The Case of Ecuador Applied to Chile

El Mostrador, January 13, 2024

In Chile, it has not yet happened, but it could very well occur that criminal organizations carry out high-impact communicational actions, such as the takeover of a television channel in Ecuador.

It is evident that what happened in Ecuador attracted the attention of a significant part of Chile, as it highlighted that if we do nothing, or if we act incorrectly regarding organized crime, we could end up like them in a short time, despite the government’s statements that Chile is not comparable to the reality faced by Ecuadorians.

The purpose of this column is to indicate that a country like Chile is indeed at risk, but that the issue is manageable if addressed now and decisively. Everything indicates that organized crime is already operating within our country and that there are territories already under its control, where the rule of law does not exist, but rather the law of the strongest, the power of weapons, and criminals.

Assuming that the readers of this column, like its author, agree that there is a problem that must be addressed and that its attention must be immediate, decisive, rapid, and effective, or as we artillerymen would say, hitting first—hitting hard—so that we can continue to hit, I dare to make some reflections and recommendations based on what we see in Ecuador and how they are managing the crisis they are experiencing.

Just like in Ecuador, the current government and previous ones allowed the problem or cancer to arrive, grow, and go unaddressed. This is partly because there were other issues deemed more urgent and a priority, and on the other hand, due to nonexistent security architectures and a national intelligence system, combined with the inexperience of the current governments in matters of security and transnational organized crime.

One example of the above is the lack of foresight, as no one anticipated that the demobilization of the FARC in neighboring Colombia would create a surplus of available weapons, as well as unemployed guerrillas. Many of them currently work in transnational organized crime, applying everything they learned in their previous work.

If we add to this that when authorities encouraged the migration of Venezuelans, they did not consider its effects, we have an explosive cocktail, as not everything that arrived was good, and it also allowed the transit of the ‘bad’ disguised as ‘good.’ This is evidenced by the available prison statistics and the fact that several organizations operate in multiple countries in the purest style of multilatinas.

To tackle the problem of organized crime, the first and most obvious step is that we all must agree that the problem exists, is serious, and is urgent. Failing to act implies becoming a failed state. We must reach an agreement among citizens, the Executive, the courts, the Public Ministry, the police, and, to some extent, the Armed Forces, in case the issue is of such gravity that they must be employed to support the Law Enforcement and Security Forces.

That consensus—and understanding the nature of criminals—must be transferred to those who will carry out the work in the form of prior amnesties, such as those announced this week in Ecuador. The key to the effectiveness of the Ecuadorian solutions lies in the fact that military and police will use the measures of force that the problem requires for its resolution and will not be restricted by the fear of ending up in prison themselves rather than the criminals.

It is much easier to combat organized crime than terrorist or insurgent organizations. Organized crime has little popular support, and its elimination enjoys broad backing from the population. This point, combined with the issue of prior amnesties, allows the state to unleash all its forces and be very effective in solving the problem. The state’s action needs a green light from the people of Chile, and the fact that they are criminals and not organizations with political color should ensure cross-party support. This is already happening in Ecuador and was what ultimately allowed for drastic and effective decisions to be made.

In Chile, it has not yet happened, but it could very well occur that criminal organizations carry out high-impact communicational actions, such as the takeover of a television channel in Ecuador. Such actions are what convince public opinion that action is necessary, and at the same time, it is a strategic error on the part of the criminals, as they would have fared better had they not ‘promoted’ themselves publicly. The dilemma is how we convince Chileans not to wait for a crisis of such magnitude to take the reins.

Of course, the Armed Forces can support police actions, but anti-crime actions must primarily come from Carabineros and the PDI. Unlike Ecuador, the Chilean police, which is military in nature, has the capabilities required to combat organized crime. They only need intelligence, political will, and prior amnesties of the type dictated in Ecuador.

The objective of organized crime is economic; it does not have political goals. They seek profits. Just like in other legitimate economic activities, they have competition. The first step should be to eliminate each other and prevent them from uniting forces against state agents. They operate without rules, and for them, the end justifies the means, which makes them more effective than if they operated according to the rules. For them, there is neither God nor law, only money and bullets.

While it is true that criminal groups operate as organizations and most of the time have the initiative, they will never have the capabilities and organization that the state and its institutions can possess. It is only necessary to ensure that they are 100% available and free from scourges such as corruption for their total effectiveness, something that criminals know and exploit to their advantage.

It is clear that, in the absence of a national security system, the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security must begin evaluating organized crime, planning possible solutions to the problem, and anticipating actions if necessary.

We cannot allow what happened in Ecuador and what is additionally occurring in Peru and Bolivia to happen here, in order to gain support for what harsher actions may entail. Otherwise, it is very likely that we will end up calling on the National Defense institutions to lend a hand to the police, take charge of the country, and have an admiral or general giving orders and restricting individual freedoms, because what would apply is a State of Siege and not a simple State of Emergency.

Richard Kouyoumdjian
Vice President AthenaLab

Source: El Mostrador