Commentary on GADFA's position regarding the constitutional proposal on national defense

El Mostrador, December 7, 2023

There is animosity, bias, and prejudice against the concept of “national security,” even though this notion is accepted and formalized in the field of international relations, security studies, and strategic affairs globally.

On December 3, in a publication by this outlet, the National Defense and Armed Forces Analysis Group (GADFA) calls for the rejection of the constitutional proposal that will be put to a vote on December 17, for failing to meet “basic democratic standards,” with some observations regarding what is established in it concerning national defense and the Armed Forces. The purpose of this response is not to reverse the voting intention but to address the objections raised by this group of specialists.

First, there is animosity, bias, and prejudice against the concept of “national security,” even though this notion is accepted and formalized in the field of international relations, security studies, and strategic affairs globally. As a basis for this, it is worth noting that within OECD countries, there is a national security architecture (in these terms) in 71.05% of member countries. Now, if we examine NATO states, the percentage where this national security architecture exists rises to 80%.

If there are still doubts about the study of national security—as a concept—we can cite the review of the educational offerings of the 30 best universities in the world, according to the ranking compiled by CONICYT-Chile for the year 2019, where we find that 76.7% offer programs that study national security, without ambiguity or euphemisms. In other words, the concept exists, is studied, and is part of the theoretical framework of a discipline like international relations, being key today to understanding the challenges the state faces regarding the risks, threats, and opportunities it must confront in this transitional international order we are experiencing.

Second, it indicates that the proposed roles lead to the militarization of the state, incorporating constitutional norms such as the protection of critical infrastructure or the safeguarding of border areas. Again, it is necessary to review the global trend in this regard, as we are evidently undergoing a paradigm shift in security matters, and we know that paradigms in crisis no longer necessarily explain current phenomena. The protection of critical infrastructure is a mission that increasingly requires the collaboration of the Armed Forces’ capabilities when such infrastructure is vital for the safety of the population.

Notably, the European Union in 2008; Germany in 2009; Australia in 2010; and the United States in the same year, among other countries, have defined the notion of critical infrastructure and designed strategies for its protection that integrate all actors for its safeguarding, without excluding the capabilities of the Armed Forces, of course. Now, regarding the safeguarding of border areas, it must be agreed that military border control is a basic function of the Army; it is where they train, acclimatize, and plan the defense of national sovereignty. It is different for them to perform permanent police functions. However, the mere fact that they are at the border undoubtedly benefits the security of our country.

Nothing has been heard so far from the same group of analysts questioning the permanent role of the Maritime Police, which is under the Chilean Navy, performing similar functions. Certainly, the above requires a process of integration and coordination among state actors at the border, all acting under their constitutional or legal missions. To withdraw from the benefits that the Armed Forces provide in land, maritime, and air border control will not help create a safer country. The border police will be another actor that must be integrated and coordinated within a broader border security framework.

A third element referred to is the special chapter, Chapter VI, of the constitutional project that includes the Armed Forces. In this regard, it is important to highlight that the core issue is not the chapter itself, but its missions, and if they are in the Constitution as a chapter, it is not due to their autonomy or because they are on the same level as the powers of the state, but because they are essential for the security of the state and have accompanied it since its formation as a republic. If the purpose of the state is the common good, expressed in terms of security, development, and well-being for the population, what problem exists in detailing their constitutional missions in a chapter, especially when today the main problem of the country is its security, as a decisive factor for the well-being of citizens.

Fourth, it is stated that the supreme command of the President of the Republic is limited only to the case of war, that his authority to appoint the commanders-in-chief of the five most senior officers is restricted, and that he can only retire them by reasoned decree, all of which would reinforce the corporate autonomy of their commands. In this regard, there is no such corporate autonomy, despite repeated assertions. In our legal framework, the Armed Forces are subject to the political power of the moment, exercised by each government as it sees fit. The command is supreme in times of war because it is the President who directly exercises the conduct of military operations, but in peacetime, he is not dedicated to conducting them; rather, he delegates this function to the Minister of National Defense.

Furthermore, he can retire the commanders-in-chief whenever he wishes, through a reasoned decree, of which only the National Congress is informed. The above does not limit his presidential powers but confirms them. The President of the Republic appoints the future commander-in-chief from among the five most senior officers, as this is a norm that provides stability in such a delicate function as national defense and security. It ensures that whoever holds this position possesses not only the necessary competencies but also the expected experience for it. If it does not suit him, he can retire them whenever he sees fit. The norm aims at accountability for presidential actions, not at limiting presidential authority.

Overall, it is believed that the content of the proposal does not affect the professional role of the Armed Forces, which today clearly—given the challenges of the international context—are collaborating in a broader spectrum of their functions, as is the case in most European democracies and developed countries. What is relevant is not to leave them aside but to establish the specific legal attributions they must fulfill in collaboration with state institutions in a politically led inter-agency or inter-institutional process, from which it would not be sensible to exclude them.

Moreover, in the current operational performance governed by the existing Constitution, they are already doing so, and there are no major questions regarding the current government’s decisions to employ them in northern and southern Chile. Where we agree with GADFA is that these functions should not be developed or utilized beyond the limits where their primary mission is affected, being this only an exceptional employment, as defined in the constitutional project.

John Griffiths and Marcelo Masalleras

Source: El Mostrador