The New Intelligence Law of Chile

We will soon have a new intelligence law that modifies and improves upon the one from 2004. However, I want to make it clear that we will not have a significantly more efficient intelligence system available for several more years. In this column, I will emphasize the system and its core, the National Intelligence Agency (ANI).

In a system, it is the law that establishes the purpose, as well as the way the system operates and the units that compose it. It defines who manages, supervises, and controls it so that it does not lose focus and remains oriented toward its objectives. Resources, whether human or material, can also be defined in the law or regulated in a law or regulation issued subsequently.

A former director of the ANI once told me that Law 19.974 of 2004 was not a bad law and that the main problem of the ANI was the limited resources allocated, with no more than 100 personnel and minimal funding for intelligence. For example, the Argentine and Spanish equivalents of the ANI have 15 and 50 times more human resources allocated, respectively (not considering military and police intelligence).

The numbers speak for themselves, and we will have to wait for human, material, and technological resources to be allocated, as the new law did not address this issue, nor did the 2026 budget, which only allocates $10,639,369,000 to the ANI, approximately $400 million more than in 2025 and only 0.012% of the Republic’s budget. With that budget, we cannot expect great things.

Let’s analyze what we know about the new intelligence law in parts. Yes, it clearly improves aspects of coordination and system use. It creates the interministerial council composed of ministers responsible for national security (Interior, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Public Security), who propose to the president how to utilize the system. Additionally, it establishes the intelligence committee that manages the system, which includes the ANI, presiding over the joint chiefs of staff’s intelligence directorates, and the Armed Forces and Police.

Apart from those who participate directly as part of the system, it creates the concept of collaborators such as the Cybersecurity Agency, Gendarmerie, UAF, Customs, SII, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, positively expanding those who provide and deliver information.

As expected, it does not go into much detail about how intelligence or counterintelligence is conducted, but it dedicates significant text to how what is done will be controlled, or who can authorize special information-gathering procedures. It is in this section, regarding authorizations and control, where I have my most serious reservations, apart from the budgetary concerns, as they threaten the operability and effectiveness of the system.

Special requests must be approved by a minister of the Supreme Court, which is a clear exaggeration, something I have not seen occur in other countries. Additionally, apart from the internal control mechanisms, we add the oversight of the General Comptroller of the Republic (CGR), the Courts of Justice, and the Chamber of Deputies. We cannot expect the system to be very agile and effective with four levels of control, whereas the norm in any organization is to have only two, at most three: one internal and two external, which function in such a way that they do not hinder the proper functioning and objectives of the system.

In a developed country’s intelligence system, or one that belongs to NATO, it is normal for supervision and control to be permanent regarding the operation of internal controls. To be effective, these must be incorporated into operational processes and subsequently through annual audits by regulators, which should be the CGR and the Chamber of Deputies via its Intelligence System Control Commission.

The new law does not provide many details about intelligence or counterintelligence operations outside of Chile or the capacity to neutralize or capture enemies of the state beyond our borders, including terrorists and criminals. This is something that, at some point, when we have overcome the ghosts of the past, we will need to discuss and analyze.

We have made several steps forward with the modernization of the current law, so we must be grateful to those who, after seven years, achieved these advancements. However, we still have much work to do and resources to allocate if we want to have a robust intelligence and counterintelligence system that effectively protects us from the realities and risks of the 21st century. Chile deserves the best protection we can provide.

For more details on what is expected from an intelligence system or what it should be capable of doing, I recommend reading the attached document from AthenaLab “General Considerations for the Proposal of an Intelligence System in Chile”, by the acting executive director of AthenaLab, John Griffiths, which was recently presented along with documents related to national security and public safety.

STUDY | Proposal for a New Security Architecture for Chile