Response to "The End of Military Autonomy"
This article was translated automatically and may contain differences from the original. For reference, read the original.
El Mostrador, June 2, 2021
Regarding the autonomy of the Armed Forces, two assertions by Eduardo Santos, author of the column “End to Military Autonomy,” are particularly striking as they reflect a perspective from several centuries ago. The intention to move the offices of the institutional Chiefs of Staff to the Armed Forces building demonstrates a lack of understanding of how modern institutions operate, including their command and control systems. Modern management is decentralized and does not require in-person contact, except under very special conditions. The command and control technology of the 21st century, currently present and in use in the Armed Forces, precisely enables this. Finally, the mention of modifying the Oath to the Flag to one of his own creation is another proposal that defies comprehension.
Engineer Eduardo Santos writes a column that adds to other voices that, in the current context, only seek to criticize the Armed Forces of Chile and their efforts to establish a modern and effective instrument of force in light of present challenges and those anticipated in the near future. Criticism is always welcome and appreciated, especially when it is well-founded and motivated by a well-inspired spirit. In this case—honestly—the presentations and arguments are unclear, outdated, do not reflect reality, are biased, and pose a danger of harm, precisely to National Defense. I find it pertinent to address some of the assertions so that the reading public can contrast and judge for themselves the different views at play.
The first concept to discuss is the aforementioned strategic posture of deterrence. This posture has modalities of denial and retaliation in strategic literature. The one adopted by Chile is a combination of both, given the current geopolitical and geostrategic situation, which has not changed and obliges us to maintain our capabilities, as we are certain, based on the public declaration of respective national interests, that neighboring actors have interests opposed to those of Chile and aspire to affect the territorial integrity of the Republic.
A brief analysis of the defense policies in the region, as well as explicit territorial claims (land, maritime, continental, etc.), is sufficient to understand that other actors are attempting to affect our national interests by other means. Consequently, it is a duty of national political leadership to prevent any threat to our sovereignty and national interest and, in accordance with our pacifist position and openly without claims or aspirations over anything other than what is ours, to create the conditions for security and defense that allow for the resolution of controversies, which are foreign to a spirit of cooperation and dialogue, to maintain peace, which is currently ensured precisely by the strategic capabilities of Defense, among other instruments.
This indicates that a first strategic lesson is to know how to read the scenario before embarking on cooperation processes that—although very necessary and desirable—require at least two similar behaviors, convinced that through cooperation absolute and relative gains can be achieved that surpass the interest in controversy. This, in the national case, has not occurred to date, which is why it is surprising that strategic positions lacking support are proposed, constituting more of a wish, an aspiration rather than a responsible attitude, as we have not yet enjoyed the dividends of peace based on recent agreements, but rather this has been possible precisely because of what Mr. Santos wishes to change.
In terms of cooperation, tango is danced between two actors, who additionally enjoy the dance. It is also noteworthy that he uses the expression “Financable Strategy,” as a strategy is not useful nor can it be called such if it does not start from the basis of linking objectives, their political value, and the means necessary to achieve them. There is a logical direct relationship and coherence between ends and means in any strategy.
The axiom posed by Mr. Santos regarding “the successes of the past constitute the origin of future defeat” is quite debatable. I agree that there are examples in that sense, but they do not withstand counterargument, as there are many more cases of concatenated successes in well-planned campaigns that lead to the achievement of well-planned objectives. Victory is indeed the result of successes and defeats, but there is no doubt that victory is the result of prior successes, in all respects. What must be guarded against is a mindset rooted only in past successes or failures, without adapting to the context and reality of the present. Even more debatable is his repeated assertion that the Armed Forces of Chile have military doctrine from the 19th century. Here are some additional examples.
Does any reader find it plausible that the Chilean Army could have assumed command of the land component in the joint and combined PANAMAX exercise, conducted in 2016, with military doctrine from the 19th century; or that the Chilean Navy could have assumed command of the maritime component in the RIMPAC exercise in 2018, the largest naval exercise in the world; or that our Air Force operates in multiple high-level international exercises if our doctrine were from the 19th century? Obviously not. The training levels of personnel in the Armed Forces of the 21st century and the levels of bilingual joint and combined interoperability achieved with the Armed Forces of the first world have allowed the Armed Forces of Chile to be an effective military tool, which additionally supports the Republic’s foreign policy and is indispensable in safeguarding sovereignty and protecting national interests.
Another assertion by Mr. Santos that lacks support and that he must prove is the supposed spaces of autonomy of the Armed Forces. The Political Constitution of 2005, signed by President Lagos, and the respective subsidiary laws, such as Law No. 20424, “Organic Statute of the Ministry of Defense” (2010), completely transformed the command structure of the Ministry of Defense, the national strategic leader, and the processes and responsibilities of primary and secondary planning. Subsequently, the repeal of the law on Defense Capability Financing brought about another significant change. Currently, there is no autonomy of the Armed Forces, except in those elements essential to ensure that they are professional, disciplined, hierarchical, and non-deliberative.
Mr. Santos seeks to bell the cat, to end military autonomy and return the military to a republican culture, without mentioning what those spaces of autonomy are, nor in what extrarepublican culture the Armed Forces currently find themselves. He also mentions that the real authority and presidential command should be restored. It would be good for Mr. Santos to review the constitutional precepts and the current laws to verify that nothing prevents this, as that authority is very well defined and it is not precisely the Armed Forces that impede it. To attempt to bell the cat would be to acknowledge that political power, despite its attributions, has not done so. And that is unfair both to political actors and to defense authorities.
Regarding Chapter XI of the Political Constitution and Chapter XII concerning the National Security Council, the criticism seems to be directed at the original text from 1980, but not at the current and valid Political Constitution of the State, which establishes in its Article 101 the purpose of the existence of the Armed Forces, which is none other than the same mission enshrined in the constitutions of a large number of OECD democracies, as well as most South American democracies. Regarding the National Security Council, the current regulation for convening it is the exclusive responsibility of the President of the Republic, and if we review again the trend in Western democracies, it is an organization that is increasingly being implemented and adopted with greater strength in solid Western democracies, based on the current international order and the nature of the threats affecting the State.
This organization, political in its essence and organization, with permanent functioning, has as its main mission to advise the President or Prime Minister on dealing with risks, threats, and opportunities. At this point, I agree that a security architecture should be created, different from the previous one, modern, efficient, open, participatory, and transparent. Mr. Santos mentions the appointed senators and the binomial system, which is irrelevant, as this is already part of the past and consequently is not in force. That is to say, it does not exist in the current legal text, and the reason for including them in the foundations of the topic at hand is not explained.
He mentions that the current Constitution has maintained a supposed military autonomy shielding unacceptable privileges. It would be good for Mr. Santos to review, in an exercise of comparative attributions, the constitutional texts and laws that in various Western democracies establish the framework for functioning and attributions for the different tasks of National Defense, given its special nature. Additionally, he accuses the Armed Forces of endorsing de facto powers, without providing evidence or clarifying what he means by this.
Where he also does not explain his animosity is in accusing the Armed Forces of kidnapping (“Stockholm syndrome”) political authorities in the sector, as if they were puppets or authorities without personality, in order to materialize purchases in the context of “a monstrous procurement program.” Mr. Santos, the responsibility for Defense has corresponded to the legitimate political authorities, many from his own political sector, and this has been carried out with responsibility, realism, and seriousness, which has allowed for strategic capabilities that have provided the country with the peace it needs for development and that you, as a citizen, have also enjoyed. It is the responsibility of every member of the defense community to be informed about the processes, laws, and responsibilities in this area.
Where we do agree is that we are operating in the 21st century, with 20th-century technologies, as do most Armed Forces of the more developed states, since these processes take decades. Just one example, the main battle tank of the U.S., the “Abrams,” and the armored infantry vehicle “Bradley,” are indeed from the 20th century, entering service in 1980. The truth is that your phrase motivates us to express that “we must overcome 21st-century criticisms with outdated 19th-century opinions, and biases and prejudices of the 20th century.” To achieve this, nothing is better than fostering greater closeness and understanding of National Defense and its valuable contributions to the security and well-being of citizens.
Additionally, and now in the propositional part regarding autonomy, two assertions by Mr. Santos that reflect a perspective from several centuries ago are particularly striking. The intention to move the offices of the institutional Chiefs of Staff to the Armed Forces building demonstrates a lack of understanding of how modern institutions operate, including their command and control systems. Modern management is decentralized and does not require in-person contact, except under very special conditions. The command and control technology of the 21st century, currently present and in use in the Armed Forces, precisely enables this. Finally, the mention of modifying the Oath to the Flag to one of his own creation is another proposal that defies comprehension.
Nonetheless, it is appreciated that it is important, key, and very valuable to exchange opinions, but always trying to temper comments, criticisms, biases, and prejudices that are not equitable and do not align with reality. The Armed Forces of Chile, composed of young people from all backgrounds, sectors, and localities of the country, do not deserve this. It is no coincidence that today, despite all the criticisms expressed here, they remain among the most respected institutions in Chilean society.
John Griffiths Spielman
Head of Security and Defense Studies AthenaLab
Column by Eduardo Santos
The End of Military Autonomy
El Mostrador, May 28, 2021
History teaches us that the success of the past is the origin of the defeat of the future, for which we must overcome the obsolete military doctrine of the 19th century, to operate in the 21st century with 20th-century technology, which our Military Force continues to develop through new procurement projects for unnecessary and unfundable weapon systems, and which shows that they seem to continue living in another Chile that no longer exists. For this reason, it is essential to replace the current deterrent posture, based on the threat of retaliation through large military capabilities incompatible with our foreign and defense policies, with a new financable strategic posture of cooperation and legitimate defense, which takes advantage of the dividends of peace arising from recent agreements with our neighbors.
The election of the members of the Constitutional Convention that will replace the Constitution of the Dictatorship and the unprecedented parliamentary questioning of Defense Minister Baldo Prokurica regarding the participation of the Military Force in public order activities, spying on journalists and a judge, and the dissemination of potentially deliberative statements, are strong signals marking the end of the policy of “as far as possible” and the beginning of the task of putting the bell on the cat to end military autonomy and return the military to a republican culture, restoring real authority and presidential command and incorporating strong parliamentary powers for an effective balance of powers.
In the Cold War scenario, the 1980 Constitution imposed an ideological lock on a Protected Democracy, which, to safeguard National Security, restricted popular sovereignty under military tutelage. To this end, a deceptive political dependence on the Military Force was constructed, placing it in Chapter XI of the Constitution and in Chapter XII concerning the National Security Council, at the same hierarchical level as other autonomous institutions such as Government, Congress, Judiciary, Comptroller’s Office, Constitutional Court, and Central Bank; in addition to incorporating other authoritarian enclaves, such as appointed senators and the binomial electoral system.
The result of this institutional design has been a masquerade, where political authorities pretend to command and the military pretend to obey, as the permanence of this Constitution, although made-up in 2005, has continued to allow the remaining military autonomy to shield unacceptable privileges through the abuse of extensive military secrecy, facilitating behaviors such as those examined by Congress and the internal disorder observed in corruption cases, in addition to implicitly endorsing de facto powers to protect their interests, hindering the construction of a more just, humane, and fraternal society that replaces this system of economic abuse, consistent with its ideological model.
In this environment, the military have not been alone, as our authorities and mainly some Defense ministers have been infected with the “Stockholm Syndrome,” with a complacent attitude that has translated into adopting a posture of “prudence” to avoid affecting military sensitivity and acquiescing to finance a monstrous arms procurement program of $13 billion to date, aimed at ingratiating the military according to a doctrine inconsistent with social priorities and with an international scenario evolving from war to crisis, where Chile does not face threats in a foreseeable future, but rather risks, and in which defense is a collective construction.
History teaches us that the success of the past is the origin of the defeat of the future, for which we must overcome the obsolete military doctrine of the 19th century, to operate in the 21st century with 20th-century technology, which our Military Force continues to develop through new procurement projects for unnecessary and unfundable weapon systems, and which shows that they seem to continue living in another Chile that no longer exists. For this reason, it is essential to replace the current deterrent posture, based on the threat of retaliation through large military capabilities incompatible with our foreign and defense policies, with a new financable strategic posture of cooperation and legitimate defense, which takes advantage of the dividends of peace arising from recent agreements with our neighbors.
To begin with the proposed military restoration, we must promote flagship initiatives, such as ordering the immediate return of the permanent offices of the Chiefs of Staff to the Ministry of Defense building and processing the legal modification of the formula established in Law No. 10,544 for the oath “by God and by this Flag” that the Military Force must fulfill, incorporating “to swear or promise to faithfully uphold the Constitution and the law,” so that the closeness with political authorities and this new commitment to life facilitate building trust and allow civilians and military—together—to begin the path toward a new common future of which we can all feel proud, and then make effective political leadership by incorporating into the New Constitution the following: “Special powers of the President of the Republic include: … Exercising Supreme Command of the Military Force in times of peace, external crisis, or state of war.”
In this scenario, the New Constitution will allow for a long legal and political process of many years of work to undo these enclaves and end a culture of autonomy, for which it is essential that our political authorities assume their responsibility, awakening from their current complacent lethargy, to begin exercising without fear the new powers that will be available. Democracy is stronger.
