 2010, Law 20,424 “Organic Statute of the Ministry of National Defense” was approved. This regulation, along with the constitutional changes of 2005, is one of the most significant for the political-military relationship. The powers of the Minister of Defense were expanded; the Undersecretary of Defense was created, the Undersecretaries of War, Navy, and Aviation were merged into the Undersecretary for the Armed Forces, and the Joint Staff was created, with new powers and responsibilities, to enhance the joint employment of land, naval, and air forces. Consequently, Law 20,424 provided the structure and powers to the Ministry of Defense to fully exercise leadership in the defense sector.

On September 10, 2019, the President of the Republic enacted the law establishing a new financing system for the strategic capabilities of defense. With this, in addition to repealing the reserved copper law, a mechanism for multi-year resource allocation was instituted, transparent and subject to broad civil controls, considering for these purposes the National Congress, the Ministry of Defense, and the Comptroller General of the Republic.

Additionally, there is an initial project regarding the military career for officers and non-commissioned officers, concerning extending active service; changing the years of service required for retirement; and modifying the promotion system.

As can be seen, from 2002 to the present, various governments have implemented constitutional, legal, and administrative initiatives aimed at regulating the political control of the Armed Forces and their subordination to legitimately constituted authorities. It has been a long but effective process, which has involved the collaboration of the armed institutions. Its highest expression is concentrated between 1998 and 2010.

Modernization and Re-equipment of the Armed Forces

In parallel to the normative progress described, and as we previously stated, starting in the second half of the 1990s, due to an improvement in the political-military relationship and the political will to have a national defense commensurate with the development achieved by the country, significant financial support was resolved for the armed institutions. Additionally, it was of interest to the governments to increase the professional level of the Armed Forces to maintain their apolitical status.

The flow of resources remained at a high level until 2012, beginning to decline increasingly from 2013. In other words, in just over a decade, the military forces managed to develop the greatest strategic capacity that the country has known in the last hundred years. By the end of 2012, the Chilean Armed Forces, although fewer in number compared to several countries in the region, were the most modern, best equipped, and had the highest technology incorporated in Latin America.

This was supported in the air by having the most advanced frontline aircraft in the region, with full air refueling capability and the best airborne early warning system. In naval terms, with frigates featuring cutting-edge technology and the most modern submarines on the subcontinent. On land, with the most powerful armored units in Latin America and the best-equipped special forces.

Final Comments

In conclusion, since 1990, and especially after 1998, the refinement of democracy in Chile has progressively developed the necessary political mechanisms for the realization of civil control over the Armed Forces, as corresponds to a consolidated democratic system.

Moreover, the government of Chile now has the structure and regulations for the proper governance of the Armed Forces and, with that, to exercise civil supremacy over the military establishment. This does not mean that the various processes that underpin the Political-Military and Civil-Military relationship are not still being refined and modernized.

What has not been clearly and updated defined is the Defense Policy and the Military Policy that guide the long-term design of the Armed Forces; the required capabilities; their levels of availability; their versatility; and what strategic stature Chile wants or needs to have. In summary, there is a lack of a National Defense Strategy, duly agreed upon, that regulates investments, structure, maintenance, training, and the activities of the Armed Forces.

A significant concern that must always be kept in view, especially with the new financing system for the Armed Forces, is to avoid the degradation of strategic capabilities, whether due to lack of resources for maintenance; insufficient training; absence of updates; or significant reductions in new acquisitions, all of which notably impact the level of deterrence and the ability to effectively fulfill defined tasks.

Finally, in the short term, the debate on new tasks for the Armed Forces will be of special relevance, in the context of cybersecurity; transnational threats; internal security; and operations other than war, aspects that must be resolved with the main references being national interest; international cooperation; the efficient use and exploitation of available technological means; and the necessary multi-agency collaboration.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES:

• Boeninger, Edgardo (1998) Democracy in Chile: Lessons for Governance, Editorial Andrés Bello. Santiago, Chile.
• Bruneau, Tomas C. and Tollefson, Scott D. (2006) Who Guards the Guardian and how. Democratic Civil-Military Relations. University of Texas Press, Austin.
• Fuentes, Claudio (2006) The Transition of the Military. LOM Ediciones. Santiago, Chile.
• Army of Chile (1991) Presentation of the Army of Chile to the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation. Military Geographic Institute. Santiago, Chile.
• Godoy Arcaya, Óscar (1999) The Chilean Transition to Democracy: Negotiated. Public Studies Journal No. 74, CEP. Santiago, Chile.
• Huntington, Samuel (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman.
• Ministry of National Defense. (2010) National Defense Book. Santiago, Chile.
• Rodríguez Elizondo, José (2018) History of Civil-Military Relations in Chile: From Eduardo Frei Montalva to Michelle Bachelet Jeria. Fondo de Cultura Económica Chile S.A.