Intelligence and Its Failures
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WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?
Intelligence is “useful information, in that it is a product oriented toward a purpose, where the information collected and processed is the ongoing input for decision-making.”[1] Intelligence involves a cyclical process through which information obtained from various sources and methods is analyzed and converted into valuable products for the organizations it serves.
Intelligence requires entities that plan the process, means for searching and collecting information, sources from which to obtain data, analysts who process and integrate the information, and methods for disseminating the results so that they can ultimately be used by decision-makers.
WHAT CONSTITUTES AN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM?
Intelligence systems or architectures are, in essence, a set of specialized organizations focused on various types of intelligence. Thus, we will have strong organizations in human intelligence, others in communications intelligence, signals intelligence, satellite imagery intelligence, etc. Recently created organizations are related to open-source intelligence, as well as those concerning social media intelligence. In summary, they possess a center of gravity and specialization in the search and processing of information to be integrated, analyzed, and as a result, convert that information into intelligence useful for the political decision-making process in the case of state intelligence. This involves having a series of experts in different fields of knowledge, as many topics have an interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and multidisciplinary nature.
WHO DOES INTELLIGENCE SERVE?
Intelligence serves decision-makers; in this case, the strategic intelligence of the state serves the highest authorities of the nation, particularly the Executive Branch. For this purpose, intelligence requires an efficient and robust system that coordinates and integrates the various services and efforts to achieve better results in addressing threats, risks, and opportunities. In any consolidated democracy, the intelligence function is fundamental for the governance of the state; it is essential for facing the challenges of an uncertain international system and the internal dangers of a country, always improving the quality and timeliness of decision-making.
WHY DO INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS FAIL?
Intelligence is a human activity that has existed for millennia, in which error—like in any action involving people—is always a possibility, whether from the means of search or from their processing and interpretation. Errors or failures are inevitable. What is truly important is to reduce them as much as possible.
On the other hand, the function and activity of intelligence have always benefited from technology and the ingenuity it provides in the search for information. It is true that intelligence systems today are being favored in this regard, as well as in processing through artificial intelligence. But technology is a double-edged sword, as it is available to the intelligence system, it can also be used by any organization that, having the economic means, develops and acquires it, even at an individual level.
The trap of technology is to rely too much on the possibilities it offers us, without considering that it is also used by adversaries, maximizing their capabilities and forgetting that, in this area, the only type of intelligence that offers us better chances of understanding intentions is human intelligence. Additionally, specialized literature indicates that 97% of available information comes from open sources and 3% from secret sources. It is on this 3% that human intelligence can make a difference.
Another area where intelligence errors often reside is at the intersection between the intelligence system and the political system it serves. The users of intelligence are at the political level, and they often determine not only the center of gravity for intelligence search but also which intelligence—as processed information—receives greater attention. It is in this interaction where strategic intelligence problems or failures also reside.If we analyze the report or investigation of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, we will find that the inability to prevent these attacks was more a systemic failure of the entire state
[2], than an intelligence error. Regarding intelligence, there was indeed information disseminated throughout the U.S. intelligence system. Amy Zegart points out that there were 23 instances that could have stopped the attacks[3]. These instances and evidence were spread throughout the intelligence system, which by doctrine privileged compartmentalization of information over sharing information. The reasons point to the idea that “information is power,” as Francis Bacon stated many years ago. Additionally, the number of specialists dedicated to human intelligence to deal with this threat was notably diminished. Moreover, there were FBI reports that anticipated the nature of the attack, but they remained in analysis within the respective bureaucratic chain of command of the organization[4].In intelligence, every surprise or strategic failure originates from a series of interconnected events that were not observed or whose attention did not attract a specialist. A contrary example occurred during the Soviet missile crisis in Cuba in 1962. At that time, a U.S. analyst was able to identify in a photograph taken by a spy plane a configuration of facilities shaped like the Star of David, which was the model for Soviet nuclear missile installations. This was undoubtedly an intelligence success.Another example of an error in intelligence systems is found in the Syrian, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Iraqi attack against Israel in 1973, on Yom Kippur. This military offensive reversed the successes of Israeli intelligence during the Six-Day War in 1967. Fifty years ago, in the Sinai Peninsula—then under Israeli control—Egypt subjected the Israelis to constant military exercises, acclimating them to the point that they were perceived as routine. Undoubtedly, within this context were signs of increased troop movements being deployed to the border. This was initially interpreted as just another exercise and not as a genuine attack in full execution. Here, intelligence also failed to detect the articulation of a common front against Israel’s security, with the strategic deployment of military means to its border on at least three fronts simultaneously. The level of penetration of human intelligence, at least in Egypt and Syria, no longer had the level of infiltration in high political and military circles that existed prior to 1967.
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS FAIL?
When errors in intelligence systems occur to such an extent that they impact national security through the loss of numerous lives and high material costs, the first thing that should normally be done by the political level housed in the legislative chambers is a complete investigation to determine the causes and errors made, in order to improve procedures, training, doctrine, and equipment of the national intelligence system. What should never happen—even in countries that do not have a robust intelligence system—is to do nothing and allow events to go uninvestigated. This is the best recipe for another disaster to occur.
Similarly, another effect in this type of crisis is that it affects not only intelligence but everything related to national security. Examples of this include the modifications in the national security structure in the United States already mentioned, as well as intelligence errors in the United Kingdom and Spain in detecting and preventing terrorist attacks in the first decade of the 21st century, both in London and Madrid. In both cases, it is relevant to highlight that these attacks led to the creation of a national security architecture in both countries, where the intelligence system was integrated as a significant part of that comprehensive system.
In this regard, it is surprising that in the case of October 18, 2019, and after four years, a special commission has not been established in the National Congress to investigate the possible causes, as well as the potential errors of the national intelligence agencies responsible for this task or other decision-making levels. From this, it is not surprising that little progress has been made in improving the state intelligence system, much less in triggering the creation of a national security agency.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Given the current challenges of the international concert, there is an urgent need for a national strategic intelligence system that serves the purposes of the state.
- Such a system does not operate in a vacuum, but in the context of a national security architecture, of which it is an essential part.
- Catastrophic events like those analyzed must trigger a review and changes in the entire structure and levels of intelligence of the state (political, strategic, order and security, etc.).
- In the case of Chile, there has been no review and reform of the intelligence system, despite events such as those that began on October 18, 2019, the existence of numerous transnational criminal organizations, and the rise of internal terrorism as reported by international organizations. Given the current reality, a prompt review and implementation of a robust intelligence system and a national security architecture in line with the times and what citizens demand is imperative. Only in this way will we be better prepared to face risks, threats, and also to detect opportunities.
- John Griffiths
Head of Studies, AthenaLab
Marcelo Masalleras
Researcher, AthenaLab
October 19, 2023
DOWNLOAD DOCUMENT
Athenalab. Working Document No. 3 “Proposals for a New National Intelligence System” . August 2019. Available at:http://www.athenalab.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/athenalab_doc_3.pdf [2]
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-107srpt351-5.pdf[3]
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/israels-intelligence-disaster [4]
