The Use of the Armed Forces in Times of Peace

El Mostrador, October 4, 2021

As recent events in Iquique and the Macrozona Sur have shown, desperate citizens, faced with the inaction of the State, are taking matters into their own hands and deciding on solutions themselves, with the consequences that we all know will follow. In this sense, perhaps the only solution to motivate a political resolution to the problems we face, or to decide to employ the Armed Forces, is to wait for the crisis to escalate so that we can decide to extinguish the fire, keeping in mind that the use of defense institutions is not a good solution to the issues we face, but rather a desperate measure that employs inappropriate means for problems that have a political origin or originate outside our borders.

Recently, the longest constitutional state of emergency that Chile has experienced in decades came to an end, and I hope that the pandemic remains under control, thus avoiding a new phase in which individual freedoms are restricted in the pursuit of the common good.

Due to being in a constitutional state of emergency, all of Chile was administratively assigned to the Chiefs of National Defense (JEDENA), who are coordinated by the Chief of the Joint Staff (JEMCO), despite reporting directly to the President of the Republic. Most importantly, a significant portion of the effective force of the institutions was assigned to police roles, such as controls on highways, airports, and in cities, which obviously detracted from the training of their members and the maintenance of the necessary material to generate credible deterrence or to be in a position to safeguard Chilean territory, its sea, and its airspace, or to protect national interests wherever they may be located.

In any discussion about the role and purpose of the Armed Forces, it is essential to be clear about their primary purpose, as failing to do so can lead to their use for everything that politicians deem necessary, since they are hierarchical, obedient, disciplined, and possess training that generates multifunctional capabilities and material that often has dual-use capabilities.

The use of the Chilean Armed Forces by the Executive for purposes other than their primary role is not a characteristic exclusive to right-wing governments; it has been employed by both the left and center-left, as the expansion of mission areas did not begin with the current government of Sebastián Piñera.

The current government, it must be acknowledged, has had to govern in a more complex security scenario, where the pandemic is not the only challenge it has faced; it has also had to confront a surge of immigrants entering through the northern and northeastern borders, an increase in cross-border crime, particularly drug trafficking, a Macrozona Sur where the government administration and other powers cannot guarantee the rule of law, and, more importantly, a social outbreak that left the country in a deep political crisis and an Executive with low popular approval, to the point that if our political regime had been parliamentary, the government would have received a vote of no confidence.

In such a complex scenario, it is not surprising that the Chilean Executive, as has occurred in other regions, has sought to employ its Armed Forces for more functions than those established by the Constitution as their ultimate purpose, which, exceptionally, allows them to be used in constitutional states of emergency, provided that the rules for such purposes are met. In this sense, it is correct and desirable that the existing control mechanisms, the Comptroller’s Office and the Chamber of Deputies, perform the task of reviewing that the defense institutions are used only for the purposes established by the Constitution, as otherwise, they may end up being used for even more complex objectives, such as sustaining a non-democratic regime in power, as is the case in some countries in the Latin American region or elsewhere in the world.

The Armed Forces are not designed to carry out police procedures or to replace the police in their work, and while it is true that providing logistical and technological capabilities to the police temporarily, while they acquire and develop what they need to perform their tasks, may be advisable, there is a risk that these arrangements become permanent and that the boundaries gradually shift, leading them into functions that the Constitution does not assign to them, with inadequate training and without the necessary material.

In this sense, the Comptroller’s Office acted appropriately by stating that the intention to support the police with the Armed Forces in the Macrozona Sur, through a decree, was not administratively correct. The proper way to involve defense institutions in police work is through a constitutional amendment, which must obviously have broad cross-party political support. This is not what many want to hear, but international experience in the use of the Armed Forces in any type of activity indicates that not only must the appropriate capabilities and training be in place, but it is also essential to have the political and popular support that such a measure requires.

In relation to the above, it also helps to avoid cynicism and to call things by their name. We need to agree on whether the problem we have as a country in the Macrozona Sur is of a police nature or if it is a pure and simple insurgency accompanied by criminal elements, which are common when such phenomena occur. If we understand what is happening or what motivates the events, we will know what remedies or solutions we need to apply, and in this way, we can stop pretending that the problem is merely criminal and that it can be resolved through lawsuits, with coordinated investigative actions by the police and guidance from the Public Ministry.

The problem is that the opposition parties are more concerned with gaining power or bringing down the current government than with helping to find solutions to the problems. However, they are being shortsighted, as what complicates us today will not disappear with the end of Sebastián Piñera’s government. High-volume immigration will continue to exist as long as we have failed states like Venezuela and, without changes, also Argentina, or have drug-producing countries as neighbors, or parts of the Mapuche people in an insurgent mode.

As recent events in Iquique and the Macrozona Sur have shown, desperate citizens, faced with the inaction of the State, are taking matters into their own hands and deciding on solutions themselves, with the consequences that we all know will follow. In this sense, perhaps the only solution to motivate a political resolution to the problems we face, or to decide to employ the Armed Forces, is to wait for the crisis to escalate so that we can decide to extinguish the fire, keeping in mind that the use of defense institutions is not a good solution to the issues we face, but rather a desperate measure that employs inappropriate means for problems that have a political origin or originate outside our borders.

Richard Kouyoumdjian
Vice President AthenaLab