What should the right do regarding national security, including public safety?

¿Qué debe hacer la derecha en materias de seguridad nacional, incluyendo la seguridad pública?

El Líbero, May 22, 2024

Current problems cannot be solved with laws; they require accurate diagnoses, which in turn allow for the selection of the correct solutions, but above all, they require the political will to act decisively. Public opinion will support those who demonstrate the character and strength to resolve issues, something that the center-right and right candidates seeking the presidency possess in abundance.

Currently, there are bills being discussed in Congress that could significantly impact national security, particularly in how public safety is managed, which is clearly the top priority for all Chileans. On Monday, May 20, the government delivered a new list of 32 initiatives, most of which are already known, along with some new ones of lesser importance. There are no major developments to focus on, so in this column, we will concentrate on the most important aspects.

The center-right and right, especially given the almost certain possibility of being in government in March 2026, should understand what is at stake and take a strategic position on the issue. President Boric’s government, which is currently benefiting from a copper boom that aids fiscal accounts and the economy, knows that if they can change public perception regarding public safety, they can increase the chances of one of their own becoming president, which is not unlikely if the current opposition insists on running separately in every upcoming election. The scenarios of two opposition candidates competing for the presidency in a runoff are based on the assumption that the current government will not be able to turn around the security situation, which may not be the case if they learn from their mistakes.

The improvement in public perception that the Executive seeks regarding security is driven both by attempts to demonstrate that something is being done, and by achieving concrete results in terms of crime reduction, peace in the Southern Macrozone, and a decrease in illegal immigration at the borders with Peru and Bolivia.

For this government, taking action involves advancing its security agenda in Congress, which, while it may have some future impact, will have little to no effect in the less than two years remaining. The reasons are detailed below:

  1. Critical infrastructure (CI): There are no terrorist threats putting it at risk. A variant of CI is being used at the borders with Peru and Bolivia, allowing the Army to assist in border security, supporting police and other state services. It is a waste of resources since, in practice, there is no repatriation of illegal immigrants to Bolivia except for those from that highland nation. There is indeed more effective work than in the past, and the military presence is beneficial, but it does not change the fact that illegal immigrants still enter, and they cannot be returned. Additionally, it involves the use of highly trained military personnel in sophisticated weapon systems for police duties, preventing them from training for warfare, which we have managed to avoid by having armed forces trained and with proven deterrent capacity.
  2. Rules of Use of Force (RUF): Understanding that the armed forces are not designed for public order, the RUF are only necessary if there is political will to use force, and as they currently stand, they rather seek to avoid its use. Incorporating the issue of military justice is positive, whether in the requested form or through a military public ministry working with specialized courts. It is necessary to provide military and police personnel with legal security and guarantees of due process, which are not regularly present in the actions of the Public Ministry and ordinary courts. Just ask Commander Crespo, Corporal IM Seguel, Carabinero Zamora, and conscript soldier Robledo.
  3. Intelligence Law: It is very necessary to improve the law regulating intelligence matters. Unfortunately, the one currently in Congress is not a good bill. It does not resolve the issues present in the 2004 law, and worse, it generates bureaucracy and expenses at the central level that are of no use. It does not create central operational capabilities or effective coordination between police and military capacities in this area. As it stands, it is risky to approve it. There should be no rush, and it should only be passed when experts give it their approval. In the immediate term, it is much more effective to generate capabilities in police intelligence divisions and to regenerate the intelligence fusion center that Admiral Jordán established during his tenure as director of the ANI. Current parties are playing with current players, not future ones.
  4. Law creating the Ministry of Security: It will not generate immediate additional capabilities regarding public safety. We already have almost the entire Ministry of the Interior and Public Security dedicated to public safety issues. The right should seek to prevent this project from advancing unless it brings very concrete and clear benefits, which are not currently evident. Moreover, similar to the case of the enhanced ANI sought by the intelligence bill, care must be taken to ensure that they do not end up with a Ministry of Public Security filled with members loyal to the current government.
  5. Modifications to the Anti-Terrorism Law: This is a bill that should be advanced and done well. There are no objections to it receiving cross-party support.

On the other hand, not everything is negative; the recently published economic intelligence law is a good initiative, provided it is accompanied by the authority to effectively investigate money flows, as well as their origins. This implies having access to funding sources and is key to investigating organized crime and what is happening in the Southern Macrozone. If this had been available years ago, many lives and much destruction could have been avoided.

The government’s agenda does not include implementing a national security strategy that is operationalized with the respective architecture and system that operates it. We continue to address issues piecemeal and trying to give the impression that we are doing things, with the only immediate effective measures being related to the economic intelligence law, the anti-terrorism law, and parts of the agenda that were being developed with the Senate president. The rest does not contribute significantly and only diverts attention from what is not relevant and effective.

It is not relevant because it does not stop illegal immigration, does not reduce crime or attacks, and does not address violence in the Southern Macrozone from insurgents and organized crime. All these issues require political will and a lack of fear to act. Serious problems have always required tough solutions; otherwise, they will overwhelm us and destroy us.

Illegal immigration can be stopped by not allowing more illegals into Chile. If that requires setting up refugee-type camps, so be it. It is fine to have a humanitarian attitude, but it is another thing to accept more people into Chile than we can manage, especially if some of them are bad, very bad. Walls and fences can also be solutions, but they take time and are not cheap.

Combating organized crime requires a determined will from the Executive, the Public Ministry, and the courts. It also requires clear and decisive support for the police in their actions, as well as the necessary financial resources. Combating organized crime requires human and physical resources, which must be financed with state funds. Denying the essentials in this regard is a short-term solution that leads to long-term hunger. What better than for the current government to address the problems they have so that they do not become a burden for the incoming administration? The sooner they start, the better.

In the case of the Southern Macrozone, the issue is not about doing more of the same. Like in the previous case, it is a matter of will and action. More than three weeks have passed, and there are still no results in the search for the murderers of the three Carabinero martyrs. It is an area where a Bukele-type solution could yield positive results, but it must also be accompanied by a joint action of all state agencies and powers in what is called a “Whole of Government approach.” It does not require more laws than those already in place and cannot be fixed by indefinitely prolonging states of emergency. It requires a correct diagnosis of the problem, which leads to the selection of the most appropriate remedies, but above all, action must be taken now before it is too late. It is the least that the sergeants Cisterna, Arévalo, and Vidal deserve.

Current problems cannot be solved with laws; they require accurate diagnoses, which in turn allow for the selection of the correct solutions, but above all, they require the political will to act decisively. Public opinion will support those who demonstrate the character and strength to resolve issues, something that the center-right and right candidates seeking the presidency possess in abundance.

I do not mean to say that the revised intelligence law and the RUF are not important, but they are not critical at this moment. It is better to give them time and produce good laws in those areas, but if I were in charge, I would focus much more on having a national security strategy that includes resolving the aforementioned problems. Otherwise, it sounds like putting the cart before the horse and trying to shift the problems to Congress.

Solutions for Chile do not come from a single military-type solution. The military can help, but it is not an ideal solution. It is impractical in combating urban organized crime, but applicable in rural counterinsurgency, where it must be combined with the joint action of the rest of the state. This requires both the Army and the Marine Corps to prepare for it and to be assigned the necessary resources to carry out that task. Both institutions have their human resources stretched to the limit due to ongoing deployments in states of emergency, support for police at the borders, summer forest brigades, and other tasks. The armed forces prepare for war, to defend territory, sovereignty, and national interest. Performing non-primary duties permanently is not free; it is exhausting and demotivating. They are no longer manpower-intensive, and this is something that must be considered when designing solutions that involve a military component.

It should not be assumed that because the armed forces are hierarchical, obedient, and non-deliberative, they are available for anything at any moment. Support them legally, legislatively, and financially. This support, along with similar support for the police, is much more effective than spending time on legal initiatives that may never be effective or are unnecessary. Provide them with legal security and guarantees of due process along with clear and precise orders. You will see that they are capable of performing wonders.

Richard Kouyoumdjian
Vice President of AthenaLab

Source: El Líbero


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