Current European Rearmament: Why Increased Military Spending Does Not Guarantee Strategic Autonomy

1. CONTEXT

European states are undergoing their most significant rearmament process since the end of the Cold War. This process began to take shape in 2014, driven by Central and Eastern European countries following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and expanded across the continent after the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This context is compounded by uncertainty regarding the U.S. commitment to European security, stemming from multiple warnings by Donald Trump regarding NATO.

In this scenario, European states (almost all NATO members) have responded with a sustained increase in their defense budgets. Collectively, the defense spending of the twenty-seven EU member states reached €418 billion in 2025, a 20% increase from the previous year. This trend was reinforced during the NATO Summit in The Hague in 2025, where allies agreed to allocate at least 3.5% of GDP to military needs by 2035, with an additional 1.5% for security-related investments.[i].

Figure 1. Europe, European Union, and NATO.

European rearmament has also taken on a discursive dimension. Emmanuel Macron has insisted that Europe cannot indefinitely delegate its security to the United States and has urged his peers to “believe in our sovereignty and our strategic autonomy.”[ii]. In the same vein, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has described the current situation as a “moment of independence,” in which Europe must be able to “guarantee its own defense and security” and have the “freedom and power to determine its own destiny.”[iii].

However, increased spending and rhetoric alone do not guarantee greater strategic autonomy. If that is the goal of European leaders, the challenge for countries lies in transforming those resources into shared priorities, sustainable operational capabilities, and an industrial base less dependent on third parties. Rearmament may strengthen the strategic capabilities of these states, but the central question is what type of autonomy it is producing and to what extent it modifies the existing transatlantic architecture.

2. STRATEGIC AUTONOMY: DIMENSIONS AND DEGREES

Rather than autarky or isolation, strategic autonomy is understood as the capacity of one or several states acting in coordination to set priorities, make decisions, and mobilize resources without significantly depending on external decisions and influences.[iv].

Strategic autonomy can manifest in three dimensions. The first is decisional and institutional, referring to the ability of states to identify threats, agree on priorities, and translate them into executable decisions. The second is operational, concerning the ability to plan, deploy, and sustain military actions through sufficient means. The third is industrial and technological, implying the capacity to produce, maintain, and update those means without being subject to critical external dependencies.

Alongside these dimensions, it is important to distinguish three degrees of strategic autonomy, defined by the level of control that states retain over external support. Autonomy is full when they can set priorities, sustain operations, and maintain their means without being exposed to decisive vetoes or conditions from third parties. It is partial when they retain their own decision-making and action capacity but require external support in key functions, such as intelligence, strategic transport, or maintenance. At its lowest level, it is restricted when third parties control essential resources and can limit, suspend, or condition their use.

3. THE OBSTACLES TO EUROPEAN REARMAMENT

The increase in spending for military and security needs opens the possibility for greater strategic autonomy for European states. However, for this progress to occur fully, the additional resources must translate into common decisions and capabilities that European states can employ with sufficient control. So far, this conversion continues to face political, material, and historical obstacles.

3.1. More Resources, but Still Fragmented Decisions

The first obstacle is political and institutional. Although the European Union has expanded its participation through funds and incentives, fundamental decisions regarding military priorities, acquisitions, and the use of force remain under national control. The recent increase in budgets has not been accompanied by an equivalent reform of the institutional architecture.

For example, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) retains an intergovernmental logic. Its most sensitive decisions require unanimity in the Council. This rule becomes especially restrictive when operating under divergent strategic preferences, while community institutions lack the authority to impose a common direction. Thus, a single state can delay measures supported by the majority and force other partners to seek alternative mechanisms. The blockages by Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary regarding various aid packages for Ukraine have demonstrated the practical consequences of a rule[v] that recent rearmament has not changed.

The instruments created to deepen cooperation also do not substantively alter this structure. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) relies on commitments without effective sanctions, while the European Security Action Instrument (SAFE) expands the EU’s financial capacity and favors joint acquisitions without establishing binding planning for national budgets. Thus, while the European Commission has gained influence over the industrial dimension of defense, military decisions remain in the hands of national governments.

Additionally, there is a lack of a fully shared strategic vision. Eastern flank countries focus their attention on Russia, while several Southern European states are more concerned about the Mediterranean and the Sahel[vi]. Differences also persist regarding the relationship with the United States. France, for example, has advocated for greater European action capacity, while other governments, such as the British, view rearmament as a way to strengthen their contribution to NATO.

The notion of a “European pillar” of NATO offers a meeting point between these positions, although it leaves open the question of how much independent action the continent truly seeks. The diversity of military acquisitions among countries reflects this ambiguity. Poland extensively relies on South Korean suppliers, Germany continues to incorporate U.S. systems[vii] and Spain intensifies its industrial cooperation with Turkey[viii]. When these acquisitions respond to uncoordinated national planning, they can multiply platforms and logistical chains, complicating their integration on a European scale.

3.2. More Capabilities, but Still Critical Dependencies

The second obstacle is material. Increased spending can strengthen European forces without necessarily reducing their dependence on the United States. After the Cold War, the specialization of functions within NATO led European allies to rely on Washington for several critical capabilities[ix]. Current rearmament addresses some of these shortcomings, but does not yet replace the necessary support to sustain high-intensity operations.

This support is particularly concentrated in operational functions that are difficult to replace and essential for effectively deploying and employing military forces. European states maintain deficits in strategic transport, aerial refueling, target identification, and acquisition. In air defense and missile defense, although they have the Franco-Italian SAMP/T system, a significant portion of their capabilities still relies on U.S. systems[x]. These functions receive less attention than large platforms, but they determine the ability to deploy a force and sustain it over time. Consequently, the increase in aircraft or ground units only expands European autonomy when accompanied by information, logistics, and operational support under their own control.

Dependence also extends to the technologies incorporated into military systems. Equipment developed or assembled in Europe may contain software and components from the United States. This exposure continues during maintenance, parts replacement, and upgrades. Thus, a capability may formally belong to a European state while still being subject to decisions made outside the continent.

The intelligence domain offers a concrete example of this vulnerability. In March 2025, the United States temporarily suspended information sharing with Ukraine, reducing Kyiv’s ability to observe Russian movements and select targets[xi]. Although Ukraine does not constitute an institutional equivalent of European allies, the episode illustrates the pressure power retained by those who control an indispensable resource for another state’s operations.

In response to these dependencies, the European Union has introduced instruments aimed at promoting joint acquisitions and strengthening its industrial base. SAFE and the European Defense Industry Program (EDIP), adopted in 2025, represent significant advances in promoting strategic autonomy, but they still operate on a limited scale compared to the volume of national rearmament. They also face a temporal challenge, as consolidating an integrated industry requires years, while governments need to respond immediately to a strategic environment with greater threats.

3.3. The Persistence of National Military Sovereignty

The previous obstacles do not operate in a vacuum. More than constituting a third independent obstacle, the historical trajectory of European states helps explain why decisional and industrial fragmentation has shown such resistance to change. War played a central role in the formation of European states. Studies in historical sociology have shown how military demands drove more effective tax systems and favored the concentration of coercive means in the hands of state authority[xii]. Defense has thus been linked early on with the exercise of sovereignty.

War also contributed to shaping the political map of the continent. Competition among nearby units favored those capable of sustaining fiscal and military efforts[xiii]. From the medieval diversity of empires, city-states, and principalities, the territorial state ultimately emerged as the dominant form. Control of force was therefore not an added competition later on, but a constitutive dimension of the European state.

This trajectory helps to understand why defense has advanced more slowly than other areas of integration. Sharing military capabilities requires governments to accept that part of their security will depend on decisions made by other states. It also necessitates specialization of functions and relinquishing certain national means under the expectation that partners will maintain their support during a crisis. The political cost of that delegation is high because it affects a prerogative historically associated with state authority.

Over time, this association has been reproduced in defense bureaucracies, legal frameworks, and industries organized primarily at the national level. When European institutions promote common planning, governments retain final control over the use of force. When industrial integration requires concentrating production or distributing capabilities among countries, states tend to protect companies and knowledge deemed strategic.

Distrust matters within this mechanism, but not as a simple cultural remnant of the past. It arises from the vulnerability of depending on another government to access an indispensable capability. This legacy does not prevent European cooperation, although it raises the costs of delegation and helps explain why decisional and industrial fragmentation persists even when greater integration would offer operational advantages. The trajectory that produced states capable of waging war complicates the construction of a common defense that requires sharing part of the sovereignty formed around it.

4. WHAT AUTONOMY ARE EUROPEAN STATES BUILDING

In the short term, European rearmament is producing partial and uneven strategic autonomy, falling short of the aspirations expressed by some of its key leaders. Resources are increasing more rapidly than the political capacity to direct them collectively. European states have larger budgets and are beginning to recover capabilities weakened after the Cold War. However, decisions remain fragmented, and several essential functions for high-intensity operations continue to depend on the United States.

This does not mean that the current process lacks effects. Strengthening the European industrial base and joint acquisitions can reduce dependencies and expand the continent’s capacity to take on greater responsibility in its environment. Its impact will depend on whether the new instruments modify national decisions and do not merely finance parallel programs.

The most likely outcome is not a European defense separate from the transatlantic architecture, but a stronger European pillar within it. In that scenario, European states would gain room to act and sustain some operations while retaining the guarantee of U.S. security and access to critical capabilities. Thus, autonomy would advance as a more balanced management of interdependence, not as a break with NATO.

In the medium and long term, the decisive question will be whether rearmament allows European states to better complement and control their vulnerabilities or whether it consolidates a burden-sharing distribution in which they spend more but continue to depend on Washington to fully employ those capabilities.

5. IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA

European rearmament poses a significant challenge to the strategic interests of Latin American countries. The rapid increase in demand on a concentrated and slowly expanding industrial base pressures prices in the defense industry and prolongs delivery times[xiv]. In the event of a need or renewal of strategic capabilities, Latin America competes for the same suppliers, from Saab for Gripen fighters and the United States for F-16s to France for submarines[xv]. Without a broad industrial base or regional mechanisms to aggregate orders, the region has little margin to cushion that pressure. The problem is already visible in Brazil, which, facing deliveries of fighters expected until 2032, is negotiating the temporary leasing of up to fifteen used aircraft[xvi].

However, the process also opens an industrial opportunity. The saturation of the European production base drives governments and companies to seek partners outside the continent to expand their supply chains. Latin America, and Chile in particular, can take advantage of this opening in three ways. The first is to consolidate a national defense innovation ecosystem by articulating technical training centers, universities, and strategic companies, such as ENAER, ASMAR, and FAMAE. This would allow for the transformation of specialized knowledge into technological solutions and advance from purchasing or assembling to providing capabilities for an expanding market. The second is to engage in joint production programs. The United Kingdom, for example, promotes local construction of frigates at ASMAR through licenses and technology transfer, following experiences developed in Poland and Indonesia[xvii].

These partnerships can attract investment, generate jobs, and facilitate access to advanced technologies. The third is to acquire systems or capabilities currently in service that some European countries, according to press reports[xviii], are evaluating for exchange or purchase. This alternative would address urgent needs and reduce incorporation timelines, although it would offer fewer industrial benefits.

The European experience also offers a potential institutional lesson. Its response to dependence on the United States shows that autonomy can be expanded through collective capabilities without requiring a break with the allied power. Latin America continues to address much of its security needs through bilateral and poorly coordinated relationships, which accentuates the asymmetry with Washington. Theoretically, the reactivation of regional frameworks capable of articulating diagnoses, making decisions, and developing shared capabilities could reduce that fragmentation. In this way, Latin American countries could expand their margin to defend their own priorities and engage with the United States from a less unequal position.

DIEGO SAZO
Head of Research in International Relations

CARMEN GRESSE
Research Assistant

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[i] NATO, “NATO Concludes Historic Summit in The Hague”, June 27, 2025, https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2025/06/27/nato-concludes-historic-summit-in-the-hague

[ii] Emmanuel Macron, “Statement by Mr. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, on the Challenges of the European Political Community,” Budapest, November 7, 2024, https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/296075-emmanuel-macron-07112024-communaute-politique-europeenne

[iii] European Commission, “2025 State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen,” Strasbourg, September 10, 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/speech_25_2053/SPEECH_25_2053_EN.pdf

[iv] Barbara Lippert, Nicolai von Ondarza, and Volker Perthes, eds., European Strategic Autonomy: Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interests, SWP Research Paper 4/2019 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, March 2019), https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP04

[v] BBC, “Hungary’s Orbán Accused of Disloyalty and Blackmail over Ukraine Loan Veto,” BBC News, March 20, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cq6jrvgqeejo

[vi] Andrea Gilli, Nicole Koenig, Margarita Šešelgytė, and Ricarda Nierhaus, “European Cohesion for Security and Defense,” DGAP Policy Brief 1, German Council on Foreign Relations, February 4, 2026, https://doi.org/10.60823/DGAP-26-43232-en

[vii] Sophia Besch, Erik Brown, and Rafaela Uzan, “Rebalancing the Transatlantic Defense-Industrial Relationship: Regional Pragmatism in Northeastern Europe,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 22, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/12/rebalancing-the-transatlantic-defense-industrial-relationship-regional-pragmatism-in-northeastern-europe

[viii] Vozpópuli, “Spain Embraces Turkish Military Passion: A New Naval Agreement After Buying Aircraft for the Air Force,” April 14, 2026, https://www.vozpopuli.com/defensa/espana-abraza-la-pasion-militar-turca-un-nuevo-acuerdo-naval-tras-comprar-aviones-para-el-ejercito-del-aire.html

[ix] James Sperling and Mark Webber, “Understanding NATO,” in The Oxford Handbook of NATO, eds. James Sperling and Mark Webber (Oxford University Press, 2025), 3-23.

[x] Max Bergmann, Otto Svendsen, and Jonathan Burchell, “Europe Needs an ASAP Program for Air Defense,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 23, 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/europe-needs-asap-program-air-defense

[xi] Warren P. Strobel, Siobhán O’Grady, Ellen Nakashima, Missy Ryan, and Kostiantyn Khudov, “U.S. Pauses Intelligence Sharing with Ukraine Used to Target Russian Forces,” The Washington Post, March 5, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/03/05/us-ukraine-intelligence-sharing/

[xii] Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-191.

[xiii] Hendrik Spruyt, “War and State Formation: Amending the Bellicist Theory of State Making,” in Does War Make States? Investigations of Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology, eds. Lars Bo Kaspersen and Jeppe Strandsbjerg (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 73-97.

[xiv] AthenaLab, “The Challenges for the Defense Industry in the New International Order: Three Comparative Visions,” December 11, 2024, https://www.athenalab.org/noticias/2024/12/11/documento-especial-los-desafio-para-la-industria-de-defensa-en-el-nuevo-orden-internacional-tres-visiones-comparadas/

[xv] Mathew George, Katarina Djokic, Zain Hussain, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2026).

[xvi] Douglas Royce, “Saab and Embraer Unveil First Locally Manufactured Gripen E in Brazil,” Defense Security Monitor, March 30, 2026, https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2026/03/30/saab-and-embraer-unveil-first-locally-manufactured-gripen-e-in-brazil/

[xvii] Zona Militar, “United Kingdom Continues Positioning Its Type 31 to Be the Future Multi-Role Frigate of the Chilean Navy,” November 27, 2025, https://www.zona-militar.com/2025/11/27/reino-unido-continua-posicionando-sus-tipo-31-para-ser-la-futura-fragata-multirol-de-la-armada-de-chile/

[xviii] El Mostrador. “The Secret Sale of Armored Vehicles from the Chilean Army to Germany,” November 20, 2025, https://www.elmostrador.cl/unidad-de-investigacion/2025/11/20/la-secreta-venta-de-carros-blindados-del-ejercito-chileno-a-alemania/