Shadows of the European Tour: The Weaknesses of Boric's Foreign Policy

Ex-Ante, June 1, 2024

A paradigmatic case of the level of unforgivable oversights was that of the former Ambassador to the United Kingdom, and now it is that of the Chilean Ambassador to Spain, who seems to understand his job as a constant posting on social media, trivializing a role that should inherently be discreet. The necessary action for foreign policy to regain substantial prestige and overcome these deep weaknesses is a course correction: a “call to order” will have no effect.

A presidential tour provides many opportunities for a government to explain itself on key aspects. President Boric’s second trip to Europe highlights weaknesses that are likely irreparable. No matter how the courtesy cloud typical of such trips may distort the perspective of iconoclastic politicians who begin to believe their own propaganda and boast of continuing old policies, clashes with reality remain constant.

The agenda of the tour reflects valuable efforts (such as in the areas of mining, energy, and science), but contradictions and misunderstandings continue to undermine the government’s credibility both externally and internally.

For President Boric, a former member of the parliamentary group “Chile without FTAs,” it has taken more than half of his term to accept reality (at least in part): that is, to proclaim that “Chile is an open country to the world thanks to its extensive network of trade agreements,” and to promote the resilience and “certainty that Chilean institutions offer” to foreign investment, and “open trade in times of protectionism” (during the previous tour, Boric told the BBC that part of him wanted to overthrow capitalism).

The world of politics is rife with flip-flops. The problem arises when these are poorly executed. For example, in Germany, Boric complained of unfair treatment at the start of his government, stating that “there were those who had doubts about our commitment to maintaining some of the treaties that had been advanced in Chile.”

The amnesia is brutal. No one can forget that Boric’s presidential campaign—in his first government program—proposed to review all of the country’s free trade agreements in citizen participation forums according to a new model of turquoise feminist development; and in that program, an anti-free trade academic intervened, whom Boric appointed as Undersecretary.

Moreover, already in government, Boric reiterated until the end his opposition to the CPTPP, the most modern treaty that the Chilean Congress has approved to date, which corresponds to the same text signed by Bachelet in 2018. However, in 2019, Boric and his group filmed an apocalyptic video stating that the CPTPP jeopardizes rights such as vacations and pre- and post-natal leave, and prevents the adoption of public health or environmental policies.

The President and his close associates have never admitted errors in this matter: on the contrary, they blame others for having little faith in them. What do they believe today? Can we trust that they will not revert to their usual stance?

The same applies to the other major agreement whose technical negotiation was concluded under a different government, that with the European Union. Until a year ago, Boric suggested that the EU hindered industrial policy; the EU had to clarify that this had never been the case.

On this trip to Europe, Boric finally acknowledged that EU investment in Chile “drives the complexity of our economy, research, and development,” an admission that is significant since the final approved text (December 2022) is essentially the same as the one Piñera concluded in 2021. The government has only just sent it to Congress (June 2024), without clarity on why such a positive initiative for Chile has been so delayed.

The press, however, finds it difficult to ask questions about delays, contradictions, and shifts in foreign policy. The same government that celebrates Freedom of the Press (Chile hosted the global commemoration of this right) concludes many exchanges between the President and the media—even during this tour—with exasperated responses, abrupt closures (the phrase “I am convinced that” replaces the need for empirical evidence), or brief communications where the formula “state policy” is presented as a narrative mantra that often will not withstand scrutiny.

La Moneda seems unaware that the arrogance, normalized from the top of the State, fosters a culture of suspicion that harms national coexistence. Personal attacks by government supporters on journalists and columnists abound: in a black-and-white environment, raising questions, presenting data, and highlighting nuances becomes extremely difficult. Part of the opposition, undoubtedly, also contributes to the negative atmosphere with its attitude.

Governmental pedantry was also evident during the tour. It was celebrated that today “we can be partners on the same level, as equals” with developed countries (as if we had not enjoyed dignity in our external relations before this government), and it was also asserted that “the world needs Chile,” as if there were no alternatives to the national contribution to the energy transition, and as if those resources were the exclusive source of Chile’s soft power. In Switzerland, we again asserted arrogantly that we have no double standards regarding principles, although we clearly do. We pride ourselves on our commitment to Human Rights, yet regarding Cuba, the government maintains a firm silence despite the repression and hunger that are ravaging that people. Regarding Venezuela, where disrespect towards Chile has increased in the past year, the government admits only to an “authoritarian drift” and issues notes of protest, even though international institutions report a dictatorship committing crimes against humanity, in alliance with transnational crime.

As for China, there is nothing to say. What about the genocide of the Uyghur ethnic group reported in the UN work of former President Bachelet? What about the persecution of the Chinese diaspora in other countries, including ours? What about the undue pressure that Codelco and SQM have received regarding the lithium agreement? What about the Chinese control of electricity transmission in Chile resulting from the lack of filters on foreign investment? Zero reaction.

We also boast of our support for international law, but this applies to some situations and not others. In our own region, the administrative annexation of two-thirds of Guyana by Venezuela did not elicit a reaction from the Chilean government, but support for Palestine is profound, including arguments in the two legal proceedings before The Hague, while for Ukraine, there are only words of support for the principle of territorial sovereignty.

Regarding our own border, the commitment seems much weaker: the violation represented by an Argentine construction on Chilean territory is minimized as a “mistake.” The lack of strategic vision regarding neighboring and regional matters could cost us dearly.

The only survey on perceptions of foreign policy and security conducted in Chile over the past five years (IPSOS-AthenaLab) clearly shows, as a consolidated trend, that the primary concern of Chileans is the fight against organized crime and the porosity of borders, issues that Chileans see as intrinsically linked. Ignoring this wake-up call, which also extends to foreign policy, and instead indulging in self-indulgence and narcissism is a recipe for major misunderstandings.

A paradigmatic case of the level of unforgivable oversights was that of the former Ambassador to the United Kingdom, and now it is that of the Chilean Ambassador to Spain, who seems to understand his job (for which he receives around 13 million pesos monthly) as a constant posting on social media, trivializing a role that should inherently be discreet.

The necessary action for foreign policy to regain substantial prestige and overcome these deep weaknesses is a course correction: a “call to order” will have no effect.

It would mean, at a minimum, purging the Foreign Ministry of yes men and yes women, young and old who have received high responsibilities without sufficient merit; operating without the presidential advisory on foreign relations, which remains under the charge of the former spokesperson for Chile without FTAs; and reinstating in the Foreign Policy Council the knowledge of senior specialists who can bridge with Defense (two portfolios that speak too little), such as the former commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces, who were excluded by the current administration without even being notified of their departure.

Otherwise, in the eyes of public opinion and other governments, the decline of the Chilean Foreign Ministry will continue. Paz Zárate Senior Researcher, AthenaLab Source:Ex-Ante.