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In light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one of the terms that has been repeated countless times in recent days is ‘hybrid warfare’ (HW). On one hand, experts, journalists, and others have used the concept broadly, often without fully understanding the term. This almost indiscriminate use has led to various interpretations, depending on who uses it and the circumstances in which it is employed. On the other hand, it is labeled as a new way of waging war, leaving many impressed by this supposed innovation.
While its specific meaning may not be relevant in the context of a news story, when defining a strategy to address a phenomenon, there is no doubt that its correct conceptualization is essential.
HYBRID WARFARE, A (NOT SO) CLEAR CONCEPT
As is known, adjectives are words that modify (qualify or determine) nouns, granting them specific characteristics. In the case of hybrid warfare, the same applies. The hybrid label imposes a distinguishing aspect, which the Royal Spanish Academy defines as ‘that which is the product of elements of different natures.’[1] In the case of HW, the problem with its conceptualization is that the combinations of different types of elements are numerous, and therefore, its understanding can vary depending on context, culture, experience, etc. A recent article published by the Small Wars Journal titled ‘Hybrid Warfare: One Term, Many Meanings’ presents a summarized view of the varied interpretations, which allows for verification of the aforementioned.[2]
Originally, the first use of the term is recognized in the 1990s by Thomas Mockaitis in a book titled ‘British Counterinsurgency in the Post-imperial Era’. However, the person who proposes and develops the concept more deeply, comprehensively, and recognizedly is Frank Hoffman, through a monograph published in 2007 titled ‘Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.’ In his work, Hoffman establishes that HW incorporates a variety of ways to conduct war, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts that include coercion and indiscriminate violence, and criminal disorder.[3] Similarly, through the study of the case of Hezbollah, this author warns about the capabilities that some violent groups have acquired, allowing them to develop a conflict of these characteristics resembling that of states, and likewise observes that this way of conducting war can also be applied by states. A final noteworthy characteristic of the conceptualization presented by Hoffman is that it focuses HW on the battlefield and not on other levels or spheres.
As previously noted, while Hoffman’s first organized analysis and conceptualization is not the only one, in the analysis conducted by Solmaz[4] for his aforementioned article, at least five interpretations of HW are recognized (the first being the approach proposed by Hoffman):
In conclusion, one concept, multiple interpretations, which vary in the actors involved (states or non-state groups), the manner of conducting war (regular and irregular tactics), the means employed (conventional or unconventional, violent and non-violent), and the level at which it manifests (from tactical to strategic).
HYBRID WARFARE, A (NOT SO) NEW CONCEPT
Although the term HW has been widely used over the past 15 years, especially recently, one should not fall into misconceptions such as concluding that it represents a change in the nature of war or similar notions. If we return to the definition of the adjective ‘hybrid,’ it is easy to identify that war throughout history has been the combination of various tools available to political power to achieve proposed ends. Different civilizations have done this, are doing it now, and will undoubtedly continue to do so in the future.
The use of different tools to achieve victory by the two great powers of the time in the Peloponnesian War illustrates this. But beyond what was done by Athens and Sparta, the veiled and indirect participation of Persia to achieve its own objectives, using non-military means, shows that the ‘hybrid’ is not a modern invention.
Another much more recent case was the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. There are numerous examples where both sides engaged in the use of propaganda and disinformation, utilizing the tools available at the time, to affect nations within the sphere of influence of their opponent, with Latin America being a scene of significant activity.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the concept has now been coined and popularized—sometimes incorrectly and indiscriminately—the innovative aspect of these times is the greater proportion of non-military means, the emergence of new technologies that provide new capabilities to penetrate more quickly and deeply into the adversary, and the more intense participation of other actors, previously less visible, such as private companies, interest groups, and individual persons. The dominance of outer space and the invention of a fifth dimension for the use of forces, such as cyberspace, have created new conflict and collision scenarios. This situation, far from simplifying, has generated new complications, even for international law, as the identification or classification of an armed attack is not evident in these realms. If a power, through cyberspace, manages to disable an electric generation plant without using physical means, it could lead to the death of patients in medical centers of an adversary state. Therefore, the way we view the spectrum of conflict is affected, and the separation between peace and war becomes blurred, creating a relatively continuous and not distinctly separated line as it was traditionally analyzed (crisis, armed attack, war).
In summary, the hybrid use of means cannot be considered something new, as it is part of the essence of war and strategy, but the predominance of other tools and the more visible participation of new actors, as well as the difficulty in identifying peace and war, are indeed new.
It is not possible to conclude without mentioning that, despite a different balance in the use of military means and the presence of actors that had been less prominent in warfare, the threat of using force as a backup or the employment of military power remains decisive elements in achieving political objectives through the instrument recognized as war.
CONCLUSIONS
[1] See at: https://dle.rae.es/h%C3%ADbrido
[2] Solmaz, Tarik. ‘Hybrid Warfare: One Term, Many Meanings’. Small Wars Journal. February 2, 2022. See at: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hybrid-warfare-one-term-many-meanings
[3] Hoffman, Frank. ‘Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.’ Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Virginia. 2007. p. 29.
[4] Ibid, Solmaz.